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A.  PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Bilateral relations between Latvia and Russia cannot be understood other than 
within its specific historical context, comprised of more than eighty years of uneasy 
puzzles, conflicts, and attempts for reconciliation. Two world wars and two revolutions, 
memories about ruthless crimes against the population as well as profound rhetoric about 
value differences create puzzles of policies that are deeply rooted in history. The 
difficulties of contemporary bilateral relations lead us to search for an explanation of the 
development of Latvian-Russian relations. How does anyone find the most plausible 
explanation concerning the nature of these relations, and is there a way to predict the 
future of these relations?  
The security environment around the Baltic Sea over last three years has changed 
fundamentally. Three Baltic States – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia-- occupied by the 
Soviet Union from 1940-1991, became members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in spring 2004.  
The desire to be a member of the transatlantic community simultaneously 
excluded political identification with the Soviet past and meant weakening the political 
and economic ties with Russia, the anchor of the Soviet Union and its successor. 
Therefore, throughout the 1990’s, discussions about how to build relations between the 
two states and what political goals were to be achieved were an important part of the 
political debate within Latvia and Russia. Moreover, this discussion has been reciprocally 
important since the establishment of the Latvian state in 1918 and, traditionally, bilateral 
relations have been an important area of concern for politicians in both states. 
The enlargement of NATO and the EU was expected to serve as an impulse for 
positive changes in relations between Latvia and Russia. After 2004, however, these 
relations had a tendency to deteriorate, reaching a state of regular insults between 
political leaders. The foundation of fundamental discrepancies between Latvia and Russia 
derive directly from the interpretation of consequences of World War II, namely, a legal 
and political dispute over the interstate border, and the status of the non-Latvian 
population in Latvia. At the current stage both states are inclined to diminish profound 
2state of “negative stability,” but not the dysfunctional nature of bilateral relations.  At the 
same time, as will be argued, the reasons for enhancing a dialog are not being pursued 
through the genuine interest of both states to seek compromise over actual bilateral 
problems. In fact, both states are trying to maneuver using means of power and 
persuasion to achieve their respective goals. 
The topic is very significant for three reasons. First, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union both neighbors had all necessary preconditions for political and economic 
cooperation that would contribute for promoting the security and well-being in the Baltic 
States and around the Baltic Sea. Seeking for common positions in regional and global 
security matters, however, appeared to be difficult to be successful. Especially after 
Latvia joined NATO and the EU, seemingly hopeful prospects for cooperation vanished 
in the course of political debate. The legacy of the Soviet regime left both states not only 
with unsolved legal and political problems, but also with feelings of mutual resentment. 
Second, any impediment to cooperation between Latvia and Russia after the 
enlargement of NATO and the EU has potential to become an impediment of cooperation 
between these organizations and Russia. From this perspective, normalization of relations 
is in the interests of all European states and NATO allies. 
Third, there have been many disputes about the nature of Latvian and Russian 
discrepancies as they were based in cultural differences between Latvians and Russians. 
The effect of domestic political culture and traditions of decision-making in the sphere of 
national security seem not researched enough to draw these conclusions, but it is 
important to test existing practices and link them to theoretical approaches.   
B.  ARGUMENT AND MAJOR QUESTION 
This research rests on the thesis that relations between Latvia and Russia, after 
NATO and the EU enlargement, are still based on strong mutual historical biases that are 
consequently produced by domestic politics and limit the flexibility of the formulation 
and implementation of state foreign policy in regard to each other. Thus, it has been 
demonstrated how issues from the past, if unmastered politically, can create situations in 
which political and economic cooperation between states becomes problematic. At this 
moment there is no sector of interstate relations that is not be influenced by cooperation 
problems, caused by unsettled issues of the past. Among these disagreements, one issue, 
3however, has taken central place, namely, the interpretation of the consequences of 
World War II. The victory of the Allies over Nazi Germany did not bring freedom for all 
nations in Europe. The “iron curtain” not only divided spheres of influence in Europe, it 
also doomed the nations of Central Europe to long suffering under the communist regime. 
For Latvia the end of World War II meant numerous crimes against its population, 
including repressions, deportations, and massive emigration of Latvians to the West. 
Moreover, Soviet policy left behind even more complications; for example, the transfer 
of the Abrene district – a Latvian territory-- incorporated into the Russian Federation in 
1946. After Latvia regained independence in 1991, this issue developed into a territorial 
dispute between the two states.  
The recognition of occupation is another extremely important issue for Latvian 
historical consciousness and even sovereignty of the state in the future, due to its link to 
the continuity of the state. It must be said, however, that legal discussions have been 
heavily influenced by political debate within both states, which has overshadowed legal 
rationale and thus possibilities to find a common solution based on principles of 
international law. 
Having said this, this thesis argues that the border dispute and whole complex of 
Latvian-Russian bilateral relations is unlikely to be solved without a mutual political 
commitment and compromise. 
To explain this statement the following questions will be addressed:   
1) Why at the beginning of the 21st century do the majority of foreign policy 
issues between Latvia and Russia find their roots in interpretations of the 
outcome of World War II?  
2) How do domestic audiences and political institutions influence foreign policy 
formulation in Latvia and Russia after NATO and EU enlargement? 
3) Has Russia changed its foreign policy towards the Baltic States from treating 
them as former constituencies of the periphery of the Empire to acknowledging 
them as full-fledged members of the European community? If so, is Russian 
foreign policy irreversible? 
4) Do disagreements between Latvia and Russia have or have the potential to 
cause a significant impact on broader security agendas in Europe? 
4C.  METHODOLOGY 
Foreign policy of any state must be analyzed through the lens of domestic 
political and social institutions structures, beliefs and constructed identities, and rhetoric 
of the political elite. Therefore a general framework of this thesis will be analyzed from 
the theoretical approach of constructivism, even though some policy arguments can be 
better explained by looking also in the paradigms of neorealism and liberal 
institutionalism. 
For this thesis a number of primary sources such as the official documents of the 
Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation (laws, regulations, bilateral and 
multilateral agreements will be reviewed, as well as the conventions, concepts and drafts 
of official documents); interviews with the officials and academics will also be presented 
and analyzed. Secondary sources will include books on regional studies of the security of 
the Baltic States and the history of WWII and its consequences; articles and publications 
on the history of defense cooperation within the Baltic Sea region as well as information 
from news agencies and Latvian, Russian, and global media. 
The thesis consists of an Introduction, three chapters of description of Latvian-
Russian political relations and policy formulation, the case study of the Latvian-Russian 
border treaty, and the Conclusion. 
Chapter II deals with the framework of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations. The 
chapter is divided into two parts. The first part takes a look into the most widely used 
international relations paradigms – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and 
constructivism. While the general conclusion deriving from the theoretical overview is 
that none of these paradigms is able to explain Latvian-Russian relations sufficiently, the 
constructivist approach provides the most suitable framework to explain the development 
of these relations.  
The second part of this chapter deals with Latvian-Russian relations in the context 
of European security. The influence of the EU and NATO enlargement on the security 
environment, eliminating the “gray zone” of European security, has significantly 
improved stability in the Baltic Sea region. For the first time in history, NATO expanded 
into territory occupied by the Soviet Union for fifty years. The interests of Russia to 
increase its influence on the European security environment are emphasized through 
5exploitation of lack of coherent policies among the EU members. There are also other 
problem areas, such as European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) or Treaty of Conventional 
Forces in Europe, where Latvia and Russia do not find similar opinion. 
Chapter III analyses Latvian policy towards Russia. The main issue on the 
Latvian agenda is the recognition of occupation by the Soviet Union, which consists of 
the Latvian-Russian border problem, the recognition of state continuity and the issue of 
compensation for damage caused by the Soviet regime. While the border problem will be 
analyzed separately, the issue of restitution for the occupation and the evaluation of the 
most important questions of history will seek to answer, why the Latvian society still 
finds the basis of the current political agenda in the events of sixty years past. The culture 
of national security decision making is influenced by factors such as a lack of domestic 
coherence concerning attitudes towards Russia and the schism within Latvian political 
leadership about the perspectives of cooperation. Hence, in order to illustrate how 
domestic disagreements impede formulations of foreign policy in regard to Russia, the 
chapter deals with the most important components of the daily political agenda of Latvian 
political leadership of both right and left wing politics.     
Chapter IV deals with Russian foreign policy towards Latvia, which is composed 
of three major areas, namely, the humanitarian problems and critics of Latvian policies 
against Russian speaking population; the economic interests of Russian energy 
enterprises in the Latvian transit companies and the political interests that derive from the 
potential increase of energy dependency of Latvia; and finally the criticism of Latvia 
concerning its evaluation of the outcome of World War II and the attitude towards the 
soldiers of the Red Army and the  Latvian legion of Waffen SS. The chapter argues that 
the negative attitude of Russian foreign policy makers derives directly from the 
perception among their elite that Latvians do not recognize Russia as a great power and 
do not respect the values and interests deriving from the complexity of Russian historical 
heritage. The Russian population is also explicitly negative in its perception about Latvia 
and considers it one of the most hostile and most dangerous countries for Russians. 
Russia also considers the Latvian quest for “historical justice” unrealistic. Therefore, the 
Russian political elite is pursuing the policy which embraces economic coercion against  
 
6Latvia. In general, Russia is not interested in cooperation with Latvia if this cooperation 
does not create a simultaneous political gain for strengthening Russian positions in the 
realm of the former Soviet Union.        
Chapter V is the case study of the unsigned Latvian-Russian border treaty in the 
context of the larger border dispute. This problem has “Janus face” that is comprised of 
mutually linked judicial and political disputes in which both states express opposite 
opinions. As argued in this chapter, the problem of the border treaty impedes the whole 
spectrum of cooperation between Latvia and Russia. In essence, the Latvian argument is 
that the dispute should be solved according to the provisions of international law that 
would include the reassurance of Latvian state continuity. Russia claims the need to agree 
on the status of current interstate borders and sign the treaty without any preconditions. 
Therefore, the chapter discusses the positions of both states and argumentation for 
decision making in terms of the link between domestic and foreign policies in both states.     
The Conclusion provides an overview of findings of the thesis and discusses 
possible solutions and conditions in which Latvian-Russian relations could leave behind 
the mutual resentment from the past and concentrate on mutually beneficial cooperation, 
both economically and politically.  
 
7II.  INTERESTS AND VALUES: FRAMEWORK OF LATVIAN-
RUSSIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 
A.  NEOREALISM, INSTITUTIONALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE 
SCOPE OF LATVIAN-RUSSIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 
By the beginning of the 21st century Latvian-Russian relations comprise a 
complex puzzle of problems embedded in the uneasy heritage of Soviet policies and 
discourse of post-Soviet development. Political objectives of Latvia have been directed 
towards integration in the EU and NATO. Russia has struggled with seeking its identity 
in the global and European security environment. 
Scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye pointed out that “contemporary world 
politics is not a seamless web; it is a tapestry of diverse relationships. In such a world, 
one model cannot explain all situations.”1 Thus, none of the theories of international 
relations is able alone to explain all layers of relations that exist among political actors. 
The contemporary international relations is therefore a mixture of “rationale and 
rationalization, systematic presentation and symbolism that become so intertwined that it 
is difficult, even for policymakers themselves, to disentangle reality from rhetoric.” 2 
These categories do not all apply to any one theory: “rationalization” is a variable of 
institutionalist theories, while symbolism applies to constructivism.  
It is necessary to look on Latvian-Russian bilateral relations from the perspective 
of all three most widely used international relations paradigms, namely, neorealism, 
liberal institutionalism and the approach of constructivism, because  each of them 
explains some part of these relations. At the same time, even if realism and 
institutionalism present strong cases in some areas of Latvian and Russian foreign 
policies, these theories fail to explain the roots for the formulation of interests and values 
of respective states. Therefore, constructivism, even though it does not describe all 
aspects of relations between the two states comprehensively should be considered the 
most explanatory theory for Latvian-Russian relations. 
                                                 
1 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1977, 4, a similar statement has been expressed by Stephen Walt in 
International Relations: One World, Many Theories, Foreign Policy, No.110, Special Edition: Frontiers of 
Knowledge (Spring, 1998), 30.  
2 Ibid., 5. 
8In order to explain the framework of relationship between Latvia and Russia, this 
chapter deals with most important assumptions of neorealism, institutionalism and 
constructivism, as well as the European context of Latvian-Russian relations, and the 
importance of motivation for policies of both states in terms of interests and values that in 
both cases draw different pictures of the world and prospects for future cooperation.     
1.  Neorealism 
The core claim of neorealism (or structural realism) is that in the international 
system the main actors – states – compete for power in the environment, where there is 
no central authority; therefore the international system should be considered anarchic. 
More to the point, realists consider force an applicable and effective tool for 
implementation of policy. They also admit the existence of a hierarchy of security 
agendas in world politics, and on the top stand issues of military security.3 
For realists, the increase of power availability results in expectations that states 
will use power in order “to expand its sphere of domination, whether for security, wealth 
or other motives.”4 From this perspective, if interests contradict norms of morality, 
interests must prevail. Indeed, the reviving Russian economy sends a signal that the 
availability of resources will be translated into political capital, used to regain positions 
of great power. Sentimentalism does not play a role here. At the same time Latvia, albeit 
a much smaller state, has also grown economically and politically stronger, especially 
during last five years, and currently is part of the most powerful economic and military-
political alliances on the globe. If the elimination of a “grey zone of security” in the 
Baltics supports the realist view that stability is achievable by power equilibrium – i.e., 
equal distribution of power in the international system, then current stability in the Baltics 
should be explained by the attempts of smaller states to balance Russian influence after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The stability, however, does not necessarily mean more security. Kenneth Waltz 
challenges the assumption that “stable states make for a stable world.”5 Even in the 
                                                 
3 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1977, 23-24. 
4 Jack Snyder, One World, Rival Theories, Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec. 2004, No.145, 55. 
5 Kenneth Waltz, Reductionist and Systemic Theories, in Neorealism and Its Critics, Robert Keohane 
(ed.) Columbia University Press, 1986, 50.  
9situation that states would seek the stability without preconditions or political aims “all 
states would nonetheless remain insecure; for the means of security for one state are, in 
their very existence, the means by which other states are threatened.”6  
Alastair Johnston stated that “the neorealist paradigm assumes that states are 
functionally undifferentiated units that seek to optimize their utility. Usually utility is 
unproblematically defined as power, often as capabilities and resources.”7 The logic 
behind this is that both large states and small states have the same desire for the future, 
namely, to expand their capabilities and through this process, to improve their positions 
in the international arena. 
Realists emphasize the importance of the international system on the nature of the 
state, because the attributes and internal characteristics of the state, taken separately, do 
not provide sufficient insight into the prospective foreign policies of the state. Hence, “if 
the international-political outcomes are determined by what states are like, then we must 
be concerned with, and if necessary do something to change, the internal dispositions of 
the internationally important ones.”8 This assumption would lead to an explanation of the 
Latvian-Russian relations in the context of changes in the international system and 
particularly in changes of balance of power9 with emphasis on the weakness of Russia in 
the 1990’s. The prediction of realism therefore is that the increase of Russian power 
should result in renewed power claims in the territories of former Soviet Union, and 
possibly beyond that. This claim could be based on the nature of Russia as an aggressive 
state,   a claim supported by statements of Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and 
Kenneth Waltz. All scholars acknowledge that states could have certain peculiar 
characteristics, governmental patterns, political traditions and ideologies; hence, there 
will always be enmity or animosity toward other states.10  
                                                 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Reductionist and Systemic Theories, in Neorealism and Its Critics, Robert Keohane 
(ed.) Columbia University Press, 1986, 51.   
7 Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security, Vol., 19, No.4., 
1995, 35. 
8 Ibid., 48.  
9 Jack Snyder, One World, Rival Theories, Foreign Policy, Nov/Dec. 2004, No.145, 56. 
10 Kenneth Waltz, Reductionist and Systemic Theories, in Neorealism and Its Critics, Robert Keohane 
(ed.) Columbia University Press, 1986, 94. 
10
At the same time John Mearsheimer expressed the idea that states are not 
interested in balance of power concerns, because the only motivation for them is absolute 
hegemony.11 Hegemony makes the state busy only about its own gains; the balance of 
power, however, requires calculations about a state’s gains versus the gains of other 
states. According to this logic, power is not the means to survival, but “an end in itself.”12 
Realism diminishes the importance of international organizations and alliances; 
therefore, the realist assumption is that changes in alliance structures in Europe after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union should not be considered the decisive factor for analysis of 
states’ bilateral relations. To put it otherwise, the role of institutions is important as long 
as it corresponds to the needs of great powers, but cooperation among states should be 
seen as “derivative from overall patterns of conflict.”13 Moreover, for realists, the 
“alliance cooperation would be easy to explain as a result of the cooperation of balance of 
power, but system-wide patterns of cooperation that benefit many countries without being 
tied to an alliance system directed against an adversary would not.”14 In this situation 
Latvia and Russia should rely on “the means they can generate and the arrangements they 
can make for themselves.”15  
Neorealists argue that “structure is certainly no good on detail… and they can 
explain only important and enduring patterns.”16 Therefore realism cannot explain some 
important components of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations. First, what interests actually 
turn Latvia towards the European security system? Even if we pay attention to the 
possibility of some specific mindsets about Russia’s nature, pure reliance on the concept 
of interests would direct us towards the choice offered by irreducible interests. From the 
perspective of physical security, the aspirations of Latvia to be part of a European 
security system are based explicitly on the idea of self-preservation and a perception of 
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Russia as a threat. Russian perceptions of NATO as a threat should be reduced on the 
same concerns of physical security. While realism does not address the issue of choice in 
interstate relations, in the sphere of economics, Latvia would rather profit from closer ties 
with Russia by using the concept of “bridge between Russia and the West.” In reality, 
though, Latvians are not mainly concerned with the physical security of their state.17 
Even when throughout the 1990’s Russia threatened to invoke economic sanctions 
against Latvia due to its policies against Slavic minorities, Latvia remained on track 
towards Europe, regardless of the decrease of oil transit and obstacles for bilateral trade. 
Hence, the irreducible interests and desire to survive in a secure environment actually 
cannot explain the importance for Latvian policy “to return in Europe” after fifty years of 
the Soviet occupation.    
Second, if we believe that animosity between Russia and Latvia is embedded in 
the international system and in the nature of Russian policies, we should question why 
the same type of behavior cannot be observed within  Russian relations with other states 
in the previous Soviet bloc system such as Hungary and the Czech Republic. By the same 
principle we cannot explain why Latvia and Estonia constantly have more problematic 
relations with Russia, than, for example, has neighboring Lithuania. If other variables 
such as position in international system and internal characteristics do not differ much, 
Russians should be expected to treat these states similarly because of their being previous 
Soviet satellites. This is not the case, however, and Russia pursues a policy that is 
directed towards diversification of bilateral relations with neighboring countries. 
Third, the whole NATO enlargement process is unnatural for realists, because 
with some exceptions, newcomers in NATO were militarily weak. In the case of the 
Baltic States the question about the potential defensibility of these states would be the 
most important factor before allowing Latvia to join NATO. The realist argument that 
Russia was too weak to resist NATO enlargement also does not seem plausible, as Russia 
did not resist the process, or bargain, or join the bandwagon. Therefore, explanations for 
the Russian position should be sought elsewhere, not in considerations of balance of 
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power. The political implications on changes within the alliance itself and formation of a 
new “policy community”18 are not even in the scope of realists, and they fail to explain 
the implications of NATO enlargement on Latvian-Russian relations.  
Actually, Latvian-Russian relations are by no means a zero sum game, contrary to 
realists’ claims. Latvia’s accession to NATO and the EU is not harmful for Russian 
irreducible interests. Quite a contrary, Russia has the most secured borders with the 
Baltic States. Hence, there are necessary preconditions for cooperation rather than 
exercise of power, and states should be interested in profiting from the stability and 
strengthening of their positions in the international system. The “integrationalist” 
development within the European security system is rather opposite to that of the unit 
level; the embracing of a more cooperative mode between Russia and the EU has had 
almost no positive effect on the Russian relations with Latvia as well as some other 
former communist bloc states. 
Realism, thus, falls short in explaining the nature of Latvian-Russian bilateral 
relations.  These shortfalls can be mainly attributed to determining what political interests 
these countries have, and what are sources of these interests. If realism could explain the 
nature of Latvian-Russian relations, we would see that the Waltzian argument that such 
characteristics as traditions of the states, ideology, and form of government are of less 
importance than the systemic order in which states found themselves. Thus, the 
distribution of capabilities among them should be considered as the most important 
variable. It is, however, not true in case of these relations; therefore we have to look to 
other theories of international relations.  
2.  Liberal Institutionalism 
The basic claim of liberal institutionalism is that progress in relations between 
states and nations is inevitable and that “trade and finance forge ties between nations, and 
democratic norms spread.”19 An indivisible part of the institutionalist vision on processes 
in the international arena is the belief that multilateral institutions facilitate international 
cooperation and diminish the prospects for conflict, because “in a world of multiple 
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issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and 
transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining 
is greatly increased.”20 As a rationalist theory, institutionalism claims that cooperation 
does not mean harmony, and confrontation still may happen.21 The motivation of the 
states to cooperate is still about self-interest, but in order to increase predictability and 
stability in the international system states voluntarily limit their actions within certain 
frameworks. It is important in this case to realize that relations between states do not 
eliminate conflict, but that the existence of institutions provides space for policy 
coordination and results in partial or total resolution of conflict.  
Cooperation, from an institutionalist perspective, leads to interdependence; the 
larger the interdependence in the system is, the less possibility there is for conflict. The 
situation of “prisoner’s dilemma” in which cooperation leads to relative gains as opposed 
to defection, is a typical reflection of rational partnership, because cheating in the 
international system is a short term policy, while cooperation is a long term incentive and 
yet rational in nature.22 From this perspective – represented by geopolitical changes in 
the Baltic Sea region and increasing stability in Latvia and other Baltic States – liberal 
institutionalism presents a very strong case. Not only have NATO and the EU facilitated 
the growth of democratic institutions and democratic practices in Latvian domestic 
political environment, the states around the Baltic Sea have been interlinked in the web of 
numerous frameworks of cooperation such as the Baltic Sea States Council, Council of 
Nordic and Baltic States, and also numerous regional cooperation projects among the 
Baltic States.23 The range of cooperation is also very broad, starting from environmental 
projects and extending to military cooperation. In some of these projects Russia 
participates as a full-fledged member. Even if we may expect that “militarily and 
economically strong states will dominate a variety of organizations and a variety of 
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issues, by linking their own policies on some issues to other states’ policies on the other 
issues,”24 the institutional framework provides a sufficient impediment to usurpation of 
power in the system, and unlimited aggression in the international environment is 
practically eliminated. 
It is mentioned by some scholars that neoliberal institutionalism has not played an 
important role in explanation of Russian foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.25 This statement contains substantial controversy. On one side, Russia is reluctant 
to accept the authority of existing international institutions when problem solving is 
required closer to the realm of the former Soviet Union. As it pertains to the Russian 
position towards conflict resolution in the Transdnestria or the Abkhazia, international 
involvement is not the most preferred among policy options. Russia tends to substitute 
existing international efforts with others, based on the framework of Commonwealth of 
Independent States, where Russia undeniably has taken political leadership.  
Alternatively, Russia has often pursued policies that facilitate involvement of 
international institutions toward solving problems or maintaining status quo, for example, 
Russian support of nuclear non-proliferation and the authority of the IAEA. Or, for 
example, Russia persistently attempts to internationalize the problem of the Russian 
speaking population in Latvia (and in Estonia), and to make it a problem of the EU. Even 
if the problem as such is dubious and reflects the rational self-interest for preservation of 
power in the Baltic region, the framework of European security institutions is exactly the 
arena where not only one side has the possibility to express concerns, but also the other 
side has an opportunity to defend itself and both can attempt to persuade others.  
The problem of institutionalism to explain Latvian-Russian relations lies in the 
persistent political impediment in the sphere of trade and economic cooperation. If liberal 
institutionalist claims concerning the separate functioning of economics (markets) and 
politics are correct,26  then economic cooperation between Latvia and Russia should not 
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suffer, or at least be little influenced by political discrepancies. Business interests for 
cooperation that delivers mutual gains would be observed. Instead we see economic 
policies of Russia inextricably linked to political relations, and even the most beneficial 
areas of cooperation are severely bound by administrative and bureaucratic procedures. In 
this situation, every political problem has the potential to jeoparde long term positive 
prospects and degenerate into a game of “chicken” – i.e., extremely destructive relations, 
where self-interest eventually disregards the role of cooperation. This problem is even 
more explicit in the context of overall improvement in cooperation between the European 
states and Russia.  
Even with the powerful presentation and influence of international institutions in 
the European security arena, Latvian-Russian relations stagnate especially in those areas 
where institutionalism promises the most success, namely, resolution of problems by 
closer cooperation. In Latvian-Russian relations the policy coordination is an unachieved 
goal between two states. At best we can locate only few areas in the whole spectrum of 
cooperation where governments have regular and productive contacts that result in 
cooperative and thus less confrontational behavior.27 
The essence of liberal institutionalism is not about prevention of conflict in the 
international system; it is about enhancement of understanding, trust and cooperation 
among actors within the system. The Latvian-Russian bilateral relations fail to succeed in 
these cases. Neither state entirely understands the motivation for other’s actions, nor there 
is trust among partners. The result is that cooperation is rather limited to periodic political 
contacts which do not result in significant improvements policy wise over time. Even 
though both states are members in the majority of European political and economic 
institutions, the solution of their relations remains largely their bilateral concern. 
Therefore, liberal institutionalism also fails to explain the framework of the bilateral 
relations between Latvia and Russia. 
3.  Constructivism  
At the top of the constructivist approach stands the assumption that there are multiple 
identities within every state, which form some specific social reality; the interests of the states  
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are defined according to these realities. Constructivists challenge the anarchy environment 
saying that “self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. 
Anarchy is what states make of it.”28 
According to constructivists, states usually look toward “balance of threats” 
contrary to the realist “balance of power.”29 By this assumption constructivists maintain 
that the perception of security has been constructed by the socially motivated 
assumptions towards threats. Hence, they emphasize the importance of values in which 
concepts of national interest take more priority, in which “principles, identities, norms of 
behavior or terms of discourse… shape preferences, actors and outcomes.”30 Therefore 
constructivists would seek the roots of bilateral problems as well as prospects for their 
solutions not in the distribution of power in the international system or in expectations of 
gradual improvement of institutional cooperation, but in interaction of multiple sets of 
values in both states. This interaction leads to understanding of motivation, and through 
this, towards an improved picture of perceptions and less hostile environment. This 
approach also leads towards seeking explanations for policy formulation into the realm of 
domestic agency and particularly into the role of the elite class – how its values and 
interests influence policy. As it is pointed out by one expert, “the elites are in a strong 
position not only to channel perceptions into domestic and interstate relations, but also 
deliberately or unintentionally to shape, manipulate and even create them.”31  
Nevertheless, at the point of the collapse of the Soviet Union, both states found 
themselves in categorically different positions. For the Latvian desire to be part of Europe 
and identification with European values was not disputable in society and within the political 
elite. Even more, Europe was the only alternative for everything experienced in the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, Latvia as part of Europe is not only a political and cultural option; it is also 
a synergy of European values. It is also obvious that Latvia’s integration into NATO and the 
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EU is not solely based upon broadly defined national interests. Latvia “re-joined Europe” as 
an integral part of a community of shared values, in which liberal democracy and free market 
matters. From this perspective Latvian policies are naturally pro-Western, either in the 
European or Transatlantic sense. 
Russia, on the other hand, discovered that after the geopolitical changes of the early 
1990’s the new state had gained sovereignty, but its former identity had disappeared entirely 
with its status. The quest for a new identity continues until this day; though the current 
leadership espousing the ideology of derzhavnost (great state) based on “a call to create [a] 
strong, paternalist and to some extent expansionist state” is hardly deniable.32 This approach, 
being close to “enlightened patriotism,”33 calls for a unique Russian  synthesis of values and 
interests in international politics, that does not, however, exclude cooperation and coming 
nearer to Europe. Therefore, the contrast to “Westernism” is foundational to the uniqueness 
of contemporary Russian identity, and instead of a desire to embrace value driven 
cooperation, Russia’s cooperation with European states is based on a mercantilist interest of 
cooperation in certain segments of economics and security. The contradiction between value 
driven foreign policy of Latvia and “unsentimental and realistic”34 interest of Russia are in 
conflict about fundamental conditions. The balance between values and interests will only 
then provide the agreement between states, when they will be in some equilibrium. 
It is also important to see Latvian-Russian relations from the perspective of changes 
of state and social institutions within both countries, because if “norms shape interests,”35 the 
changes within Latvian and Russian societies should point to the difference of value 
formation. Here also differences are important.  After regaining of independence in 1991, 
Latvia created a set of principally new state institutions such as civil service, separations of 
church and state, and uniformed services from the politics. Thus bureaucratic politics and 
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civil-military relations, although not without problems, were put in the “European 
perspective.”  Meanwhile in Russia institutional change has been by no means less 
impressive. New constitutional order and economic policies created new relations within 
Russian society. The important notion of freedom, for example, is one of the attributes of 
Russian Westernization and modernization. This, as observed by Sergei Medvedev, has 
always taken “the form of catastrophe”36 due to denial of past and existent societal culture. 
Therefore societal changes in Russia were bound by the need to govern the space with strong 
leadership that has led to “attempts to recreate a hierarchical vertical of post-Soviet space.”37 
Hence, Russian policies are driven not by any inherent national interests; these 
interests have been formed out of concerns about “right” and “wrong” concerning Russian 
attempts to persuade other former Soviet republics to keep close ties with Russian world. 
Those who reject “Russian right” (such as the Baltic States) do not have any other choice left 
than to be considered “wrong.” When we see that the Russian public in general sees Latvians 
as their greatest enemies in the world,38 the conclusion should be drawn that these sentiments 
inevitably will find manifestation in Russian policies. This assumption leads to understanding 
of policy making as a process, which corresponds to the ruling stream of values among the 
political elite and domestic society. Hence, interests can be shaped by the changes in 
domestic political values.39   
Even though constructivism seems to explain the basic problems of Latvian and 
Russian relations, it also has some shortfalls. For example, if we assume that relations 
between Latvia and Russia are driven by mutually negative perceptions, there is no clear 
answer what constructs and methods may be able to change the situation. Changing 
perceptions is the most difficult and lengthy process in the constructivist concept. At the 
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same time in liberal democracies the continuity of policies is not guaranteed, even if 
politicians would pursue such a desire. Moreover, expecting changes of perception as a result 
of interaction of values should not be overestimated, because this process does not 
necessarily bring common understandings of problems. As we see  in the Latvian-Russian 
case, living in one country for almost 45 years did not facilitate better understanding of 
motivation and identities in both countries remained rather contradicting. Therefore, the 
contrast created by different approaches  in the past (one of the sources of “right” and 
“wrong”) is able to impede prospects for cooperation even if rational assumptions for 
cooperation would suggest to institutionalize cooperation and pursue mutual gains.     
To sum up, none of these three paradigms of international relations can fully explain 
the nature of Latvian-Russian relations. The complexity of contemporary international 
relations do not allow for easy explanations of state relations. In order to understand these 
puzzles, we have to use and combine all theories of international relations that would include 
interests, values and institutions in the web of invisible and indivisible ties. 
B. LATVIA AND RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 
Notwithstanding the differences between Latvian and Russian views on the 
security environment in Europe and its development, both states had throughout the 
1990’s shared aspirations for cooperation and deeper integration with European 
institutions. Latvia and its Baltic neighbors Lithuania and Estonia were the first states to 
leave the Russian sphere of influence; the notion of integration, however, was understood 
differently in Riga and Moscow. For Latvia, integration into the European security 
structures meant membership in the EU and NATO.40 For Russia, aspirations for 
cooperation were directed more to cooperation “in the economic, political, humanitarian, 
security and military fields.”41 Russia considers the EU one of the its most important 
political and economic partners and will pursue the development of intensive, persistent 
and long term cooperation, which do not consist of conjuncture fluctuations.42 
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The agenda of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations only partially corresponds to the 
agenda of the EU-Russian relations, and consists of a few sets of political and economic 
issues. The most important of them is the problem of economic cooperation, impeded by 
Russian inclinations to acquire the Latvian energy transit enterprises. Russians especially 
emphasize the issue of human rights of the Russian speaking population in Latvia. The 
most sensitive part of the bilateral agenda is the issue of an interpretation of the past that 
includes the recognition of Latvian occupation, the border dispute between both states, as 
well as the attitude of Latvian authorities towards the direct participants in World War II. 
It is important that these questions are emphasized differently by both states. 
Recent EU-Russian relations have developed a primary agenda that includes  
energetic cooperation and easement of visa restrictions, as well as secondary agenda 
areas such as transit from Russia to the enclave of Kaliningrad and, as emphasized by 
Russia, the “humanitarian situation in Latvia and Estonia.”43  
In terms of economic cooperation, Russia and the EU are the important trade 
partners; more than half of all Russian trade takes place with the 25 members of the EU. 
The energy sector is the largest sector of economic cooperation, comprising 20 percent of 
European oil imports and more than 40 per cent of gas imports.44 Such a trade structure 
makes Russian-European relations asymmetric, because importing raw materials, 
Europeans export back to Russia consumer goods and industrial products. At the same 
time, as stated by some scholars, “foreign economic policies touch more domestic 
economic activity than in the past, blurring the lines between domestic and foreign policy 
and increasing the number of issues relevant to foreign policy,”45 Lately Russia has been 
interested in increasing its presence in the European energy market by purchasing energy 
enterprises. In this case the Latvian situation is similar to the broader European one, by 
which the EU states are reluctant to turn their energy supplies and distributors into the  
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hands of Russian-owned businesses. This reluctance caused Putin’s statement that Russia 
feels endangered in European energy markets and therefore might consider other 
directions for cooperation.46 
The EU-Russian agenda regularly goes beyond the question of cooperation into 
the prospects of integration. This idea is behind the formation of common spaces of 
economic cooperation, freedom, justice and external security agreed upon during EU-
Russia summits in 2003 and 2005. Moreover, the National Indicative Program (NIP) 
directly speaks to this issue: 
Support to the further integration of the EU and Russian economies is an 
essential component of the NIP, aiming to help removing non-tariff 
barriers to trade and investment through the progressive approximation of 
relevant Russian legislation with the acquis communautaire.47 
The unknown variable here is that the understanding about such agreements is 
different among the EU member states, and the coherence of this position with that of the 
European Commission and Russian leadership. The lack of coherent European position in 
regard to the implementation of economic cooperation emphasizes the institutionalization 
of EU-Russian relations rather than the political content. As stated by some analysts,  
the first, communitarian pillar (of the EU), is mostly governed by qualified 
majority voting while unanimous decision making prevails in the EU’s 
intergovernmental second pillar. Thus, trade and economy (first pillar) is 
separated from foreign policy (second pillar).48 
Therefore, the lack of positional unity among the EU states is extremely 
welcoming for Russia, because relations with France, Germany and Great Britain play the 
most important role for Russia, not only because these are the largest and politically most 
influential states in the EU, but because the agreement with these three, if achieved 
easily, can become a desired practice for Russian foreign policy makers. As pointed out 
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by one Russian analyst, “Russia is objectively interested in maintaining the current 
uncertain and unstructured security arrangement that took shape in Europe in the wake of 
the Cold War as long as possible – preferably until the economic upsurge in Russia 
expected by the middle of the next decade.”49 
There are other two political processes in which the EU and Russia are trying to 
develop some harmonization of cooperation, namely, the European Security and Defense 
policy (ESDP) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).  
In the context of ESDP, interestingly, the founding Latvian security policy 
documents do not give clear guidance where Latvian interests lay and which vector 
Latvian security policy is taking. For example, the National Security Concept emphasizes 
reliance on strengthening NATO capabilities and active participation in the formulation 
of EU defense policy. Where exactly Latvian interests appear in the Union’s defense 
policy development remains unexposed.50 The European context of Latvian defense 
policy after the EU enlargement, according to the current Defense Policy Concept still 
emphasizes cooperation with EU decisions, not participation in its defense policy 
planning and implementation. Nothing is said about ESDP in “Latvia in European 
Union” strategy51 or in the description of the Latvian position towards European 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.52 As observed by political scientist Žaneta 
Ozoliņa, analysis of these documents leave an impression that Latvian membership in the 
EU and NATO “was needed to change the security environment, but not as a long-term, 
multifunctional security working environment, that provides domestic stability.”53  
For Russia cooperation with the EU on security matters such as the fight against 
terrorism or Middle East developments such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or the Iran 
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nuclear problem takes the form of a triangle with the participation of the United States.54 
Therefore, the Russian interest in ESDP development and possible participation in 
civilian and military crisis prevention in particular, is not entirely clear. The cooperation 
with the EU in security matters strengthens the Russian position on the global stage, but 
whether Russians will be eager to cooperate more than to act exclusively according to 
their own agenda, has yet to be answered.  
In regard to ENP, Latvian and Russian interests intersect even more directly. For 
Latvia, the regionalization of security cooperation is well established, starting from early 
1990 when the Baltic States created their military cooperation projects.  The accumulated 
experience is now valuable enough to be used for integrating the states of Eastern 
Europe. Latvia, according to its foreign policy guidelines, is interested in assisting “states 
in between”55 in their transition efforts towards democratization and deeper political and 
economic integration, as well as facilitating shared values. The EU policy stipulates that 
the ENP is designed to give new impetus to cooperation with the EU’s neighbors 
following enlargement.56 In ENP practice though, cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova means facilitating the escape of these countries from the sphere of influence of 
Russia, which speaks against so-called “colored revolutions” in the post-Soviet realm. 
Furthermore, Latvia and Russia by nature disagree concerning the attitude towards 
Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus. Latvian Deputy of European Parliament Valdis 
Dombrovskis claimed that this status “makes Latvia visible in European politics.”57 
Latvia represents European interests in “the last dictatorship of Europe” in the moment 
when the EU position is to exercise maximum diplomatic pressure on the Belarus regime. 
This policy has been criticized by Russian leadership by statements that problems should 
                                                 
54 Viktor Kremenyuk, Changes in European Security: A Russian view, available online at the web 
page of European Security Forum at http://www.eusec.org/kremenyuk.htm  accessed on April 28, 2006. 
55 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova after NATO and the EU enlargement geopolitically are “states in 
between” Russia and these two alliances. See the detailed description of this concept in Oleksandr Pavliuk,  
Russia’s Integration with the West and the States “in Between,” in Russia’s Engagement with the West: 
Transformation and Integration in the Twenty-First Century, Alexander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble and Lilia 
Shevtsova, (ed.) M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2005, 185-205. 
56 See the web page of the European Commission at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf accessed on April 28, 2006. 
57 Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze, Rīga, Latvia, April 29, 2006. 
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be solved by inclusion, not exclusion.58 The Latvian ENP mission in Belarus is important 
for Latvian foreign policy and for European security and therefore has more positive 
gains, for example, increase of regional authority, than possible negative costs 
influencing Latvian-Russian relations.      
It would be wrong, however, to reduce Russian relations with European states 
only to the context of the EU agenda. There are also important relations between Russia 
and NATO. The last four years have brought this cooperation to the more 
institutionalized level by creating the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which facilitates 
partnership in fighting terrorism and political consultations on regional security issues. 
As it is stated by NATO, “practical cooperation, directed by the NRC and developed 
through various subordinate working groups and committees, is already generating 
concrete benefits in many key areas.”59 In this context Russian officials consider 
cooperation with NATO a success in creating new European security architecture. 
Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Glushko describes that 
there currently operate under the aegis of the RNC about 20 committees, 
working and expert groups…A special priority is forging cooperation 
under the aegis of the RNC in the struggle against terrorism (exchanges of 
information and advanced experience, training and practice exercises of 
antiterrorist units, and reinforcing the security of air and marine transport, 
the subway and other facilities of critical infrastructure).60 
These descriptions as well as other Russian sources do not speak about 
cooperation with the new members of NATO. Some Russian officials, on the contrary, 
have been rather unimpressed with the possible NATO military buildups in Poland and 
Bulgaria. Therefore, to consider NATO-Russian relations unproblematic is not accurate. 
Latvian political analysis and government documents also in this case do not 
address the cooperation with Russia within the NATO-Russia Council framework. The 
                                                 
58 See the statement of Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov at news agency LETA news report at 
www.leta.lv, April 28, 2006, accessed on May 21, 2006. 
59 See the web page of NATO at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html  accessed on April 
26, 2006. 
60 Alexander Glushko The Euro-Atlantic Vector of Russian Foreign Policy, available online at the web 
page of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/itogi/E9EC2DC520605B1FC32570E600427FFC  accessed on April 29, 2006.   
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military cooperation between both states has been traditionally inactive and is currently 
limited to isolated visits of officials within the larger NATO delegations and events. 
Eventually, in the context of European security, the area that concerns Russia 
most is the broader issues of arms control and disarmament. Russia points to the 
unwillingness of the Baltic States to sign the CFE Treaty. Russians are concerned that the 
Baltic States and Latvia in particular could become uncontrolled territories for the 
deployment of NATO forces. 
These disagreements are admitted also by the Latvian government. According to 
the provisions of the adapted CFE Treaty, it must be ratified by all signatories of the 
treaty in order to come into force.61 The biggest problem, according to the Latvian 
position, is Russian reluctance to sign the adapted version of the Treaty. Currently NATO 
members have developed a unified position towards Russia, which claims that 
“ratification by NATO Allies of the Adapted Treaty is awaiting Russia's compliance with 
adapted CFE flank provisions and continued fulfillment of its Istanbul summit 
commitments regarding withdrawals of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova.”62 
The Latvian Ministry of Defense considers the CFE Treaty “a cornerstone element for 
facilitating the openness and trust between European states; therefore Latvia is interested 
in accurate implementation of the treaty provisions, and is ready to sign the treaty 
immediately after the necessary procedures are implemented by Russian side.”63 
Russia maintains the position that all provisions of the adapted CFE Treaty have 
been fulfilled including withdrawal from Georgia that according to the agreement with its 
government will be completed by the end of 2008.64 Thus, the West imposes “double 
standards” on Russia, because link between ratification of the CFE Treaty and actions in 
Georgia and Moldova is taken out of the context of security process in Europe and is 
                                                 
61 The Agreement on adaptation of CFE Treaty was signed on November 18, 1999 in Istanbul, Turkey, 
see the detailed description of provisions of the treaty at the web page of the Monterey Institute of 
Internaitonal Studies at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/cfe.pdf  accessed on April 28, 2006. 
62 The position of the State Department of the United States towards CFE Treaty, online at 
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/11243.htm  accessed on April 28, 2006.  
63 Interview with Andžejs Viļumsons, Director of Defense Planning and Policy Department of the 
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, December 9, 2005. 
64 Speech of the Head of Russian delegation at negotiations in Vienna concerning the military security 
and arms control V. Chernov, Vienna November 22, 2005, available online at the web page of the Ministry 
of foreign Affairs of Russia at http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/dveuro  accessed on April 28, 2006.   
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therefore “ill-founded and counterproductive.”65 The discrepancies have resulted in 
statements about the possibility of Russian withdrawal from the CFE Treaty. 66  
C.   INTERESTS AND VALUES: WHERE WILL THE PENDULUM SWING? 
Having examined the main paradigms of international relations, it is clear that 
neither realism, nor liberal institutionalism nor constructivism is able to explain the 
nature of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations. At the same time it is also important to 
emphasize that constructivism seems closest to explaining the animosity, differing 
perceptions, and unfriendly policies that characterize Latvian-Russian relations. 
Therefore the approach of value driven interests seems applicable to the analysis of 
Latvian-Russian bilateral relations better than realism with its self-regarded interests of 
survival or neoliberal institutionalism with its concept of complex interdependence as the 
main components for policy formulation. From this perspective, it is important to   
explore domestic political development and its influence on foreign policy formulation in 
Latvia and Russia. Therefore, these developments will be analyzed in detail in the 
following chapters of the paper. 
In light of the domestic conditions, Russia still has to be considered a huge body 
with an unstable foundation and unpredictable nature. Even though Putin’s administration 
makes Russia stronger, for Latvia, as the immediate neighbor, there is still too much 
unpredictability and uncertainty. This is reflected by both states’ perceptions of the other 
that are neither true nor friendly. Uncertainty, however, does not derive from the nature 
of Russian state, but from discourse of the quest for Russian identity and interests in the 
global world that still continues.  
If “Russia’s integration with the European Union may well lead via Kyiv, Vilnius 
and Warsaw rather than directly via Brussels,”67 then the animosity between Latvian and 
Russian political elites is an important factor that prevents such integration. Therefore the 
                                                 
65 Speech of V. Chernov, Vienna November 22, 2005, available online at the web page of Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/dveuro  accessed on April 28, 2006.   
66 For example, in the statement on January 2006, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov directly 
linked such an option with the ratification of the Treaty by the Baltic States. Source: official information of 
the Ministry of Defense of Latvia, presented during the interview with Andžejs Viļumsons on December 9, 
2005. 
67 Ania Krok-Paszkowska, Jan Zielonka The European Union’s Policies Toward Russia in Russia’s 
Engagement with the West: Transformation and Integration in the Twenty-First Century, Alexander J. 
Motyl, Blair A. Ruble and Lilia Shevtsova, (ed.) M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2005, 153. 
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idea about the “economic integration 'spilling over' in political and eventually in security 
integration”68 is too idealistic and thus misleading in the particular context of Russian 
relations with the former satellites. Perception, then, will play a crucial role in future 
Latvian-Russian relations. The danger here should be expected from appearances of 
spirals of hyper-negativity among the elites – i.e., the situation in which the political 
leadership in both states is not able (or is not willing) to find a positive agenda that 
facilitates the changing perceptions of the neighboring nation’s society. Moreover, it is 
even not clear whether current Latvian-Russian relations are not in one such trap.    
In fact, Latvia and Russia are in a similar situation to opponents in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, where “each side tends to believe that any ‘good’ behavior by the opponent has been 
forced on him by situational factors and that opponent’s ‘bad’ behavior toward the 
respondent’s side springs from the opponent’s negative dispositions, not situational 
factors.”69 To paraphrase, positive development in these relations has a tendency to be 
explained by changes in partners’ dispositions (i.e., genuine willingness to cooperate) and 
negative development usually has been explained by situational factors (for example, 
impediments of domestic or bureaucratic politics).  
To sum up, it is obvious that for Latvia bilateral relations with Russia are more 
important than relations with Latvia are for Russia. This also means that the Russian agenda 
with the EU has the potential to influence Latvian-Russian relations more than Latvian ability 
to influence agenda setting in the EU towards Russia. The tendency of Russian foreign policy 
makers to develop the concepts of “good” EU and NATO partners versus “bad” EU and 
NATO partners should be considered worrying for establishing a coherent position in areas 
such as external relations, in the ENP as well as broader economic and political cooperation. 
Nonetheless, Latvian and Russian relations will not necessarily develop along the general 
lines of European-Russian cooperation because issues that are unique to Latvian-Russian 
relations do not generally fall into the purview of the EU agenda. The problems of Latvian-
Russian relations, however, if unsolved, have the potential to transform into problems on the 
scale of European-Russian relations.     
                                                 
68  Stephan De Spiegeleire, Recoupling Russia: Staying the Course Europe's Security Relationship 
with Russia available online at the web page of European Security Forum at 
http://www.eusec.org/spiegeleire.htm  accessed on April 29, 2006. 
69 Alexander George, Presidential decisionmaking in foreign policy, Westview press, Inc. Boulder, 
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III.  LATVIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARDS RUSSIA: THE INFLUENCE OF GHOSTS OF THE PAST 
A.  A SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
After the period of Soviet occupation was over, bilateral relations between Latvia 
and Russia were renewed in 1991. Starting from the first days of regained independence, 
the Latvian political elite and society at large found themselves at odds on historical 
issues of the consequences of World War II and fifty years of the Soviet governance in 
Latvia. This agenda has changed surprisingly little during fifteen years of independence. 
The controversies in interpretations of history in regard to diplomacy and military actions 
of Latvian and the Soviet officials from 1939 to 1946 spilled over from  a mere historical 
dispute to the political agenda, and played an important role in every cycle of Latvian 
parliamentary elections.  
The enlargement of NATO and the EU has changed the international system. 
Nevertheless, the foreign policy of Latvia towards Russia after these enlargements has 
not been significantly affected.  Foreign policy documents as well as government actions 
allow for very limited insights into the real intentions of the Latvian political elite 
concerning policy objectives towards Russia. The evidence from media reports, articles, 
and speeches provides a more complete picture of the sentiments and political culture 
determining policy options and choices.  These are bound by the hard choice whether to 
use history for political gain or to leave the historic resentments behind.       
The option that would prescribe the repudiation of history as a precondition of 
normalization of bilateral relations, however, should not be considered self evident in the 
case of Latvia. In regard to its past, the Baltic States by and large do not differ much from 
others in the former Communist block. The same dramatic choice between “whitewash 
and witch-hunt, amnesty and amnesia, justice and vengeance”70 has had continuity 
throughout the years after 1991.  As Tina Rosenberg stated, there is a ghost of the past in 
every European country. The KGB agents and process of lustration, crimes of the Soviet 
regime against the Latvian people, settlements of immigrants, territorial disputes and the 
role of Latvian soldiers under flags of foreign empires, are all Latvian “ghosts of the 
                                                 
70 Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts After Communism, Vintage books, A 
Division of Random House, Inc., New York, 1996, xviii. 
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past.” The extensive discussions about the 60 years old history have contributed to the 
schism within the Latvian society that is mirrored in the parliamentary composition. The 
reconciliation over the ideological positions and over the unmastered past seems hardly 
possible in the foreseeable future. Dominating the media and politics, issues such as 
demands for condemnation of occupation by Russia, the deadlock over the future of the 
Abrene district and the overall victimization of historical experience create an impression 
that Latvian society persistently “lives in the past.” 
This chapter deals with the link between domestic disputes over the issues of past 
and the formulation and implementation of foreign policy towards Russia. The chapter 
contains two claims. First, the Latvian foreign policy towards Russia is not formulated 
sufficiently and lacks coherence among the political elite. Without unity among the 
political actors concerning the objectives of foreign policy towards the eastern vector the 
actions of Latvian diplomacy will be heavily influenced by an ad hoc approach and thus 
much larger dependence on fluctuations in the systemic level of international relations. 
Second, the inability of political actors to reach a consensus on the historical heritage of 
the Latvian state impedes the formation of a consolidated and modern Latvian nation and 
reflects the implementation of solid foreign policy towards Russia. 
B.  DOMESTIC POLITICS AND DEBATE ON HISTORY 
Latvia is a typical democracy of Central and Eastern Europe with a broad 
representation of political parties in the parliament.71 Political actors in the parliament 
seem significantly divided by the ethnicity of the deputies.72 The absence of ethnic 
Russians politicians in the right wing political spectrum and its leading organizations on 
the domestic political stage conveys the image that they predominantly support leftist 
ideas – i.e., they favor strong government involvement in the economic processes and 
social egalitarianism, and, peculiar to Latvia, also closer relations with Russia. Usually, 
                                                 
71 The distribution of seats in the current Parliament of Latvia has been split as following: Right wing 
parties: Jaunais laiks (The New Era); Tautas partija (Peoples Party); Tēvzemei un Brīvībai (For Fatherland 
and Freedom). Centrist Parties: Latvijas Pirmā partija (Latvian First Party); Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība 
(The Union of Greens and Farmers). Left wing parties: ‘Saskaņas centrs” (Concord Centre), Par Cilvēka 
tiesībām vienotā Latvijā (For Human rights in United Latvia); Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija (Socialist party) 
Source: the web page of Parliament of Latvia at www.saeima.lv  accessed on February 8, 2006. Three 
parties: Tautas partija, Latvijas Pirmā Partija, Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība comprise the minority 
government as of June 2006.  
72 For the purpose of this thesis only the differences between non-Latvians and ethnic Russians have 
been drawn, al though the non-Latvian population is neither mono-ethnic, nor politically a monolith.   
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the social agenda for leftist movements is always more important than the “national.” In 
light of the persistent weakness of a social-democratic movement (here Latvia is rather an 
exception to other European states), the “leftists,” however, promote the political agenda 
of the non-Latvian population, which makes their leftist positions rather dubious.73 The 
programmatic goals of these parties are directed toward the cultural autonomy of 
Russians in regions or cities where they comprise a majority of the population; or towards 
the softening of citizenship law that would allow non-Latvians to become citizens of 
Latvia without the currently existing preconditions.74 Since “leftist” goals directly mirror 
the criticism of Russia against Latvia concerning the treatment of minorities and status of 
the Russian language, the right wing parties see the opportunity to accuse their political 
opponents of being unpatriotic and working in the interests of non-friendly states.75 
Moreover, active incorporation of former antagonists to Latvian independence reinforces 
the perception of leftist parties as hostile to Latvians and the state’s independence.76 
From this perspective the rhetoric of right wing conservatives and moderates concerning 
the threats to the Latvian language and Latvian ethnos as a whole was successfully used 
to mobilize the masses in the late 1980’s, and again appeared to be effective after Latvia 
                                                 
73 In order to support this statement the programs of political parties represented in the current 
parliament in the sphere of social policies have been compared. Actually, the political objectives in this 
case differ very little. All researched parties claim social support to the population as a moral responsibility 
of the state, thus making their ideological boundaries blurred. Therefore, the “leftist” social agenda must be 
seen in the context of its political aims, which is directed to the specific segment of the Russian speaking 
population. Data obtained from parliamentarian party web pages at www.jl.lv, www.tp.lv, www.pctvl.lv, 
www.tb.lv, www.lpp.lv Accessed on February 8, 2006.    
74 The current Citizenship Law demands knowledge of Latvian language, history and the national 
anthem of the Republic of Latvia as well as taking an oath of allegiance as mandatory requirements to 
receive Latvian citizenship. Additionally, the lustration limitations prevent from citizenship those non-
citizens, who have been in the service of KGB or participated in the Communist party after January 13, 
1991. Source: the web page of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of Latvia at 
http://www.pmlp.gov.lv accessed on February 9, 2006.    
75 With this argument the Latvian parliament recalled from the Foreign Relations Committee deputy 
Nikolajs Kabanovs, representing the party For Human Rights in United Latvia, accusing him of 
participating in creating the Russian documentary “Nazism in the Baltics” that defames the Baltic States for 
supporting revisionism of history. The deputy was also accused of releasing sensitive information from the 
meeting of parliamentarian committees to the Embassies of Russia and Belarus. Source: the web page of 
the Parliament of Latvia at  http://www.saeima.lv/steno/2002_8/st_060202/st0202.htm 
76 For example, Riga City Council deputy of For Human Rights in United Latvia Aleksandr Gilman in 
the discussion about education in Latvia claimed that the “Latvian state is the same kind of evil as Nazi 
state, however, weaker and more cowardly… The fact that we allowed its creation is an unforgivable 
mistake.” None of his party leaders protested or tried to soften his expressions. Available online at the web 
page of the Headquarters for protection of Russian schools at 
http://www.shtab.lv/forum/read.php?f=1&i=34181&tt=33966&d=&m=&g=#reply_34181%3Cbr%20/%3E  
Accessed on February 9, 2006.  
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joined NATO and the EU, even though by joining these two organizations Latvia has 
substantially promoted its security and the irreversibility of its statehood.  
Evidently, Latvia is constrained between diametrically opposites of right and left 
wing politics that leaves substantial influence on foreign policy formulation. Moreover, 
there is hardly any question that could be considered as the overarching goal for the 
whole spectrum of domestic politics. The priorities of the governing right/centric right 
coalitions from the very beginning were based on integration into European security 
structures (with the clear subtext of integration as the only alternative for residing in the 
hemisphere of the post-Soviet security system led by Russia) as well as the strengthening 
of the Latvian language and spread of “Latvianism” in society. Part of this inevitably is 
the political recognition of symbols of Latvian history. On the other hand, “Latvianism” 
is perceived among the Slavic minorities, as a threat to their ethnic singularity, and 
explains their reluctance to identify with the “Latvian” state. The mutual suspicion 
between “unpatriotic Slavs” and “Latvian ethnocrats” is the critical impediment within 
the Latvian society for the building of the modern political nation.  
Robert Putnam points out that institutions shape politics and that institutions are 
shaped by history; he also assumes that institutional performance depends on the social 
context of the environment in which political actors reside.77 Thus, it is obvious that the 
regaining of independence in Latvia in 1991 was a political goal which carried different 
promises for Latvians and non-Latvians. The native population did not pursue the 
establishment of a new state but the continuation of the one destroyed in 1940. The state 
constitution and many fundamental state laws were restored and gradually modernized. 
The principles of citizenship existing in 1940 were taken as the starting point for Latvian 
population of 1991, thus determining the restoration of Latvia as a nation-state, 
dominated by Latvians, as a linguistic-nation.78 The majority of non-Latvians expected 
the establishment of a state-nation, which would encompass other qualities, closer to the 
understanding of the French theologian Ernest Renan, who claimed that a “nation is a 
                                                 
77 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, 7-8.  
78 See reference on the concept of “linguistic nation” by Johan Gottfried Herder, in Ivan T. Berend, 
Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, University of California Press 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1998, 54-55. 
33
soul, a mental principle.”79 In other words, the difference between the two expectations is 
in the awareness by the ethnic groups of belonging to the particular nation or to the 
state.80 Thus, events in history happened to Latvians in their own nation; for non-
Latvians, to a large extent, the same issues carry the importance of mere historical facts 
attached to a particular territory. The interpretation of political events has not only 
different political but also different nationalistic backgrounds. 
C.  THE DOMESTIC DEBATE AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
1. National Security Concept 
Being a de facto part of the Soviet Union, Latvia until 1991 resided in the 
hemisphere that favored the approach of the offensive use of force that “was deeply 
rooted in Russia’s history of external expansionism and internal autocracy.”81 After 
regaining independence Latvia started to build its national security by creating a “national 
style of strategy.”82 If one takes Johnston’s argument that strategic culture comprises 
basic assumptions of the strategic environment and an operational level of strategic 
options, he has to answer the questions about the nature of the enemy and threats the 
enemy is posing from the point of view of Latvian national security and foreign policy. 
The current National Security Concept (NSC) is the most fundamental document 
in the sphere of national security in Latvia. It was adopted in January 2002 and claims 
that Latvia is an active participant in the security processes in Europe and is ready to take 
part in the operations led by NATO, the EU, or the WEU.83 At the same time “one of the 
most important parts of foreign policy of Latvia is partnership with the United States of 
America.”84 The Concept also underlines that Latvian security is based on the assumption 
that a threat to one of the Baltic States is a threat for all three; therefore cooperation 
                                                 
79  Isaiah Berlin, Between philosophy and the history of ideas, Izglītība, Riga, Latvija, 1998, 97.  
80 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, University of 
California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1998, 54-55. 
81 Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking about Strategic Culture, International security, Vol., 19, No.4., 
1995, 32. 
82 Reference to Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones in Alaistair Iain Johnston, Thinking about 
Strategic Culture, 1995, 32. 
83 National Security Concept, the web page of Latvian Transatlantic organization at 
http://www.lato.lv/html/nato/dokumenti/26000.html  accessed on December 15, 2005. 
84 Ibid. 
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between Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania is seen as crucial. The importance of Baltic 
cooperation has been explicitly pointed out also in the Defense Concept.85    
Emphasis is put on the political and economic cooperation with Nordic countries 
as well. While NATO and the EU are the main tools for successful implementation of 
national security with regard to Russia, Latvia cautiously expresses readiness to build 
relations that are based on pragmatism and mutual gains. The NSC does not, however, 
addresses the issue of recognition of occupation and the solution to the border problem 
with Russia, which is on top of the domestic political agenda. It leads to the conclusion 
that the strategic elite do not view these issues as important for national security.  So 
then, what kinds of threats are of importance for Latvia? The NSC includes those 
activities that are directed towards national interests and fundamental values of Latvia -- 
local and regional crises, ethnic conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and terrorism. The option of direct military attack on Latvia, however, is not seen as 
likely in the foreseeable future.86 It has to be mentioned that contemporary security 
challenges have only indirect implications for the Latvian-Russian bilateral agenda. It is 
rather a Russian claim that the Slavic minorities in Latvia have been treated in a way that 
leads to ethnic instability. This, however, has not proven right, even though theoretically, 
political adherence along ethnic lines has a potential to for internal instability.  
Nevertheless, in the perception of Latvian elite the most serious threats have 
traditionally been expected from Russia; Russian leaders have strengthened that belief by 
not putting much effort into changing its image of aggressive foreign policy towards 
neighboring countries. Consider the statement of Chief of Russian general staff, general 
Yuri Balyevsky who claimed that Russia cannot accept the political changes in the post-
Soviet realm that are encouraged by revolutions. In an interview to the Associated Press 
he went even further, saying that Russia has the right to defend its interests in “the post-
Soviet space” and “will do it.”87 Such statements, however, will not necessarily result in 
                                                 
85 The State Defense Concept, accepted by the Latvian Parliament on 13 November 2003, available at 
the web page of the Ministry of Defense of Latvia at http://www.mod.gov.lv/index.php?pid=13184  
accessed on December 16, 2005. 
86 National Security Concept, the web page of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia at  
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immediate changes to documents of Latvian national security, because they have been 
expressed by Russian political and military establishment persistently, and therefore their 
political value, caused by “political inflation”88 has dramatically fallen. The importance 
of such statements is in reinforcement of perception. 
2. Foreign Policy Concept 
Unlike in the sphere of national security, there is no adopted document in foreign 
policy; the current draft foreign policy guidelines are submitted in the Parliament of 
Latvia, and as of early June 2006 have not yet been approved. By and large, the current 
Latvian foreign policy during the 1990s was determined by the Foreign Policy Concept 
from 1995-2005. This policy document claimed the main policy goals to be integration of 
Latvia in NATO and the EU.89 In regard to Russia this document highlighted the 
objective  
to maintain normal bilateral relations with Russian Federation. They must 
be based on norms of international rights, international obligations and 
mutually beneficial cooperation.90    
In 2004 the main foreign policy goals were achieved by Latvian membership in 
an enlarged NATO and in the EU. The new foreign policy objectives, however, were not 
set immediately. Only by the end of 2004 did the Minister of Foreign Affairs submit new 
foreign policy guidelines to the government. In this regard, it would be right to claim that 
Latvian foreign policy functions without any clear political guidance; so are the policies 
towards the Latvian eastern neighbor – Russia. 
Since the purposes of this treatise do not include providing information about the 
Latvian view on prospects of cooperation, more detailed information can be found in the 
web sources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. Here, the chapter on bilateral 
relations with Russia states that  
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the value of this politician or political actor  decreases and generally  every  following  statement expressed 
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89 Foreign Policy Concept of Latvia 1995-2005, available online at the web page of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Latvia at www.am.gov.lv  accessed on April 20,2006. 
90 Ibid. 
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Latvia seeks to develop relations with the Russian Federation in 
accordance with the principles of international law and in line with one of 
its key foreign policy priorities - the maintenance of good relations with 
neighboring countries. Latvia sees its relations with the Russian 
Federation as taking the form of a constructive dialogue in the context of 
both bilateral and multilateral cooperation.91 
 Moreover, the foreign policy makers emphasize that Latvia pursues bilateral 
relations with Russia in three areas: political dialogue, direct contacts between ministries 
and other state institutions, and regional and cross-border cooperation.92 The same source 
of information is explicit about the priorities of the bilateral relations that are “signing of 
Border Treaty and resumption of the work of the intergovernmental committee.”93 None 
of these statements has ever appeared in the broader policy papers; hence we might 
consider that the political elite does not consider bilateral framework of relations with 
Russia a priority, and the formation of a political agenda in these relations has been left 
without careful engineering. In other words, the relations with Latvia are currently 
directed towards the institutional process, not a result. 
3. The Declaration of Cabinet of Ministers 
Another policy document that should be considered important for the political 
environment of Latvia is the Declaration on the Intended Activities of the Cabinet of 
Ministers, which is adopted by every Latvian government and serves as a list of political 
commitments of one particular government coalition. 
The current government has identified 43 tasks that have to be implemented by 
this government during its tenure. Out of them only two speak about  relations with 
Russia and even then in the context of “involvement in the further EU-Russia dialogue in 
line with Latvia's interests”94 and “employment of the advantages of Latvia's membership 
in the European Union in order to develop economic relations with Russia and other CIS 
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countries.”95 The other 41 span the range of the political agenda starting from adoption of 
new foreign policy documents to active membership in NATO and the EU as well as 
emphasis on the economic dimension of foreign policy, but none speaks about the 
importance  of demanding  a recognition of occupation or the border problem with 
Russia. Such ignorance is even harder to explain because the current government of 
Latvia emphasized the top importance of signing the border treaty with Russia and 
particularly emphasizes the necessity for diversification of energy resources in order to 
diminish dependence on Russian gas. 
The governmental ignorance of the “eastern vector” nonetheless has been 
challenged by the Latvian minister of foreign affairs, who said that the signing of the 
border treaty with Russia is one of the most important preconditions not only for Latvian 
foreign policy, but for the strengthening of the internal security of the EU.96 At the same 
time this important statement does not find a single reference in any Latvian foreign 
policy documents. 
In general The Declaration of the Cabinet leads to the conclusion that among 
Latvian foreign policy goals relations with Russia does not have a priority, which is 
explainable by the explicit orientation of Latvia towards transatlantic security structures. 
At the same time the unwillingness of the government to emphasize the most important 
issues of sovereignty such as the border problem and concept of state continuity (the 
latter being challenged by Russia) does not allow foreign policy formulation to enter the 
debate within domestic politics and society. 
One of the most prominent members of Latvian conservatives, member of 
European parliament Inese Vaidere, heavily criticized the inability of Latvian foreign 
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as the border treaty with Russia, ratification of ethnic minority convention, and overall 
formulation of Latvian interests in the EU. She claimed that Latvian foreign policy is “the 
vale of tears” and “feckless.”97 
In regard to the formulation of Latvian interests in the EU, concerns of Vaidere 
are by no means illegitimate. The strategy of Latvian interests in the EU is to leverage the 
support of the EU for signing the border treaty and the lifting of discriminating tariffs on 
railway transit before Russia becomes a member of the World Trade Organization.98 
Even so, this strategy contains a significant enumeration of Latvian value based interests; 
the most important problems in regard to Russia, such as political support for recognition 
of occupation and solution of the border problem are not mentioned.99 Since these issues 
should not be considered as only important for bilateral relations, the reluctance to pursue 
these interests in a wider European forum can only be explained by the actual inability of 
the political elite to transform existing values into coherent policies. 
D.  PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE 
As explained, the Latvian position towards Russia has not been integrated 
adequately into the domestic political agenda or the nature of Latvian-Russian relations.  
Official statements concerning bilateral issues are usually expressed in a diplomatically 
acceptable manner and with some exceptions do not cross the line of cautious criticism. 
The specific language of the elites, however, points to Russia as one of the major threats 
to Latvian security. This observation derives from directly observing and interpreting 
Russia’s behavior towards Latvia. As pointed out by scholars of strategic culture, 
“official language of discourse… excludes alternative strategies.”100  
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In the speeches of leading politicians in the sphere of national security we find 
references concerning the need to support and actively participate in the struggle against 
the global challenges of this century, because Latvian help to our allies will determine 
whether, as in the words of the Prime Minister, “Latvia will receive support in moments 
of hardship, or will take a risk to be isolated, when the aggressor (italics added – A.R.) 
threatens us.”101 This statement requires studying the identity of the aggressor and what 
is meant by aggression. Observing a map of the Baltic Sea demonstrates the unlikelihood 
of aggression from Latvia’s allies in NATO and the EU.102 Hence, the possibility of 
regional military conflict among liberal democracies is out of the realm of possibility. We 
should also assume that the Prime Minister, by saying the word “aggression,” meant the 
threat from terrorism in any of its forms.103 Even concerns about Russian coercion by 
using “energy diplomacy” do not necessarily reach the level of “aggression.” If so, in the 
mind of the elite the military and probably the economic coercion remain the main 
sources of fear in regard to endangerment of the national security. Thus, only one state in 
the region currently has a theoretical potential for these types of aggression: as confirmed 
by history; it is Russia, which, as stated earlier, does not do anything to dissipate such 
concerns. 
This picture, however, should be considered a misperception, because the 
variables in this situation are not actually linked. If, as claimed by NSC, there is currently 
no conventional military threat to Latvia, then any rhetoric that uses this kind of political 
language should be considered an attempt to substitute genuine foreign policy with short 
term political image making. If, on the other hand, the political statements derive from 
expected intentions rather than strong analysis of political actions of Russia, then, as 
Robert Jervis pointed out, “when expectations and desires clash, expectations seem to be 
more important.”104 In the Latvian case that is exactly the problem because any political 
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move of Russia is analyzed through existing experience in mutual relations; since there is 
no positive experience, everything is analyzed through a prism of expectation. Jervis 
continues: “the misperception is most difficult to correct in the case of a missing concept 
and least difficult to correct in the case of a recognized but presumably unfilled 
concept.”105 In the case of Latvia and Russia, the policies adhere to the category of 
unfulfilled concepts that, of course, does not mean that Russia should be considered 
friendly or even potentially friendly neighbor.  
At the same time the survey organized by the Ministry of Defense of Latvia 
reveals that Latvians do not consider Russia a significant security risk.106 The increase of 
global security risks such as terrorism or transnational crime bring Latvian population 
closer to Europeans, whose prevailing sense is that Russia is lesser and lesser a threat to 
the Europeans and should be treated rather as integral partner in the European security 
processes. In this case the difference between the attention paid by Latvia towards the 
“Russian problem” and the same issue in Europe leads to a different understanding of 
security risks among new and old members of the EU and NATO. The Latvian 
population, according to another survey, is more optimistic about Latvian-Russian 
relations and keeps a more positive attitude towards Russia in comparison with Russian 
citizens.107 As Latvian international relations expert Žaneta Ozoliņa pointed out, 
contemporary international relations exist in an environment where it is “increasingly 
difficult to divide external threats from internal ones, prioritize them, and separate 
domestic security instruments from regional and international ones.”108 More specifically 
in the Latvian case, the exploitation of Russian compatriots living in Latvia is hard to 
differentiate as an external or internal security risk. Or, for example, potential difficulties 
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with the energy supplies from Russia can create regional problems in the Baltics and 
Poland, but can also create schism between Russia and other states of the EU.      
Thus, when the Ambassador of Russian Federation in Latvia, Viktor Kalyzhni, 
commented on the debate about Russia as threat to Latvia, he said that he wants 
to emphasize that there is no need to create an enemy from Russia 
artificially. There is no one. Why convince the people living here that 
there is some threat advancing from the East? How can Russia and NATO 
be at war?109 
The Ambassador constantly disregards the fact that the state he represents in Riga 
sends messages that can be very loosely interpreted and thus create results different from 
those intended and touches on the problem of mass communication in politics. Russia and 
NATO certainly are not at war, so are not Latvia and Russia; still, the war is not the only 
form of conflict or fundamental disagreements.   
The nature of communication, as mentioned by the American scholar Wilbur 
Schramm, consists of the source, the message and the destination.110 Using the basic 
assumptions of communication theory, the source can be either an individual or a 
communication organization; the message may be expressed by voice, a form of paper or 
numerous signals; the destination (or target) can be an individual, group or undefined 
mass audience. The communication, hence, works as follows: a) a source encodes the 
message he wants to share; b) the message is put in into a form that can be transmitted; c) 
the message is received and decoded; d) the feedback encodes a decoded message and 
feedback follows. Now, to apply this to foreign policy, if there is something that must be 
implied as an intention or determined political action, the message and transmission 
should be in concert and mutually reinforced. To put it in other words, if there is a 
possibility for misinterpreting the message, we should be sure that, in the stage of 
decoding, this is exactly what will happen. Hence, if Latvian foreign policy papers 
disregard Russia’s importance for Latvian foreign policy, but policy makers claim that  
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some aspects of bilateral relations have implications on the whole spectrum of the EU-
Russia partnership, the message is unclear and transmitting such a product successfully is 
highly unlikely. 
In any field of policy or diplomacy it is a mistake to assume that communication 
can have quick and necessarily positive effects. The claim of Schramm that a message 
becomes effective only when other elements of the system (decoding, interpreting and 
encoding) move simultaneously and adequately, has enormous influence on political 
communication and foreign policy formulation, because “all steps must be accomplished 
with relatively high efficiency if any communication is to be successful…”111 Similarly 
there is a perception problem where changing an image is a lengthy and not always 
productive process. Therefore it is always better not to create a wrong image than to 
change an existing one. In this regard Latvia and Russia have fallen into both of these 
traps. Their intentions towards each other are actually identifiable only by indirection, so 
communication is also rather indirect (through media more than by political negotiations) 
and eventually perceptions are rooted deeply in strong images of historical experience 
that to a large extent have been facilitated by wrongly decoded messages by opponents. 
Particularly in smaller states such as Latvia, scarce resources must particularly 
emphasize using existing tools efficiently. For example, the whole debate about the 
participation of the Latvian president in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end 
of World War II, held in Moscow in May 2005, inevitably led to the debate about the 
kind of message Latvia would like to send to Russia. President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga 
considered this visit an opportunity to explain the most complicated events of Latvian 
history to Russian politicians, but appeared to her “surreal” bearing in mind the spirit of 
the event of celebrations.112 Hence, the problem of the content of the message here is 
more obvious than the form of transmitting.     
It is obvious that in order to speak about the foreign policy of one state we have to 
study political documents. If these documents signal an attitude of irrelevance about the 
problem we should expect that the same ignorance would be in other fields of 
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communication. If it is not true, like in the case of Latvia and Russia, we  must conclude 
that the message has been “transmitted” ambiguously or that the message has been  an 
integral part of the broader process of policy setting and implementation over which the 
source actually does not have  control, and thus he ignores it. The transmitting of the 
message, though, should not be considered irrelevant, because the political actors have to 
communicate not only with messages they want to share, but also with those they do not 
want to. When the Russian president said that Latvians instead of the Abrene district will 
receive “the ears of dead donkey”113 he should be sure that his message about denial of 
Latvians to their legal rights to this territory has been transmitted in a way that has 
decoded the message not only as aggressive, but insulting, making Vladimir Putin look 
like a rascal on the international stage. When interviewed, one of the deputies of the 
Latvian parliament and former mayor of Riga expressed the opinion that “Russians are 
genetically constructed for stealing and lazing”114 (actually meaning the contrast between 
traditional Latvian diligence and the ways of the Soviet management), his political 
opponents did not decode the message as it was sent and received it as a political attack. 
The political debate in Latvia actually challenges conventional wisdom in 
international relations in the sense that the policy options of small states can be better 
understood by “structural/systemic rather than domestic level factors.”115 There are few 
doubts that the integration processes in Europe were influenced by the terrorist acts in the 
United States on September 11, 2001. At the same time the strategic partnership of 
NATO and the EU with Russia or exposure to new security challenges such as terrorism 
or nuclear proliferation left little or no influence on Latvian-Russian relations. The 
important changes of European security not only did not change the domestic political 
agenda, but almost entirely reinforced the same political debate between Latvia and 
Russia that had already existed before the NATO and the EU enlargement.     
To sum up, the vague statements in policy documents on the position of the 
Latvian state towards actual problems in relations with Russia must be considered 
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inadequate for implementing systematic actions or creating countering policies. This lack 
of policy cohesion is undermining the possibility to defend Latvian interests in the 
political debate and/or communication with Russia. It is especially important because 
these statements not only create confusion in communication with domestic audiences, 
but also send inconsistent signals to other actors in the international system. Such policy 
has potential to paralyze some policy options and seriously limit others, as will be shown 
in the case study on the dispute over the Latvian-Russian border treaty. 
The formulation of foreign policy implications and communication of messages has 
everything to do with two other issues of Latvian domestic and foreign policy agenda, 
namely, the claim for recognition of the Soviet occupation and the role of Latvian 
soldiers during World War II. 
1. The Occupation and Restitution 
The dispute between Latvia and Russia on whether the Soviet actions in 1940 
should be considered an occupation has lasted more than ten years. This dispute over the 
last couple of years has changed into a puzzle of problems, which includes the opposite 
views of Latvia and Russia on the occupation of Latvia, the outcome of World War II, 
and the annexation of the Abrene district. Since this paper does not analyze the 
arguments of international law concerning occupation and annexation problems, the basic 
premise here is that Latvians consider the entrance of the Soviet forces in Latvia in June 
17, 1940 an occupation. The Russian leadership refuses to accept this position. 
The most emphasized and publicly debated issue in relations with Russia has been 
the Latvian claim for the need to recognize Russia’s occupation of Latvia and apologize 
for that. This problem, like others in Latvian-Russian relations, is not mentioned in the 
founding documents of Latvian foreign policy. At the same time, the Latvian political 
leadership has discussed this issue extensively. The Prime Minister of Latvia put it 
straightforwardly in a meeting with Latvian regional media: “Latvia and other Baltic 
States expect Russia to apologize for occupation.”116 He also emphasized that there will 
be no progress in bilateral relations with Russia until common understanding concerning 
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the past is achieved.117 The deputy of the European Parliament and Former Defense 
Minister Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis claimed that Latvia should demand more than just an 
apology for occupation. For him, the international society should be encouraged to 
demand the comprehensive and just evaluation of great power deals. He called this a 
“national and historic task of our time.”118 
Obviously, this issue is very important for Latvia; therefore it is surprising that 
achieving this objective has been totally disregarded by foreign policy documents and left 
to the expectations that there will be windows of opportunities for Latvia to actualize the 
issue in the future. The reviving of the Russian position in the international stage, 
however, leads to the assumption that the moment so desired by Latvians could possibly 
not emerge and in that case, either relations with Russia stall or the solution (whatever it 
could be) creates a political and moral crisis in Latvia. Therefore, one of alternative 
policy could be the right to claim condemnation of broader issues of communist ideology, 
in order to arrive at the condemnation of occupation.    
This debate raised another issue in Latvian domestic politics that caused much 
reflection in bilateral relations with Russia, the issue of compensation for occupation. The 
government of Latvia has created a special commission that will deal with the 
methodology and calculations for damages during occupation. This commission is led by 
the State Chancellery and emphasizes the technical commitment of the process that is 
expected to be years long. Nevertheless, the message about compensation sent by the 
government was neither timely nor clear for several reasons. By the end of July 2005, the 
Head of the Prime Minister’s bureau claimed that “this is not the right moment to discuss 
the matter at a governmental level.”119 He also claimed that there is not sufficient 
information about when the commission could be created. However, three days later such 
a commission was indeed created by the government, leading to conjecture that the 
sensitivity of the issue is recognized by the political elite. Similar to other cases, there is 
no systemic approach to the problem – i.e., it does not derive from policy papers, changes 
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of an international or domestic nature, but solely from peculiar “reconnaissance of 
political image making,” in which ideas have been simply thrown out for public or 
international discussion. If some window of opportunity appears to be open, political 
actions have been immediately pursued. 
Some aspects of this process should be emphasized particularly. First, more than 
fifteen years after regaining independence should be considered more than enough time 
to craft sensible policy concerning this matter. In other words, if the government has not 
dealt with this problem in more than a decade, what kind of necessity (domestic or 
international) would make this an agenda issue of domestic politics? Moreover, already 
by the beginning of 1990’s there was a study on the same problem, which has not been 
considered politically important until this very moment.120 
Second, the idea behind the claim of compensation is not clear at all. Is this a set 
up for real Latvian policy towards Russia in the future or should the work of the 
commission be considered of “historical and statistical value?” It should be stated clearly 
that the recognition of occupation and compensation are not necessarily interlinked. The 
Latvian President believes that damages of occupation should be calculated, because “it 
is important, what happened. The other question is about the demands of occupation from 
Russia – it is, in my opinion, not real.”121 It is also possible that Russians could take a 
less reluctant stand towards admitting wrongdoings, if they would be convinced that the 
recognition of occupation of Latvia and other Baltic States will not be followed by claims 
for financial compensations. If this accurately reflects Russian motivation, Latvia should 
not work alone on its position in this matter, but also actively consult with Lithuania and 
Estonia on a common position.122   
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Third, the time to emphasize the problem, namely, around the time when Latvian-
Russian relations have reached unprecedented diplomatic tensions, was not chosen 
successfully. Even if the idea to calculate damages should be considered necessary to 
research crimes of totalitarianism, it should have been done earlier. If the leader of the 
government considered the dialog to stand in “such a phase, in which the promotion of 
this question could be perceived as a totally destructive step,”123  giving support to such a 
policy only three days later, when other structural and unit level variables are ceteris 
paribus, disregards the potential risks that may result. Moreover, currently there is no 
mechanism for persuading Latvian partners in the EU and in America that this claim is 
something more than a mere political action – respectively, that the political background 
of this issue is less important than the need for justice. As such it does not add to the 
pragmatism of EU relations with Russia, and instead of broadening the policy options for 
cooperation with Russia, narrows them substantially. 
2. Latvian Soldiers Under Alien Flags–Patriots, Criminals, or Victims? 
The dispute over the role and importance of two divisions of Waffen SS known as 
the “Latvian Legion” probably has been the most intense and still is one of the most 
divisive factors in Latvian society and important for the image of the state in the 
international arena. In regard to the image the soundest criticism concerning the 
commemoration of “old soldiers” has come from Russia. Therefore, such important 
variables as identity, image and perception as well as legitimacy come together.124  
The most important of all these factors, however, is not the legitimacy of the 
Latvian Legion, but the perception about its role in Russia. Since the Waffen SS was 
condemned by the Nuremberg tribunal, for most of its left wing political spectrum, 
legionnaires in the Soviet time were portrayed as Hitler’s henchmen and thus war 
criminals.125 At the same time Russians appear to be unable to present certain evidence of 
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Latvian Legion participation in atrocities against the civilian population committed by the 
German authorities during the war. There is a tendency to equate legionnaires with 
German police units from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and should be considered 
wrong. Furthermore, the Russian media reinforces the blurred image of “Latvian 
formations” that took part in so-called punishment operations.126 Thus, the notion of 
“Latvian formations” traditionally has not been clarified and in the perception of many 
people in Russia and in the West the Legion and Sonderkommando’s create the same 
image. Any attempt to explain that legionnaires comprised typical light infantry127 seems 
to not be reaching domestic and international (and specifically, the Russian) audiences.128 
Another problem in this puzzle is that both ex-legionnaires and ex-Soviet Latvian 
soldiers have not come to reconciliation with each other. Their ability to shake hands in 
front of Latvian society would basically take this issue off the table and to a large extent 
would deny Russia from arguing about selective attitudes against veterans of the war. In 
Latvia attempts to agree on creation of one core organization for all World War II 
veterans has not succeeded. Furthermore, those who after the war followed their struggle 
against the Communist regime, in the beginning of the 1990’s, created “The National 
Partisan Union.” “National partisans” became the subject of political dispute when the 
government decided to allocate additional retirement allowances for these soldiers in 
February 2005;129 this action involved the broader issue concerning the attitude towards 
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appeared in time of Korean War, when the United States needed support of NATO and Germany, both – 
political and resource wise. For further readings on Latvian Legion see Inesis Feldmanis, Kārlis Kangeris, 
The Volunteer SS Legion in Latvia, electronic edition, available on line at the web page of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Latvia at http://www.am.gov.lv/en/latvia/history/legion/  accessed on February 11, 2006. 
129 The press release of Press Office of the Government of the Republic of Latvia, available online at 
the web page of the Government of Latvia at http://www.mk.gov.lv/index.php/?id=12511 accessed on 
February 14, 2006.    
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other World War II veterans. From the transcripts of Parliament discussions, leftists 
predominantly expressed negative attitudes concerning the decision to allocate money 
only for “national partisans.” In absolute concert, a similar attitude was expressed by the 
Russian Federation, whose criticism is mostly based on two traditional clichés: a) 
national partisans still adhere to the Latvian Legion; and b) the framing of partisans as 
“mere armed bandits.”130 Neither of these clichés actually corresponds to the existing 
historical evidence.  
The political left was apparently ready to bargain, if the rights would support a 
similar social assistance package for veterans of the Soviet army.131 There is certain logic 
in this proposal, because both totalitarian regimes – the Soviets and the Nazis – called to 
arms thousands of Latvians, and the situation of extremely limited choice touched all 
people equally. From this perspective, all Latvians who were forcefully sent to the front 
should be considered victims. If right wing parties would take one step closer and agree 
on this proposal of the leftists, the latter must lift the idea of legionnaires as criminals of 
the war, too. This option, however, has never appeared on the political stage. Therefore, 
the veteran organizations could play the decisive role, if they were able to find a 
consensus, to take at least one problem of history off the discussion table. Moreover, a 
unified approach on the past would also decrease possibilities for Russian attempts to 
discredit the image of Latvia. 
E.  DOMESTIC POLITICS BETWEEN COHERENCE AND SCHISM: THE 
INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 
Evidence presented in this chapter leaves no doubts about the decisive influence 
of the events of the past sixty years on Latvian domestic politics. The discussions 
concerning the outcome of World War II and the policies of the Soviet regime are top  
                                                  
130 See the web page of the Center for Investigation of Crimes of Totalitarianism at 
http://vip.latnet.lv/LPRA/ritv.htm for excerpts from the report Karš Latvijā pēc kara (The war in Latvia 
after the war) of Ritvars Jansons, published also in official newspaper of Latvia, Latvijas vēstnesis (Latvian 
Herald) on June 14, 2005. Specifically, the researcher draws attention to the order of the Commissariat of 
Internal affairs of the Soviet Union about “The elimination of nationalistic underground and its armed 
bands” from March 22, 1945.        
131 This position was most explicitly expressed by deputy Yakov Pliner (party For Human Rights in 
United Latvia) Available online at the web page of the Parliament of Latvia at 
http://www.saeima.lv/steno/2002_8/st_050616/st1606.htm  accessed on February 14, 2006. Interestingly 
enough, this argument has been expressed also by Russia. See the press statement from August 17, 2005, at 
the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia at www.mid.ru  accessed on May 14, 2006.  
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priorities of the majority of political parties, and they are actively debated before every 
parliamentary election. Therefore, discussions about history have daily exposure through 
media and political activity. 
The claim that “the foreign policy of the state must be stable and long term”132 is 
the ideal desire of every foreign policy maker. As much as it is ideal, in some political 
conditions it is also idealistic, because of the political environment or institutional design 
and prevailing sets of values or culture that in the current Latvian political environment 
does not encourage long term approaches. As the President of Latvia said: “The question 
of self-esteem for individuals and collectively for nation as a whole, is still urgent. And 
that is explainable by our historical heritage.”133 Foreign policy decision makers are 
forced to maneuver between the political agendas of the majority of political parties, 
whose top priorities are linked to preservation of the electorate rather than to pragmatism 
and long term thinking in foreign affairs. Therefore, the assumption that foreign policy of 
contemporary Latvia does not derive from formulated national interests, but from specific 
sets of values that are characteristic for the political elite, should be considered proven. 
Historical experience creates suspicions and excessive caution that eventually makes 
foreign policy passive. More concretely, the lack of fixed policy limits the space and 
readiness for a potential political bargain with Russia; hence and the bilateral relations in 
the majority of segments can be characterized as “negative stability” or stalemate. 
Relations between the elite and the society in Latvia open the question about the 
role of politicians and statesmen in Latvian politics in a sense used by Oswald Spengler.  
In his remarkable piece “The Decline of the West” he points out that “the true statesman 
must also be, in large sense of the world, an educator – not the representative of a moral 
or a doctrine, but an exemplar in doing.”134 To him, the true statesman must be 
distinguished from the politician by the ability to use sacrifices for the nation and its 
wellbeing, and that his beliefs are shared by the nation as an inspiration for overcoming 
                                                 
132 Artis Pabriks, Jaunie ārpolitikas ceļa rādītāji (The New milestones of Foreign Policy), Diena, 
Rīga, November 11, 2004. 
133 Gunta Bičevska, Vaira Vīķe Freiberga: Mēs esam vērtīgi.Punkts (Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga: We are of 
value.Period), Republika.lv, available online at the web page of news portal TVNET at 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/intervijas/article.php?id=220398 accessed on May 14, 2006.    
134 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Volume II, Perspectives of World History, Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc, Borzoi Book, 1961, 443. 
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challenges that would not be possible in other situations.135 In this sense the rare Latvian 
politician can qualify for the status of statesman. 
Two important policy options should be considered for the future of Latvian 
foreign policy. First, the claim of recognition of occupation and state continuity should be 
maintained, while the calculations for damages of occupation should be left for historical 
and statistical value. There are practically no policy options for securing the support for 
such a claim among Latvian allies, or any other internationally accepted institutional 
mechanisms. At the same time Latvia alone cannot ensure the implementation of such a 
claim against Russia. Even if such a claim does not contradict provisions of international 
law, in any case, it may lead to new political tension between the two states without 
substantial political gains. Second, Latvia should not divide its soldiers into “right” and 
“wrong” warriors. None of them, being in Waffen SS or in the Soviet army, has 
participated in a war that in Latvia would regard as heroic. Nonetheless, the military 
operations of Latvian units should be studied and the heroism of individual soldiers 
admitted without ceremony or resentment concerning the unpleasant turns of world 
history. Latvians should know military capabilities of their soldiers as well as tactical and 
operational considerations. Other than that Latvian citizens were illegally drafted by the 
occupational authorities, hence, both Soviet and German and from this perspective, the 
Nazis and the Communists deserve similar condemnation in history. This position should 
be maintained in policy papers and diplomatic contacts with either Russians or allies in 
the EU and NATO and the new generation of statesmen should not follow the complex of 
“historic guilt.”  
The future of the Latvian foreign policy will continue be linked to events on the 
domestic political stage. As mentioned by former State Secretary of the Latvian MFA 
Māris Riekstiņš, in order to have successful implementation of foreign policy, there is a 
need for consensus among political forces on the domestic level.136  In this sense unified 
policies do not depend on a majority of parliament but on much broader national 
consensus on issues of the past, and shared objectives in relations with Russia. Latvia 
                                                 
135 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Volume II, Perspectives of World History, Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc, Borzoi Book, 1961, 443. 
136 Māris Riekstiņš, Lai ārpolitika pēc vēlēšanām būtu veiksmīga, (For the successful foreign policy 
after the elections), Diena, Rīga, April 22, 2006.  
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cannot afford “a margin of time and error”137 in its foreign policy actions, because the 
discourse of the domestic political agenda will continue to influence Latvia’s relations 
with Russia. From this perspective the balance between constraints of internal and 
external nature should be transformed into prudent, but deliberately pursued foreign 
policy. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks stated that “we have to be able to 
utilize the international status achieved by Latvia in order to make our state wealthier 
economically and politically more influential.”138 It is hard to disagree with this 
statement; however, it deserves one stipulation: the transformation of status into influence 
should be obtained by active and deliberate policies. In this regard, though, Latvia is 





















                                                 
137 Reference on Robert Jervis Miriam Fendius Elman, The Foreign Policies of Small States: 
Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25, 
No.2.(Apr.1995), 176.   
138 Artis Pabriks, Jaunie ārpolitikas ceļa rādītāji (The New milestones of Foreign Policy),  Diena, 
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IV. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS LATVIA: 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS OF COOPERATION 
A. THE MATRIX OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS  
Bilateral relations with Latvia are not a priority of Russian foreign policy.139 
Indeed, the main concerns and priorities of Russian foreign policy in last decade have 
been focused on events closer to the southern borders of Russia. The war in Chechnya 
and the volatile situation in Central Asia and Caucasus troubles Russian leadership 
persistently. Moreover, the loss of influence in Ukraine resulting from “The Orange 
Revolution” signaled that Russia continues to confuse its relations with neighbors, some 
of whom could be considered “natural allies.”140 Desire for the restoring of power leads 
Russian foreign policy makers towards new relations with China and India, closer 
partnership with NATO and the EU, as well as dealing with regional conflicts in Middle 
East. Traditionally important for Russia remain relations with the United States, even if 
foreign policies of both states currently emphasize other directions of partnership. 
Nevertheless, Latvia has almost dominated certain areas of Russian foreign policy 
throughout the last decade. For example, in regard to Russian compatriots living beyond 
the Russian borders, Putin’s administration criticizes Latvia for its policies, namely, the 
procedures created for obtaining citizenship or promoting education reform that would 
strengthen the position of the Latvian language. Russia links this problem with the whole 
spectrum of bilateral relations between Latvia and Russia. 
In another example, Russia is concerned about the Latvian position towards the 
historical interpretation of the outcome of World War II discussed earlier. Latvia stands 
by the position that the end of the war did not bring freedom for the Latvian people, but 
rather exchanged one dictatorship for another. Such a position challenges the view that 
the war was liberation of the world from the Nazis. 
                                                 
139 Interview of the Ambassador of Russia to Latvia Viktor Kaluzhny to the radio station “Latvijas 
Radio 4” at February 17, 2006. Excerpts from the interview available online at the news agency LETA web 
page at www.leta.lv accessed on February 23, 2006.  
140 The expression “natural allies” was used by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozirev 
in regard to liberal democracies and in particular to the United States of America. The term now seems 
applicable also to the states of Eastern, Central and Northern Europe. Reference in Thomas Ambrosio, The 
Russo-American Dispute over the Invasion of Iraq: International status and the role of Positional Goods, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol., 57, No.8, December 2005, 1194.       
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These two areas of concerns do not, however, mean that other bilateral issues 
could be considered as normal. Economic cooperation, for example, even though growing 
has been seriously impeded by political constraints and should be considered linked to 
that. The reviving Russian economy, driven by high energy prices, gives Russian 
politicians tools for reconsidering possibilities for influence in areas of its immediate 
neighborhood. Therefore policy towards Latvia and the other Baltic States should be 
analyzed in the context of this process. 
Therefore this chapter argues that the current Russian foreign policy towards Latvia 
is not dependent on   changes in the international system, but is the outcome of the 
domestic inconsistency of Russian self-image or great power that includes the perception 
about the unique role of Russia in the world as well as an increasing geostrategic claim in 
the post-Soviet realm. 
B. LIMITED NATURE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS 
In 2004 Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia joined NATO, the first time in the history 
the Alliance was able to expand into territory earlier occupied by the Soviet empire. What 
for the Baltic States symbolized the end of fifty years of detachment from the European 
security and economic system, was seen in Russia as a process that by no means 
enhanced its security. According to data of the Russian public opinion research company 
VTsIOM, 46 percent of Russians consider that enlargement of NATO threatens the 
security of Russia; only five per cent think this process will strengthen Russia.141    
Russia reacted to geostrategic changes in the Baltics with calm restraint.  Russian 
policy shifted from regular emotional outbursts concerning the negative impact of NATO 
enlargement, characteristic of Yeltsin’s administration, towards more pragmatic 
cooperation with European partners. Russia considers partnership with NATO an 
important part of European security,142 meaning that successful building of relations with 
the West is impossible without pragmatism and predictability.  
                                                 
141 Data of VTsIOM research on 24-27 January, 2003, available online at VTsIOM web page at 
www.russiavotes.org  accessed on April 14, 2006.  
142 See Otnoshenye mezhdu Rossiei i NATO at at the web page of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
at http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-vnpop.nsf/osn_copy/3C91A48FF18622F4C325704300315426 accessed on 
December 5, 2005. 
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These processes created expectations that relations between Russia and the Baltic 
States will eventually be friendlier. The president of Latvia said that after NATO 
enlargement, relations will improve “based on mutually beneficial terms.”143 Former 
United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed a similar view in January 
of 2004.144 Among scholars and analysts the idea of the positive influence of NATO and 
the EU on Russia’s relations with the Baltic States was also popular.145 Indeed, if the 
geopolitical “temptation” to claim the Baltic States back into the sphere of interests of 
Russia is no longer existent, the possibilities for a new type of relations would appear 
real. At the same time, as pointed out by Russian political observer Igor Leshukov, 
possibilities for new relations do not necessarily turn into implementation of new 
policies. More than two years later the mutual antagonism did not diminish; rather the 
opposite, reaching new heights in 2005.  
Russian policy papers do not reflect geopolitical changes in the region, because 
they are adopted in 2000 and thus currently outdated. With the exception of the reference 
to threats created by the NATO enlargement to the east and territorial claims for the 
Russian territory,146 National Security Concept (NSC) does not specifically point to 
Russian policies towards the Latvian-Russian agenda. The other document, Foreign 
Policy Concept of Russia, makes more specific reference to relations with the Baltic 
States.  
There are good prospects for the development of the Russian Federation’s 
relations with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Russia stands for routing 
these relations onto the track of good neighborliness and mutually 
beneficial cooperation. One indispensable condition for that is respect for 
                                                 
143 Speech of Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga at the meeting with foreign diplomats in Riga, January 22, 2002, 
reference available online at the web page of news agency LETA at www.leta.lv  accessed on April 17, 
2006.   
144 The opinion of Madeleine Albright in press conference after meeting with Latvian President in 
Riga, January 27, 2004, reference in news agency LETA report, January 28, 2004, available online at 
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Policies: in Harmony or at Odds?, Conference Proceedings, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, 
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Russia’s interests of those states, including on the central question of 
respect for the rights of Russian-speaking population.147  
The “issue” of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia has been emphasized 
also in information from the European department of the Russian MFA in which bilateral 
relations between the states are considered to be developing unevenly, and the status of 
non-citizenship of more than twenty per cent of Latvian population is the main 
impediment to cooperation. The Russians deny the fact of occupation of Latvia by the 
Soviet Union in 1940; they also claim that Latvian efforts to investigate the actions of the 
Soviet partisans during World War II leads to “revisionism of history.”148  
The Russian MFA admits the “limited nature of political contacts” and blames 
Latvia for its “well known position against Russia and discriminating policy towards the 
Russian speaking population.”149 Nevertheless, contacts at the parliamentary and 
ministerial level, albeit not very active, have been maintained regularly. Cooperation 
between Latvia and Russian regions has been gradually developing, particularly in cities 
such as Moscow or St. Petersburg, or those regions that have geographical proximity with 
Latvia. In general, according to Russian MFA, starting in 1991 both countries signed 
more than 60 agreements and treaties, but not all of them have been ratified.  
In the sphere of economics Russia maintains that trade between two states has a 
status of most-favored nation. Russia has expressed interest in ownership of the Latvian 
transit and energy enterprises, but the Latvian government refused to sell these 
companies to Russian business, to a large extent out of national security considerations. 
Overall, the trade turnover has a tendency to grow, while the proportion of mutual trade 
in the trade of both states has a tendency to decrease.150 
                                                 
147 Chapter IV, Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, Adopted by the President of Russia on  
January 28, 2000, available online at the web page of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at www.mid.ru  
accessed on April 12, 2006.  
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Interestingly, Russian foreign policy documents practically ignore the problem of 
the unsigned border treaty with Latvia. The problem, which is examined in detail in the 
next chapter, actually arches over the whole spectrum of bilateral cooperation. There are 
also disagreements among both states concerning the accession of Latvia to The Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, but this is a secondary problem. 
Thus, relations between Russia and Latvia have been characterized as somewhat 
uneasy and less than friendly. The spectrum of Russian-Latvian relations has been 
characterized by the following components: a) the most serious issues between two states 
are linked to the status of the Russian-speaking population, which is also linked to the 
issue of the outcome of the World War II; b) economic cooperation with Latvia has been 
considered important for Russia, but it is constrained by the overall climate of bilateral 
relations. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS: 
INTENTIONALITY VS. CONTINGENCY 
1. Historical Fundamentalism 
The Latvian and Russian interpretations of the events of 1940 as well as the 
period after the World War II are totally opposite. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
Latvian position is based on the assumption that in 1940 Latvia was occupied by the 
Soviet Union and therefore Russia, as a successor state, should recognize the fact of 
occupation. Russia, on the other side, claims that the accession of Latvia into the Soviet 
Union took place according to the Latvian laws existing at the time; therefore the claim 
of occupation is by no means legitimate. In order to explain the implications of this 
dispute we shall look into three assumptions that Russian political leaders use to fortify 
their position in the dispute on issues of the past.  
The first assumption concerns the existence of occupation. Among many political 
observers and experts sources Georgii Kunadze is one of the very rare, who names the 
events of the summer of 1940 as illegal annexation.151 Russian scholars as well as 
political leadership seem united in their conviction that the Latvian argument about the 
fact of occupation is invalid, and they collectively deny the possibility of interpreting the 
events of 1940 as occupation. Russian historian Stanislav Chernichenko claims that the 
                                                 
151 Georgii Kunadze, Zrya Otkazalis’ Ot Dogovora s Estoniei, Izvestija, Moskva, July 6, 2005. 
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Soviet Army marched into Latvia with consent of the Latvian government.152 Thereby, 
he categorically denies the possibility of talking about the occupation of Latvia and other 
Baltic States. Ilya Kramnik is even more straightforward. He points out that “we should 
be proud of farsighted leaders of our (!) state, who in the hardest situation developed a 
brilliant operation that in less than ten years after the bloody war, ended with gaining the 
status of superpower.”153  
Former foreign minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev also denied the fact of 
occupation. Even admitting the unwilling accession of the Baltic States to the Soviet 
Union, he maintains that “it was not ‘an occupation in the true sense’; neither was it ‘an 
annexation.’”154 The more recent political position is similar to that of academics and has 
been expressed by Konstantin Kosachev, Chairman of the Russian State Duma's 
International Affairs Committee. He explained that the acknowledgment of occupation 
would put people living in the Baltic States in a position of occupiers. “It would be 
absolutely morally unacceptable to Russia,” maintains the politician.155 Moreover, the 
official position of the Russian MFA denies the possibility of using the term “occupation 
of Baltic States” when interpreting the events of 1940. Russians are rather inclined to use 
the term “annexation” – they admit that the Baltic States could have been forced to join 
the Soviet Union, but they do not see any conflict with the norms of international law of 
pre-World War II Europe.156 
President Putin pointed out that the demands of the Baltic States cannot be seen as 
legitimate, because the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union in 1989 has already given precise 
judgment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact from a legal and moral perspective.157 At the same 
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time he admitted respect for “the opinion of those people in the Baltics, who consider that the 
tragedy of the Baltic States’ loss of independence was connected to the end of the World War 
II.”158 Nonetheless, such a statement is far from an intention to condemn the actions of 
Russia’s Stalinist regime. To speak the words of member of the Federal Council of Russia 
Mikhail Margelov, “the Pact is already condemned. There is nothing more to talk about.”159 
The interpretation of condemnation of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact as presented 
by the Presidential team is at best superficial. The decision of the Congress of People’s 
Deputies only condemned the fact of signing the secret protocols, not the occupation of 
Latvia and the other Baltic States.160 The congress acknowledged that the 
unconstitutional agreement created consequences for “third states,” but at the same time 
stipulated “that in light of common practice with regard to such type of contracts, content 
of this agreement was not contrary to international law.”161 In today’s Russia, to consider 
this decision sufficient means inability or unwillingness to face the ugly events of pre-
World War diplomacy, which did not lead so much towards the increase of security of the 
Soviet Union, but towards  implementation of the expansion of the Communist regime. 
The second assumption is that the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union 
created infrastructure and industry without which Latvia would be a backward state. 
Closer inspection reveals that the Soviet economic plan was to build a significant 
industrial complex in the Baltic states and particularly Latvia, most of which was 
designed to produce parts for military technology. This industry was supported by a 
sophisticated infrastructure of gas and oil pipelines, ports, railways and roads. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of these enterprises appeared useless, because 
of the tiny specific industrial segments they were producing for. Roads and the public 
transportation system were also insufficient; moreover, due to the persistent shortage of  
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resources by the end of the 1980’s they were not maintained appropriately. Additionally, 
troops leaving numerous Soviet military bases in Latvia in many cases left behind highly 
polluted areas. 162 
The industrialization of Latvia does not leave an impression of any kind of great 
achievement. Disregard of the fact that Latvia before the war was at the same level of 
economic development as neighboring Finland is a problem for Russian policy makers 
when they define the impact of Soviet economic development in certain regions of the 
empire.163 What was good for underdeveloped Central Asia did not work in the Baltic 
States. Taking the level of incomes and living standards in Finland as an example, Soviet 
involvement in Latvia should rather be considered counterproductive. Therefore the 
argument of Russian Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev that “Latvia would be in 
backwoods of Europe, if the whole of the Soviet Union had not helped [to] develop”164 is 
totally wrong.  
The third assumption: Latvians are supporting the former collaborators of the 
Nazi regime and soldiers of Waffen SS. Here also the black and white of Russian 
interpretation of the events of history seems too flat to be acceptable. Russians claim that 
there is a reviving neo-fascist sentiment in Latvian society that has found its way through 
the gatherings of ex-Waffen SS veterans.165 According to this position, Latvian authorities 
do not prevent the gatherings of ex-Nazis and therefore the overall political climate in 
Latvia facilitates revisionism of history. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet regime was not 
able to accuse the Waffen SS legionnaires of war crimes. Moreover, the Soviets had to 
recognize that there was little to do with voluntarism drafting Latvian recruits for the 
Nazi’s war. Therefore a claim that Latvian policy would in any way facilitate the revival 
of national extremism is also groundless.  
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Politically, this area of mutual dispute is probably the most difficult to agree 
upon, because both sides challenge the fundamental values of the other. Martin Malia 
stated that before World War II the Soviet Union was only one of the world’s great 
powers, yet it emerged from the military conflict as “one of the world’s two 
superpowers.”166 This factor has an enormous influence on the society of contemporary 
Russia for two reasons. First, Russians, who without any doubt suffered many terrible 
civilian and military losses during World War II, still carry the image of the nation which 
broke the backbone of Nazism and liberated Europe from it. This image, reproduced by 
Soviet indoctrination efforts, is deeply rooted and became a dogmatic postulate. Second, 
and even more important, the victory in the war symbolized the unity between Russian 
people and their leaders. As Malia mentions, for the first time in the history of Russia, 
“the regime and the people had a task and a purpose together.”167 In other words, the 
actions of the regime were legitimate both before and after the war. This fact of 
legitimacy therefore can be observed in the argumentation of Russian politicians, who 
claim that the actions of Stalin when subjugating the Baltic States were not “nice”, but 
totally justifiable in light of the security situation of Russia. Both factors create 
justifications that could be characterized as “historical fundamentalism,” which in 
practice means the existence of “sacrosanct” conventional wisdoms in regard to events of 
past that are taboo for challenging. Latvians, calling for comprehensive interpretation of 
the events of the war, actually act against the Russian system of values. Hence, the 
reaction from Moscow is so uncompromising.   Even if the administration could confirm 
that  sustaining  “a historical fundamentalism” is not necessary for raising great power, 
and creating distance from the Soviet actions would rather facilitate the positive image of 
modern Russia, the current administration refuses to take these steps. This regime realizes 
that it is considered legitimate only insofar as it has a positive equilibrium of interests 
with the Russian population.168 This is a rare situation in Russian history, when the 
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leadership feels the momentum of something in common with its people. Until the 
actions of the Soviet foreign policy in Russia are widely regarded as aggressive, hopes 
for changes in the historical positions are minimal. Positive identification with the Soviet 
past is for Russians, therefore, not simply a matter of political conjuncture; it is a feeling 
of respect and possibly admiration.  
At the same time, efforts of Russian political leadership to justify the actions of 
Stalin’s regime, in fact, create an image of the aggressive nature of Russia. At best, it 
reinforces the perception about Russia as a country hostile to Latvians that can fuel the 
radicalization of Latvian society. By denying any wrongdoing of the Soviet regime in 
occupied Latvia, Putin puts cards into the hands of Latvian nationalists; their actions are 
rarely directed against Russia itself, but rather reflect domestic policies such as hardening the 
citizenship law and calling for repatriation of migrants to Russia. Furthermore, the actions of 
Latvian radicals create a counter reaction of ethnic Russian organizations, which slide into 
anti-Latvian rhetoric. Eventually, ethnic Russian complaints are received in Moscow as a 
sign of undemocratic Latvian policies towards ethnic minorities, and in the reciprocal nature 
of communication, are later reinforced in Latvia as evidence of Russian imperial ambitions. 
It is obvious that the Russian president does not have a genuine political problem 
confirming moral responsibility for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, as witnessed by his 
statements in regard to the occupation of Hungarian and Czech states.169 It also confirms that 
such a statement, used to improve relations, does have an effect as well as enormous potential 
to create preconditions for eliminating a historical dispute. However, this assumption is true 
only if Russian leaders are truly interested in improving relations. 
Therefore, the political discussion about the outcome of World War II, even is it 
does not satisfy Russia, should be held. There is a mutual gain from agreement upon 
these discrepancies: for Latvia, the moral satisfaction for historical injustices had done by 
the communist regime; for Russia, increased trust and probably even prestige among its 
most democratic and peaceful neighbors. Grigorii Kunadze said in this regard: “Yes. 
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Russia does not carry responsibility for mistakes and crimes of Stalinist politics. But only 
then, if we as a nation have bravery to admit them at least in silence.170 
2. Treatment of Slavic Minorities 
The policy of using the Slavic minorities as a tool for domestic and international 
bargaining was already in extensive use during Yeltsin’s administration. The difference 
between the policies the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, however, lies in the 
establishing of a more systematic approach towards this problem. During Putin’s 
administration a number of state agencies were created for dealing with Russian 
compatriots living outside Russia. Moreover, the Russian side claims this issue is the 
main impediment to successful relations between Latvia and Russia. It should be 
mentioned that the large number of Slavic non-citizens in Latvia is a direct result of the 
Soviet occupation, when during the fifty years of extensive development of Latvian 
territory thousands of people from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were sent to work into 
the newly created industrial enterprises. 
Russians argue that Slavic minorities in Latvia have been treated 
undemocratically by denying rights to citizenship.171 With these claims Russia 
persistently drew attention European institutions to the problem of the so-called “Russian 
speaking population.”172 Similar complaints have been expressed in Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (PACE). Especially the latter should pay more attention to  “undemocratic 
practices” in Latvia, according to Russian politicians, and renew so-called post-
monitoring of human rights, if the situation with Russian-speaking population  does not 
change, as deputy chairman of Russian delegation at the PACE Leonid Slucky pointed 
out.173 At the end of February 2006 this question was addressed to the United Nations 
(UN) High Commissionaire for Human Rights Louise Arbour, expressing expectations 
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that the UN should pay attention to “dangerous tendencies, weakening the international 
regime of the protection of human rights” in Latvia and Estonia.174  
The data from human rights organizations, however, does not reveal significant 
problems in the field of Latvian violation of human rights of Slavic minorities. There are 
approximately 25,000 Russian citizens permanently living in Latvia, but only in 
relatively few cases have human rights problems been reported.175 Altogether, according 
to data from the Human Rights Office during 2004, the bureau received 20 complaints 
about the status of aliens in Latvia as well as one case of racial discrimination and two 
cases of language discrimination.176 In the case of non-Latvian residents of Latvia, who 
were not immediately eligible for citizenship after the country regained independence; 
judicial acts have now been adopted that require only knowledge of the language, 
national anthem and history of the state as criteria for citizenship. The Latvian Center for 
Human rights points out that:  
2004 became a record year both in terms of applications for naturalization 
and persons actually naturalized. The 21,297 applications received were 
almost double that of the preceding year. By 31 December 2004, 85,352 
persons had become citizens of Latvia through naturalization since the 
beginning of the naturalization process in 1995.177  
Hence, the position based on the assumption that Russian speakers “are deprived 
of the right to receive citizenship”178 is not valid. Still, Mikhail Demurin claims that Latvia 
and other Baltic States do not follow the positive example of other European nations such as 
Hungary and Slovakia, who do not claim to “infringe on the rights of their compatriots now 
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living in Slovakia, because Slovaks were oppressed in the former Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.”179  He, however, makes a wrong comparison, because Slovakia neither existed as a 
free state nor was a victim of illegal agreements which predetermined the destiny of nations, 
as it was with Latvia and other Baltic States. The problem of wrong comparisons can be 
found in other expressions of Russian leaders.  President Putin, for example, compared the 
ethnic situation in Latvia with that in Macedonia, advocating for promoting the two state 
languages. Intentionally or not, he expressed that, “we (!) have 60 percent Russians living in 
Riga,”180 which is at best ignorance of facts.  
Observation of official statements by Russian officials and media coverage for the 
time period from 2004-2006 is creating the impression of separated roles of “good and 
bad policemen” among Russian political leadership. For example, the MFA plays the bad 
policeman, constantly hammering the more alarming news from Latvia. On May 26, 
2005 the Latvian parliament adopted the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities; the Russian reaction to that was highly generalized and 
negative in tone. The MFA announced that the “very fact of adoption of the Convention 
by Latvia was characterized by many in the world as profanation.”181 This strong 
statement attempts to portray Latvia sneering on Russians. Profanation is also presented 
as self-explanatory and an obvious fact for multiple international audiences, deriving 
from the nature of Latvian government. Who those many are, who explicitly point to the 
irrelevance of the Latvian decision, remains, however, undisclosed. 
Both Russian President Putin and Ambassador to Latvia Kalyzhni are neutral 
observers of the process of Latvian-Russian relations. Their tone however, differs. The 
ambassador positions himself as a schoolmaster, whose traditional behavior is to call 
little mischievous children, namely Latvian politicians, to act responsibly and not to 
create trouble for their parents (the Latvian state). The President, though, in this case 
should be considered a leader of the “parents committee,” who is aware of everything, 
                                                 
179 Mikhail Demurin, Russia and the Baltic States: Not a Case of “Flawed” History”, Russia in 
Global Affairs, No.3, July-September 2005. 
180 Putin’s statement in press conference on January 31, 2006, report on February 2, 2006, available at 
the web page of news agency LETA at www.leta.lv  accessed on May 16, 2006. 
181 The Commentary of the Department of Information and Press of Russian MFA, December 5, 
2005, No. 2590-05-12-2005, available online at at the web page of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.mid.ru accessed on February 26, 2006. 
66
but seems unwilling to influence the actual behavior of individual participants. 
Responding to complaints about the decision of the Riga City council not to allow 
holding the TV-bridge with Moscow in downtown Riga, he answered:  
Let us bear no grudges against these people. We all trace our origins to 
one common home, which was called the Soviet Union, and it seems that 
these birthmarks of the Soviet past, as they used to say, are still present on 
the faces of the authorities in some countries of the former Soviet 
Union.182 
Furthermore, there are “good policemen,” too. They appear very friendly, but firm 
and coherent in their disagreement to Latvian political perspectives. Such political figures 
as Modest Kolerov, Konstantin Kosachev, Mikhail Margelov, Eleonora Mitrofanova and 
Sergei Yastrzembski183 usually keep a very polite and unified position concerning the 
need to forget about the discrepancies and concentrate on the positive potential of 
bilateral relations; or, to put it otherwise, “to start relations from the white list of 
paper.”184 Mitrofanova, for example admitted that Russia and Latvia do not know each 
other good enough to make realistic judgments and called for non-politization of the 
question of compatriots in Latvia.185 At the same time the new appearances do not 
exclude the use of old arguments. In fact, this commitment of the Russian political elite 
to change the branding of their policies without changing the content is rather 
paradoxical, because it confuses the Latvian and international societies in terms of 
possible responses. Here Kolerov poses as a political bargainer when answering the 
Latvian ambassador in Moscow that Latvia cannot accept the Lithuanian version of 
citizenship, hurries to drop the cards on table by saying that then “Russia will not 
apologize to your country for our common historic past.”186 Moreover, when from one 
side Kosachev idealistically points to overcoming mutual complexes and prejudices by 
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good will and aspirations to dialog; Kolerov, from another side is deeply concerned about 
the assimilation tendencies of the Russian population in Latvia: “Any attempt to 
substitute the integration with assimilation will cause strict objections from Russia.”187  
Thus, the Russian political leadership actually attempts to send messages across 
the whole moderate political spectrum, trying to find out in which audiences each of them 
could work. The overall goal of these different approaches, however, is to send self-
styled messages that would support an image of seeking practical solutions to problems.  
One such example is President Putin’s statement on Russian television: 
We very much hope that this will be met with understanding, both by the 
citizens of Latvia and by the Latvian authorities; that they will understand 
that Russia does not intend to split Latvian society, or society in the other 
Baltic republics. On the contrary, we want it to be a unified society, but a 
society in which people, regardless of their language and ethnic origin, 
feel they are full-fledged citizens of the country where they live, the 
country they have chosen as their motherland… But I repeat, we will try to 
do this in a nonconfrontational way, so as not to create new problems…188 
This is pragmatism par excellance. But we should not hastily consider this a clear 
roadmap for the solution of the problem. The Russian president and Latvian authorities 
are not divided on the need of a unified society in Latvia. A “non-confrontational way,” 
however, is seen differently on each side of the issue. It is not likely that the intent of 
Russian leaders is to encourage compatriots to prioritize learning the Latvian language, to 
integrate into Latvian society and, become proud people of a Latvian state that is 
multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious. Thus, the actions of Russian officials do 
not leave an impression that pragmatism from words could be transformed into 
implementation of reconciliatory policies.  
In spite of the Russian hammering, a supposedly “well known” problem with 
Russians in Latvia has never developed, and ethnic tensions obviously lack potential to 
change into something seriously destabilizing. Approximately 60 per cent of Latvians and 
Russians have positive experiences in their daily interaction and roughly only one tenth 
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of the population called their experience with other ethnic group a negative or rather 
negative.189 This leads to the conclusion that the Moscow’s constructed reality actually 
does not exist in the form presented to the international community. This can be 
explained only by the motivation to create at least some political leverage, or to use the 
scarce “positional goods” available for Russia in order to recreate its self-image as a great 
power.190 Moreover, the Russian position towards Latvia has been overtly harsher than in 
case of the authoritarian states of Central Asia, where “Moscow turned blind eye to both 
the suppression of opposition… and the violations of human rights of Russian ethnic 
minorities.”191 
The question of why Latvian-Russian relations “stumble on minorities” offers 
only two explanations. Either Russian policy makers do not understand the political 
process in Latvia, or they ignore it, pushing their own agenda and disregarding the 
possibility for improvement of bilateral relations. The transparency of Latvian society 
makes collection of data and its analysis easy; therefore the option that analysts would be 
hindered from gathering all necessary data about political events in Latvia is unlikely. 
Hence, as much as the status of Russians is important for the future political ambitions of 
Russia, the need for self-preservation is important for Latvians. Therefore, the 
possibilities for changes in the position towards use of language and citizenship 
procedure in Latvia are highly unlikely, if not impossible. Moreover, since knowledge of 
Latvian language and history seem absolutely sensible for being a citizen of the Republic 
of Latvia;192  Russian pressure will only create a proportional Latvian resistance.   
The Russian foreign policy vision to use ethnic Russians as a tool for preserving 
political influence in the Baltic States is the only workable explanation of Russian actions 
persistently trying to discredit Latvia in the international arena. If so, the different roles of 
Russian bureaucrats and politicians fit perfectly into the action described by Deputy 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin, who estimated that from ten to twenty six 
million Russians live outside CIS countries. This leads him to a statement: “Our firm 
decision is – we need to go outside the CIS countries in order to work with our 
compatriots.”193 The aim for these actions is not humanitarian assistance or improvement 
of cultural relations. It is about the political status of Russians abroad, about their ethnic 
consciousness, political organization, and unity. The only question then is whether 
Russians understand that intentionally or not, substitution of cultural relations with 
political support to one ethnic group is perceived by host nations as the actions of an 
enemy. Used in combination with economics, this policy becomes a genuine coercive 
power for regaining influence in the former Soviet realm. Hence, ethnic Russians outside 
their motherland are not necessarily a source of insecurity; they are used as a tool for 
Russia’s revived claim for position in the international system, currently bound by typical 
“status inconsistency.”194 
3. Economic Cooperation 
Economic cooperation and the issue of Russians in Latvia are very closely linked in 
Russian policies; therefore, this sphere of bilateral relations has been under persistent threat 
of disruption. There are many accounts during the fifteen years after the collapse of Soviet 
Union when Russian officials were ready to vote for economic sanctions against Latvia. The 
last time such a statement was publicly expressed in August 17, 2005, when an unnamed 
source in the administration of the Russian president addressed the possibility of using 
economic sanctions specifically against Latvia, in order to change allegedly discriminating 
policies against its Russian population.195 This particular link to the status of Slavic 
minorities in the Baltic States has been recently made public. Grigory Karasin claimed that 
Russia could change its [economic] policy towards Latvia and Estonia because of treatment 
of Russians, who have been “discriminated against.”196 What kind of pattern these changes 
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could take we can calculate from the statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, 
who during the session of the Federation Council on October 12, 2005 promised  deputies “to 
use a broad arsenal of tools of economic coercion”197 in regard to  less-than-loyal neighbors. 
Later he referred to government plans directed towards increasing the profitability of Russian 
energy companies. Even if this is the real cause for the changes of Russian energy policies, 
the rhetoric of officials to use  energy resources as “a stick” for relations with countries which 
do not support Russia’s policies, is symptomatic. Hence, relations between Latvia and Russia 
should be analyzed with this overlay in mind, because the current Ambassador of Russian 
federation in Latvia, Viktor Kalyzhni, is the former minister of fuel and energy of Russia, and 
an experienced party bureaucrat and energy resource specialist.198 
The role of the current Ambassador of Russia should be considered very 
important. He does not hide Russian interests to increase influence in Latvian transit 
business. There is no coincidence that his first business trip as an ambassador was to the 
Latvian transit capital city of Ventspils. After this visit Kalyzhni openly stated that in 
order to renew oil flow from Russia through the closed pipeline of Ventspils nafta 
enterprise, “Latvia has to seek for a Russian strategic investor.”199 The chain of 
administrative events that prevented the oil pipeline from functioning, explains why the 
pipeline was closed,  
mainly as a result of the administrative resolutions of the Russian oil 
pipeline monopoly Transneft and the Russian Federal Energy 
Commission. These resolutions were aimed at not allowing Russian oil 
exports via the Ventspils transit corridor and directing as many exports as 
possible via the Primorsk oil terminal owned by Transneft.200 
Therefore, it is obvious that the activities of the Russian ambassador are less 
directed towards active cooperation in the sphere of transit, but to increasing  the 
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influence of Russian state owned companies, which no doubt can bring more profits, but 
also more dependency from the administrative decisions within Russian politics. As such 
the position of Latvians refusing to sell their energy companies to Russians is coherent 
with the vision of national security, which considers diversification of energy supplies an 
important priority for diminishing the unwelcome tendencies of monopolization in this 
sphere.201 Hence, the ambassador’s claim that  
Russia is open and predictable. The politics of Vladimir Putin are 
understandable for all. Currently Russia has good relations with the EU 
and NATO, with leaders of economic great powers.202  
is not so obvious for Latvians. Moreover, the overarching irony of the inability of Latvians to 
grasp the economic benefits from the offered cooperation is not a good way to communicate, 
if the Russians persistently fail to translate their intentions into attractive and peaceful 
looking proposals of economic policy.    
The unknown variable thus far is the intention of Russians after gaining control 
over the largest energy companies in Latvia. The discourse of political contacts leads us 
to think that here Russians would not deal with profitability of their enterprises or  
exploring  new markets, but the purchase of a tool for influencing political processes in 
Latvia, now a member of the EU and NATO. For this purpose the ambassador is trying to 
create a myth that if Latvia would sell its assets and stop complaining about historical 
injustice, the economic benefits would be enormous. These expectations should be 
considered rather naïve, because nothing impedes the transit and economic cooperation 
right now, except an argument that Russia actually does not get any political benefit from 
this type of cooperation.  
In this respect the emotional reaction in Latvia on the signing of the agreement 
between Russian Gazprom and German BASF on building the gas pipeline is well 
understandable. Symbolic importance of this treaty has been added by the presence of top 
political leaders of Russia and Germany; therefore this project has been called “a new 
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German-Russian pact” or “Putin-Schroeder pact.” The gas pipeline project is the best 
evidence that the practical implementation of “geopolitics of energy resources” has 
started and that Russians are aware of the gamble they are taking to profit from a lack of 
coherent EU position on energy. European states need more energy resources and gas is 
cheapest available and obviously will remain so for a long time. If this pipeline would be 
an entirely economic project, it would not be laid beneath the Baltic Sea. For the mutual 
gains the most convenient route would go through Poland and/or the Baltic States, in 
order to ensure that all interested nations of the EU would profit from this project. The 
interdependency between the Baltic States, Poland and Russia would increase and this 
would be the right moment to prove the new and friendly nature of Russian economic 
policy. The concerns that the decision on building the gas pipeline from Russia to 
Germany is a political project were expressed not only by the leaders of the Baltic States 
and Poland, but also by Commissary for Energetic of the EU Andris Piebalgs.203 
The actual implementation of the project leaves major doubts about its allegedly 
non-political foundations. Behind the route of the project, there are potential losses for 
the Baltic States and Poland in case of political discrepancies with Russia. The lack of an 
alternative source of supply makes dependency on Russia really frightening, because the 
Russian-German project theoretically allows closing the gas supplies to these countries, 
even if the political costs would for Russia be enormous, dare the politicians such actions. 
Nevertheless, exactly these concerns were strengthened by Andrians Dāvis, the Chairman 
of the Latvian energy monopoly Latvijas Gaze, who expressed the opinion that after the 
gas pipeline is finished the current natural gas storage in Latvia becomes useless for 
Russia,204 and as such the future of Russian gas supply to the Baltic States appears to be 
dubious. It should be said, however, that even if such an option is only theoretical and 
political costs for such action would be catastrophic for Russia, it provides reason enough 
for seeking alternative energy sources.205 The Russian leadership also does not hurry to 
reassure Latvians about the secure future of energy supplies, thus adding to the 
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uncertainty of the situation. Interestingly, among shareholders of Latvijas Gāze are the 
Gazprom and another Russian company Itera-Latvija, which were interested in the 
economically most profitable solution and thus to participate in the gas pipeline project. 
According to the company officials, they worked actively to be included in the pipeline 
project, but were prevented from that.206 Thus, the political decision to exclude a Latvian 
company from participation in the project signals that the promised profits would remain 
an illusion if political gains for Russia are not part of the business deal.  
The Russian politicians have many times stated how important it is to “separate 
economics from politics” or to provide “economic incentives”207 in order to improve the 
bilateral political process. As evidence demonstrates, these statements are misleading, 
because Russia does not have incentives to improve the economic relations with neighboring 
countries if such cooperation does not strengthen the political positions of Russia. In other 
words, if Latvia continues to disagree with Russia on history and the treatment of its Russian 
population, no successful cooperation will ever be possible. 
D. COOPERATION BETWEEN MISPERCEPTION AND HYPOCRISY 
The Russian foreign policy towards Latvia displays a strong inconsistency between 
political statements and real commitments. The inability of Russia to portray and implement 
its foreign policy as friendly towards its closest neighbors is the largest problem of Russian 
foreign policy makers. In words Russia expresses its willingness for cooperation in the whole 
spectrum of bilateral relations. Russia, however, implements policies that disregard any 
mutual gains. As a result of that, Russia’s energorealism creates suspicions concerning what 
the real Russian intents are. The one policy direction, however, is clear: putting the 
combination of energy policy and compatriot relations into a regional perspective, Russia 
leads towards the facilitation of internal schism within the EU about the future of energy 
supplies, gaining and politically profiting from it. In a situation, when European states are 
similarly interested in possibly cheaper energy resources, Poland and the Baltic States 
                                                 
206 The shareholders of Latvijas Gaze are German E.ON Ruhrgas International AG that holds 47, 15 
per cent, OAO Gazprom holds 25 per cent and SIA Itera-Latvija - 25 per cent shares each. See the position 
of the chairman of company’s board Adrians Davis at news agency LETA report from September 5, 2005, 
available online at the web page of news portal TVNET at 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/arzemes/article.php?id=82190  accessed on April 16, 2006.  
207 Both statements cited in Mikhail Demurin, Russia and the Baltic States: Not a Case of “Flawed 
History, Russia in Global Affairs, No.3, July-September 2005. 
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have a risk to slide gradually into an energetic “quasi isolation.” Therefore, the idea of 
“energy NATO” should be considered as a serious signal of insecurity that has a potential 
for escalating.  
In general, it is obvious that Russia does not have a comprehensive and positive 
long term policy towards Latvia. It makes Russia rather psychologically alienated from 
its neighbors. Indications of velikoderzhavie (great power state) have been faced in the 
Baltic States very critically and make them ready to sacrifice any cooperation with Russia 
if that can help to secure their independence. Thus, this policy may appear more realistic 
than it might appear in Moscow. The current “negative stability” or political freeze on 
most important bilateral questions is directed to the future, when political dispositions 
could possibly create advantages for both states to achieve their goals. One of the most 
influential Russian foreign policy experts, Sergei Karaganov, described this saying: “We 
[Russia] lack a long-term policy with regard to most regions of the world. We lack 
strategic planning. We lack knowledge.”208 The lack of knowledge creates and maintains 
the Russian perception of Latvians as their greatest enemies in the world.209  
George Kennan mentioned that it was the Soviet leadership that “consistently 
added to the dimensions of… problem[s] by their own actions.”210 He continues, saying 
that in order to reassert the legitimacy of the regime, which is essential for Russia to 
remain politically stable, “they never hesitated to depict the outside world as more 
inimical and menacing than it actually was, and to treat it accordingly. In this way they 
not only encumbered themselves with imagined burdens that had no real existence, but 
they also provoked real fears and resentments that need otherwise never have existed.”211 
From this perspective, the approach of Russia on relations with Latvia has from the 
Soviet time changed as little as possible. 
                                                 
208 Sergei Karaganov, Take Care  Not To Repeat The Same Mistake, Nezavisimaya Gazeta – 
Dipkurier, No. 16 (79) December 2004, Yulia Petrovskaya, available on line at the WPS Monitoring 
Agency web page at www.wps.ru/e_index.html  accessed on April 22, 2006  
209 The public polls in the spring of 2005 in Russia revealed that Latvia and Estonia are among four 
states Russians see as  greatest enemies. Latvia is first with 49 per cent, second was Lithuania with 42 per 
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http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050621/40562651.html accessed on December 4, 2005. This trend has been 
confirmed also by similar survey by VTsIOM in May 2006. 
210 George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy: 1917-1941, Greenwood Press, Publishers, Westport 
Connecticut, 1978, 115.  
211 Ibid., 115. 
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V.  THE LATVIAN-RUSSIAN BORDER: NEGATIVE STABILITY 
AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE: THE VIEW FROM LATVIA  
The interstate the border status and the signing of the border treaty between the 
two states have been the most widely discussed issues over the last three years in 
Latvian-Russian bilateral relations. The main differences between the states’ positions are 
about the status of the Abrene district (or current Pytalovskii region of the Russian 
Federation).212 Twice – in 1997 and in 2005 – the two governments considered signing a 
treaty, but neither time did pursue these intentions. As of the summer 2006, the prospects 
for signing the border treaty remain unclear and the situation around the whole issue has 
developed into a precarious stalemate. Apparently, neither side has any incentive to move 
neither forward with the signing of the treaty nor with a solution to the problem. 
The border dispute is at the center of relationship problems between the two 
states. First, there are issues of international law involved such as the recognition of 
occupation and the illegal annexation of Latvian territory. Second, both Latvia and Russia 
maintain rigid and disparate positions in regard to the historical interpretation of the 
events of the 1940’s. Third, the border dispute reveals the inconsistencies in the policies 
of Latvia and Russia regarding to the status and the new border treaty. In other words, the 
dispute over the border is not a single issue; it is a package of problems. Thus the ability 
to solve them is a litmus test for the maturity of bilateral relations between the states. A 
solution to border problem has not been reached during the last fifteen years. 
In this dispute the neighbors have opposing arguments. Latvia claims that the 
border problem was created by the chain of events in 1939 and 1940: namely the Soviet 
and Nazi non-aggression treaty and the occupation, and incorporation of Latvia into the 
Soviet Union.213 After 1991, Latvia pursued a non-recognition policy towards the transfer 
of the Abrene district to the Russian Federation. Russia, on the other hand, grounded its 
                                                 
212 In this chapter both names of disputed territory - Latvian Abrene and Russian Pytalovo - are used 
referenced to the position of the respective country.   
213 The secret additional protocols of the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-aggression (or the so-called 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact) assumed the “territorial and political rearrangements in the areas belonging to 
the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania)…” The text of the secret additional protocol 
available in George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy: 1917-1941, Greenwood Press, Publishers, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1960, 178. 
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interpretation of the border problem on the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, which 
introduced the principle of inviolability of state borders in Europe. By this provision, 
Russia claimed that the administrative border between Latvia and Russia at the moment 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union must be determined as the legitimate border. The 
current stalemate hinders the development of Latvian-Russian relations in other spheres 
and is the most explicit example of how the past impedes policymaking and prospects for 
future cooperation.  
This chapter argues that even if international law establishes Latvian rights over 
the district of Abrene, the border dispute seems unsolvable without mutual political 
commitment and compromise. Any expectation to achieve “absolute” victory in this 
dispute, from one side or the other, should be considered unrealistic. I also argue that 
Russia as successor of the Soviet Union, must take the significant step of admitting that 
the problem of the Abrene district derives from the purposeful political actions of the 
Soviet government in 1944 and 1946 that were neither legal nor democratic. 
The evidence brought out in this chapter reveals that over the last three years 
Latvia and Russia have been trying to move their relationship into the future using  
modifications  to border dispute policies formulated  a decade ago, leading to inconsistent 
actions and confusion about the real intentions of both states. This chapter explains the 
roots of the border problem, the official positions and policies of Latvia and Russia, and 
the practical implementation of policies. The Chapter suggests the possible ways of 
solving the problem. 
A.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BORDER PROBLEM  
The border of the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federative Socialist 
Republic was stipulated by the Latvian-Russian Peace treaty signed in Riga on August 
11, 1920. According to this treaty “Russia recognizes without objection the independence 







Russia in relation to the Latvian nation and land on the basis of the previous State legal 
regime as well as any international agreements…”214 The Treaty also established the 
border between both states.215  
Before World War II the district of Abrene, including six parishes, comprised 
approximately two percent of Latvian territory with a population of 35,000.216 The Peace 
treaty became such an important legal document that legal reference to it is included in 
the Constitution of Latvia (Satversme). More specifically, Article Three of Satversme 
stipulates “the territory of the State of Latvia, within the borders established by 
international agreements…,”217 and only international agreement that establishes a 
Latvian border with Russia is the Riga Peace Treaty. 
In the twenty years between signing of the Peace Treaty and the Soviet 
occupation of Latvia, both states confirmed their commitment to respect the interstate 
borders. On February 5, 1932, Latvia and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression 
treaty that was based on the Riga Peace Treaty, which “inalterably and for all time form 
the firm basis” of Latvian and Soviet inter-state relationships.218 According to non-
aggression treaty, Latvia and Russia confirmed commitment to respect the territorial 
integrity of both states. On October 5, 1939 Russia and Latvia signed another treaty in 
which both states made reference to the Riga Peace Treaty. However, the “mutual 
assistance pact,”219 as it is known, actually established rights for a limited presence of 
Soviet ground forces and Navy on Latvian soil.220 This treaty stipulates that the Peace 
Treaty and Non-aggression Treaty comprise the firm foundation of bilateral relations 
                                                 
214 Article II of the Peace Treaty. Text of the Treaty available online at the web page of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Latvia at http://www.am.gov.lv/en/policy/peace-treaty  accessed on December 8, 
2005. 
215 See Article III of the Peace Treaty. 
216 This number, however, cannot be expected to be precise, due to the military operations of World 
War II and the massive emigration of much of the population from the area by the 1944. Dietrich Loeber, 
for example, in his publications about the Abrene district mentions the number 50,000.   
217 The Constitution of Latvia, available online at the web page of Latvian Parliament at 
http://www.saeima.lv/index_eng.html accessed on December 9, 2005. 
218 The text of the Non-aggression Treaty of 1932 cited in Occupation of Latvia: Three Occupations 
1940-1991: Soviet and Nazi Takeovers and Their Consequences, Occupation Museum Foundation Riga, 
2004, 6.   
219 Ibid.,6. 
220 Similar treaties were signed with Lithuania and Estonia at approximately the same time.  
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between Latvia and Russia. Even so, in June 1940 the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic 
States and incorporated Latvia, thus creating dramatic political changes in the country. 
In July of 1944, Soviet troops re-entered Latvian territory following the retreat of 
German army units. On August 22, 1944, the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet 
Socialist Republic made the decision to transfer three districts of Latvian territory to 
Russia.221 The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR supported this petition 
based on “repeated requests” of the population of the Abrene district,222 and in 1946 these 
changes were stipulated in the Soviet legislation.223 
In 1990-1991 the border issue was again on the political agenda because the 
Latvian Declaration of Independence obliged the Latvian government to negotiate 
relations with the Soviet Union based on the Riga Peace Treaty of August 11, 1920,224  
which obliged the Latvian government to talk about the status and future of the Abrene 
district. The disputed territories were left with only a temporary demarcation line “until 
the issue has been decided in negotiations with the Russian Federation.”225  
These negotiations on the state borders started after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Since 1992, the discussion about Abrene has been constrained by the 
Latvian political position to re-establish Latvian statehood and apply the previously 
binding Latvian-Russian Peace treaty. Other challenges to negotiation are consequences 
of the occupation and the Russian position to refuse recognition of the occupation, and 
claiming the legitimacy of border changes of 1944 and 1946. The Latvian-Russian 
governmental commission prepared a de facto demarcation line by the end of 1997 or so 
                                                 
221 Decree of the Supreme Soviet of Latvian SSR, cited in Dietrich Loeber Russian-Latvian 
Territorial Dispute Over Abrene, The Parker School Jounal of International Law, Vol. 2, 1995, 540.  
222 Ibid., 541. 
223 Dietrich Loeber  in his research Russian-Latvian Territorial Dispute Over Abrene makes reference 
to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR On Establishing the Border 
between the Latvian SSR and RSFSR, October 5, 1946 and Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR ob 
utverzhdenii izmenenii granitsy mezhdu Latviiskoi SSR i RSFSR [Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR: On Confirming the Changes of the Border between the Latvian SSR and RSFSR], 
October 19, 1946.   
224 See the web page of the Parliament of Latvia at http://www.saeima.lv/4maijs/docs/d_4maijs.htm 
accessed on December 5, 2005.   
225 Dietrich Loeber Russian-Latvian Territorial Dispute Over Abrene, The Parker School Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 2, 1995, 542. 
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called “technical agreement.”226 The government of Latvia supported a draft treaty on 
December 9, 1997, but failed to gain support for the signing and ratification of the treaty 
in Parliament. Initially the provisions of the new border treaty were kept secret from the 
Latvian society, but it was clear that the Latvian government was ready to sign the border 
treaty without establishing territorial claims. The Russian government refused, because of 
other political issues to ratify the document. Both states continued to maintain their 
positions on the issue. 
From 1998-2004 Latvian-Russian relations were regularly shaken by a fever of 
distrust and countless mutual insults. In such an atmosphere, achieving the agreement on 
the interstate borders did not seem likely and the process was temporarily disrupted. 
In late fall of 2004, Russia expressed an interest in signing the border treaty and 
the negotiation process re-started.227 Nonetheless, in spring 2005, on the eve of the 60th 
Anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in WWII, Russian-Latvian political dialog 
reached new heights of disagreement. Since arguments about the events at the end of 
World War II, and after directly touched upon changes to the Latvian-Russian border, the 
option to sign the new border treaty again appeared on the bilateral agenda. Now the 
dispute over the new border’s legitimacy triggered the antagonistic positions of both 
parties concerning recognition of occupation and the overall evaluation of the outcome of 
World War II. Again, both states prepared the earlier version of the border treaty for 
signing planned for May 10, 2005, as part of the EU-Russian negotiations.  
Meanwhile, in Latvia, after ill-prepared and controversial debate among the 
public as well as foreign policy experts, the politicians came to an agreement that signing 
the border treaty without its having a reference to the Riga Peace Treaty was not 
possible.228 In April 26, 2005, the Latvian government adopted the explanatory  
 
 
                                                 
226 The draft treaty can be called a “technical agreement” only theoretically, because the formulations 
within the treaty speak about “state border” not about “line of demarcation.”  
227 The interest of Russia was emphasized in the interview of the minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia 
Artis Pabriks to monthly magazine Rigas laiks, Riga, August, 2005. 
228 Aleksandrs Kiršteins, Shall We Raise a Toast to The Aggressors on May 9, available online at 
news portal Apollo at http://www.apollo.lv/portal/news/73/articles/37938  accessed on December 9, 2005. 
Mr. Kiršteins is the former Chairman of Foreign Commission of Parliament of the Republic of Latvia, 
translation from Latvian.  
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amendment to the draft border treaty in the form of a declaration that would make clear 
that the current border status not being the result of the will of Latvia might redress the 
problem in the future.229  
This Latvian position was unacceptable for Russia. On April 29, the Russian 
MFA informed the Russian media that the signing of the treaty was impossible until 
Latvia releases its territorial claims to Russia. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
claimed that “the text of declaration in fact points to the territorial claims, (and) denies 
the border Treaty between two states its aim and goal.”230   
Currently, both sides maintain their positions and the only prepared draft treaty is 
the one confirming the borders in their existing status, namely, leaving Abrene (Pytalovo) 
under the jurisdiction of Russia. Signing the border treaty in the foreseeable future does 
not seem likely. Also, a solution to the whole complex of political disagreements between 
Latvia and Russia is far from a final resolution.  
B.  LATVIAN POSITION AND POLICY: A SOLUTION ACCORDING TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Latvian position towards the issue of returning occupied territory has never 
been politically unequivocal. The Parliament of Latvia did accept the decision for non-
recognition of the annexation of the Abrene district.231 However, this decision does not 
contain a strong demand for transferring the territory of the Abrene district to Latvia. 
According to the Foreign Policy Concept of 1995, Latvia claimed that the border problem 
of the Abrene district must be solved according to internationally recognized norms.232 In 
this sense, proposed Latvian readiness to sign the treaty makes clear that the principal 
“non-recognition” of the de facto situation; however, it does not provide Latvian society 
and government with the envisioned end state.  
                                                 
229 See the declaration of Parliament of Latvia on the border treaty between Latvia and Russia, 
available online at the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia at 
http://www.am.gov.lv/en/policy/bilateral-relations/statement/Declaration/ accessed on March 27, 2006. 
230 The Commentary of the Ministry of foreign Affairs of Russian Federation at http://www.mid.ru/ns-
reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419c7a/432569d80022027ec3256ff100487f8a?OpenDocument  
accessed on March 27, 2006. 
231 See the web page of the Parliament of Latvia at http://www.saeima.lv/4maijs/docs/4sesija.htm  
accessed on December 5, 2005. 
232 See the web page of the Parliament of Latvia at http://www.saeima.lv/AK/dokumenti-koncepcija-
div.html accessed on December 5, 2005. 
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Since 2005 draft policy guidelines233 do not reference the border problem, the 
current policy in regard to the border dispute can only be calculated from the statements 
of Latvian politicians in the media and in the public environment in general. Thus, the 
Latvian minister of foreign affairs, introducing the draft policy guidelines, claimed that 
“the signing of the border treaty with Russia is a significant precondition”234 in order to 
ensure successful cooperation with other EU states in the spheres of internal affairs and 
justice. This position, actually, does not contradict or challenge the position that the 
Latvian Parliament established a decade earlier. Other founding policy documents, such 
as NSC, also do not speak about the border problem as a possible risk for the national 
security. Nor is the necessity to solve the border problem mentioned in declarations of 
Cabinet actions of Latvia, as we saw in previous chapters.235 Hence, for Latvia the 
solution to the border problem is not a national security priority. 
The lack of reference to the importance of the Latvian border in updated policy 
papers nevertheless is misleading. The statement included in the Foreign Policy Concept 
of 1995 should be considered valid,236 but the abstention from restating the official 
position of 1995 can be explained by the sensitivity of the problem and the lack of firm 
policy towards the treaty. 
The Foreign Policy Concept of 1995 determines the Latvian position, based on 
provisions of international law, and demands restoration of the boundaries existing prior 
to occupation – i.e. June 17, 1940. Since Latvia was occupied the decisions made by the 
Soviet puppet authorities concerning the transfer of the Abrene district into the Russian 
Federation were completed unconstitutionally and were invalid. This claim has a strong 
foundation, because there is no sufficient ground “to invoke ‘change of circumstances’ 
(clausula rebus sic stantibus) with respect to the peace treaties of 1920.”237  
                                                 
233 New foreign policy guidelines were introduced in the government by the end of 2004 by Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks. 
234 Artis Pabriks, Jaunie ārpolitikas ceļa rādītāji (New signposts of foreign policy), Diena, November 
11, 2004. 
235 See the web page of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, available at 
http://www.mk.gov.lv/index.php/?id=30  accessed on April 3, 2006. 
236 The Foreign Policy Concept determined Latvian Foreign policy until 2005. 
237 Lauri Mälksoo. Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: The Case of Incorporation of the Baltic 
States by the USSR: A Study of the Tension between Normativity and Power in International Law, Martinus 
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In the field of practical politics, however, that the demands of Latvia are very 
controversial was mirrored by the extensive domestic debate throughout 2005. The 
official position, expressed in policy documents and statements during the last decade, 
has been not actively pursued in practical terms. The obvious discrepancy between stated 
policy goals and the actions of government officials creates an impression that Latvia 
does not have a convincing policy in regard to its Eastern border, and actions rather 
deriving from available options in any given situation. This assumption is based on two 
observations: the Latvian efforts to internationalize the issue along with official and 
public statements. 
1.  Limits of Internationalization 
During the last fifteen years Latvia did not undertake any significant steps to seek 
internationalization of the border issue in order to achieve the results stipulated by the 
Foreign Policy Concept. On the official level, the search for alternate solutions was also 
minimal. Thus the negotiations with Russia which started in 1991 remained the only 
practical policy instrument for the solution of this problem. In order to involve the 
international community into the solution of the border dispute, the options available for 
Latvia were essentially two: a) the International Court of Justice (ICJ); and b) the 
European Union (EU). Other theoretically possible options for discussion of this issue are 
within the framework of regional political organizations such as Council of Baltic Sea 
States or even the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); these 
organizations, however, by the nature of aim or actions directly do not deal with the 
solution of the border problems.238 
a. International Court of Justice 
The ICJ, as has been proved by cases of land and maritime disputes 
between states around the world, is regarded by the international community as 
competent and authoritative to deal with problems in its jurisdiction.239 A judicial solution 
involving the ICJ would fit into Latvian policy goals; nevertheless, Latvia has never 
                                                 
238 One of the main political organizations of the Northern Dimension, the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, in late autumn 2005 expressed support for the Estonian position in its border dispute with 
Russia. Even though politically important, it does not pursue any further action and therefore the 
internationalization of the issue in this case could not be considered as established institutionally.    
239 See the electronic catalog of cases of International Court of Justice at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm  accessed on March 18, 2006. 
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expressed such a proposal. According to Loeber, neither Latvia nor Russia recognizes the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ in this case.240 William Slomanson explains that the ICJ “does not 
have the power to hear cases, absent the express consent of the defendant nation.”241 From 
this perspective, the ICJ and international regimes in general, have only as much power 
and influence as the member states are willing to accept. Hence, the possibility to hear a 
“Latvia vs. Russia” case in the ICJ seems unlikely in the future, too. 
These constraints, even the most important ones, are not the only factors 
behind Latvia’s abstaining from using the ICJ as a tool for solving the border dispute. 
There is also an important political subtext. In light of the dramatic disagreements 
between Latvia and Russia on the historical interpretation of this issue, a ruling of the ICJ 
would probably create a solution for the border problem, but not address the whole 
complex of disagreements that surround this issue.  
The context of the whole spectrum of Latvian-Russian relations prevented 
the utility of an “ICJ option.” For example, from 1991-1994 Latvia had one overarching 
policy goal to be achieved in relations with Russia: the withdrawal of the Russian 
military from Latvian soil.  Any ICJ case most definitely would not facilitate already 
complicated negotiations on this matter and the physical withdrawal in general. Later, the 
integration process into NATO and the EU also affected the foreign policy agenda in a 
way that the border dispute was put aside. In the early 2000’s Russia was also interested 
keeping the border treaty issue low on the priority list, because its political weakness 
suggested possibilities that the unsolved border problem could become an impediment for 
Latvian participation in the EU. Such expectations of the Russian side were legitimate, 
because, as Loeber mentions, the Pact for Stability in Europe, signed in Paris in 1995 
called potential candidate states “to solve their territorial disputes, if they wish to qualify 
as candidates for membership in the European Union and in NATO.”242 But no objections 
eventually were put in the way of Latvia (and by the same matter Estonia) to become a 
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member of the EU and NATO. Hence, “the EU option” seems natural for 
internationalization of the border issue after Latvia became a member of the Union. 
b. The European Option 
The border of Latvia and Russia is at the same time the border of the EU 
and Russia, therefore the influence and political authority of the EU should be expected 
to create conditions for finding an acceptable solution. A successful example, how the 
cooperation problems of one of its members and Russia could be transformed into the 
framework of the EU-Russia negotiations is handling of problem of Kaliningrad. Here, 
Lithuania and Russia could not find a solution of the Russian military transit, was 
transformed from the bilateral into the multilateral framework as early as 2001, - i.e. 
before Lithuania became a member of the EU.243 
The position of the EU towards the border problems of Latvia always has 
been expressed very diplomatically and essentially favored the improvement of Latvian 
relations with Russia in the border dispute. The requirement to have solved border 
problems before consideration of membership in the EU was not enforced in the Latvian 
case, however. 
The EU also never became involved in an active mediation between 
Latvia and Russia concerning bilateral discrepancies. The Foreign Relations 
Commissioner Benita Fererro-Waldner expressed the opinion that the European 
Commission will do everything possible to urge Russia to sign a border treaty even 
before the celebrations of the end of World War II in May 2005.244 High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the 
European Union Javier Solana stated that he persistently works with the border problem 
of Latvia. At the same time he explained the cautious European position in regard to the 
dispute by saying that “we have to avoid statements that could make the situation 
complicated.”245 Obviously, the diplomatic language of European leaders does not 
                                                 
243 See the position of the EU in Overview of the EU-Russian relations available online at the internet 
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accessed on March 19,2006.  
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encourage Latvians to stay on their positions to solve the border issue “according to 
international norms,” because it inevitably would end with increasing cooperation 
problems with Russia, which is more than likely a “no” to the EU leadership option. 
At one moment in the spring of 2005 prospects for intervention of the EU 
in order to solve the problems of one of the newest members of the Union (Latvia) 
seemed realistic. Commissioner Fererro-Waldner pointed out that on May 10, 2005 
during the EU-Russia summit, both sides agreed to determine signing and ratifying the 
border treaties “a priority for development of the EU-Russia relations.”246 The President 
of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barosso claimed that the situation between 
Latvia and Russia should be considered “very serious” and on May 13 he was ready to 
become a mediator between the two states. In a similar way Javier Solana was also ready 
to intervene in the dispute.247 Even more, according to Latvian media, some Latvian 
diplomats sincerely believed that the agreements reached in Moscow on May 10 would 
remain on the paper only, if the “Latvian problem” would not find its solution.248 
The European position changed significantly in May 2005. A week after 
the overwhelmingly optimistic statements of EU leaders, Fererro-Waldner suddenly 
claimed that the border issue was a “primarily bilateral problem.”249 The minister of 
foreign affairs of Latvia Artis Pabriks announced that since the EU does not express a 
unitary position on foreign policy “currently we cannot expect the EU to intervene in the 
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on May 18, 2005, at www.leta.lv accessed on March 28, 2005.    
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Latvian-Russian border treaty.”250 The situation continued to deteriorate further by the 
statement of the Head of Bureau of Commissary for Energy Andris Ķesteris in August 
2005. He pointed out that the adoption of the unilateral declaration creates a special 
situation and that “Latvia should handle the situation by herself.”251 While the EU leaders 
sent one inconsistent message after another, Prime Minister Aigars Kalvītis stated that 
signing the new treaty in the current situation is not a priority of Latvia.252 
Eventually, in early December the Commissar confirmed her position and 
said to Estonian Eesti Paevaleht that the border treaty should be “mostly solved 
bilaterally…”253 The European Parliamentarians expressed a totally different position, 
saying that “unsigned border treaties is still one of the priorities in relations with Moscow 
and cannot be considered a bilaterally solvable problem.”254 The parliamentarians stated 
that even if judicially the border dispute could be seen as a bilateral issue, from a political 
perspective, as the Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee of the Parliament of 
Europe Elmar Brok said, a “different level of security in its regions is unacceptable.”255 
The bottom line of the European position, even though highly 
controversial, is comprised of two aspects. First, the changing position of the EU signals 
that the Union does not have a convincing position on how to solve the border problem 
between Latvia and Russia. It would not be acceptable for the EU not to deal with this 
problem at all, because even if the antagonistic tendencies between Latvia and Russia 
currently are in the latent phase, they still have potential to escalate into something more 
                                                 
250 Interview with Artis Pabriks to Latvian radio on July 18, 2005; excerpts available online at news 
agency LETA web page at  www.leta.lv, accessed on March 29, 2006 
251 Excerpts from the interview of Andris Kesteris to the TV program Nedēļa (A Week) of Latvian 
Independent television on August 13, 2006, cited in www.leta.lv accessed on March 28, 2006. 
252 News agency LETA, news report from June 10, 2005 available online at news agency LETA web 
page at www.leta.lv  For reference see also excerpts from response of Benita Fererro-Waldner to the letter 
of Chairmen of Foreign Relations Committee Elmar Brok and Tomas Hendrik Ilves, available online at 
www.leta.lv news report from November 15, 2005, accessed on March 28, 2006.   
253 Excerpts from the interview with Benita Ferrero-Waldner quoted by the news agency LETA. 
Available online at news agency LETA web page at www.leta.lv news report from December 12, 2005,  
accessed on March 28, 2006. 
254 Sanita Jemberga, ES Krievijai Atkārtoti Norāda, ka Baltiešu Robežlīgumi Nav Divpusēja Problēma 
(The EU Repeatedly State to Russia That Border Treaties of the Baltics Are Not a Bilateral Problem), 
Diena, October 12, 2005. 
255 Ibid. 
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profound and thus eventually endanger cooperative prospects between Russia and the 
EU. Moreover, leaving one of the Union’s members, Latvia, alone against Russia could 
be a wrong signal for other European states and potential democracies such as Moldova 
and Ukraine, who also have their own problem agenda with Russia.  
The second aspect is that the outcome of the border dispute in the Latvian 
case could only be considered successful from the perspective of Europeans if situation 
remains status quo. As observed from changing public statements by European leaders, 
interaction with Russia over small piece of former Latvian territory is apparently not an 
option in Europe.256 Signals, which Latvia received concerning the halt of EU 
involvement in the dispute does not, however, mean that the EU would lose interest in the 
issue in general. But the EU obviously will not support any changes of interstate borders 
in Europe out of concerns of chain reaction, and thus the EU position is clear: status quo 
must be maintained and solutions must be found deriving from this legal principle.  
This assumption also explains the changes in the EU position towards the 
problem, because no other policy changes towards Latvia or Russia could be observed at 
the time; no dramatic disagreements between Latvia and the EU can be found in the 
public media environment and, moreover, the unsigned border treaty does not create 
some kind of new political situation in relations between Latvia and Russia or the EU and 
Russia. The only significant factor influencing the change of the EU position is Latvia’s 
adoption of the unilateral declaration.  
Thus the attempt to internationalize pressure on Russia through the EU 
appeared unsuccessful, at least in the form Latvia desired. In the future the EU will 
follow the development of the border situation, but as an institution will most likely 
maintain low profile political involvement, and the solution of the problem will indeed be 
sought in a bilateral framework. 
c.  Alternative Solutions 
Besides attempts to internationalize the border problem, Latvia pursued 
two other options which could be regarded as alternative ways to reach resolution on the 
border treaty. It must be said that these activities never were emphasized by Latvian 
                                                 
256 The language of the statements would be interesting enough to study separately. From all possible 
varieties of positions, none actually emphasized Latvian rights to claim the territory. 
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foreign policy makers and thus should not be considered as a crucial part of seeking the 
solution to the border problem. Here they are only mentioned as illustrations of the 
efforts of the Latvian government to gain from the loss of territory.  
One of the alternatives was a compensation of five billion dollars for the 
lost territory that the Latvian parliament proposed in early 1992.257 However, after 
Russia refused to discuss the matter and called this proposal “cartographic 
manipulations”258 Latvia never pursued further discussions on this alternative, and after 
1992 it did not appear on the negotiating table in any form.  
Such an idea should not be considered wrong, because it generally fits into 
“solutions by international norms.” If Russia would agreed to pay, both states could 
consider that this was just a purchase of territory; all moral resentments, historical 
injustices and political capitalizations on the issue would not be on the agenda and this 
question would be  part of the past. The reluctance to pursue a demand after refusal by 
Russia to agree on Latvian terms can be explained only by the belief within the Latvian 
political elite of the 1990’s that Abrene could be transformed back and that the district is 
not inevitably lost.  
Also relatively unsuccessful was the attempt to solidify the Baltic position 
in regard to the border problem. After Lithuanian and Estonian leaders refused to join the 
Latvian President Vīķe-Freiberga in Moscow during the celebration of the end of World 
War II, the three states actually never reinforced their traditionally strong commitment 
for a similar position towards Russia concerning  events in past. This would be 
particularly important in the cases of Latvia and Estonia, whose border problems are 
identical. Even if it did not create any significant schism among the Baltic States, the 
obvious reservation to express observable political support  for each other signals that the 
Baltic States prefer to pursue individual agendas with Russia, and do not want to be tied 
into one chain of foreign policy that would limit their individual options. 
If a solely judicial solution of the border problem, one which leaves little 
doubt about Latvia’s strong and legitimate position, is not likely, the political process 
                                                 
257 John B. Allcock, et.al (ed.), Border and Territorial disputes Longman Current Affairs, 3rd edition, 
1992, 35. 
258 Ibid., 35. 
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requires preparedness to bargain and compromise. It does not mean, though, that a 
foreign policy goal to solve the border issue according to “international norms” would 
not be achievable. It only confirms that words and deeds of Latvian policy towards the 
Abrene district from the very beginning have gone different, and to a large extent, 
distinct, paths. The political process during last ten years, basically, has left Latvia with 
only one foreign policy option, namely, direct bilateral engagement with Russia. The EU, 
as evidenced by the position its officials, would facilitate any political process between 
Latvia and Russia which leads to the solution of the border problem, but not intervene 
directly. From the Latvian point of view, if the EU led mediation of the problem, it would 
not lead to the transfer of Abrene back to Latvia; therefore, such mediation is apparently 
not desired and the return to it is not necessary.  
To sum up, the whole process of border negotiations, failure of 
“internationalization policy,” and reaching a preliminary agreement on interstate borders 
in 1997 actually points to the natural limits of Latvian foreign policy in regard to the 
border problem, namely, that not all possible policy instruments are available for 
practical actions. At the same time, in cases of the ICJ and the EU, the Latvian position 
has not been pursued with the efforts necessary for the state to regain the territory of the 
Abrene district. 
2.  Political Elite and Domestic Constraints on the Border Problem 
In the situation of rather symbolic international support and involvement, Latvia 
has been left with two options: to continue seeking judicial non-recognition of the current 
status of the Abrene district or to comply with the de facto situation and sign the border 
treaty without certain preconditions and therefore to appease the all vested interests. 
From the foreign policy perspective, the first option seems hard to maintain. 
Latvia does not have any leverage on Russia to change its position in the most 
fundamental of discrepancies, namely, the illegality of Soviet actions after World War II. 
Thus the second option, which in fact was consequently pursued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Latvia during the 1990’s, still seems the most prudent and realistic. At 
the same time it must be said that an unconditional signing of the treaty should not be 
pursued, because such an option leaves Latvian foreign policy makers without any further 
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possibilities to claim the recognition of occupation. Moreover, Latvian society would 
remain divided on this issue and would strengthen national radicalism. 
From the domestic perspective, though, the situation is rather different. The 
second option is the harder one, because it requires explaining the difficult choices of 
foreign policy makers to the public, and pursuing strong domestic realpolitik that would 
put more important issues before less important ones, leaving policy makers free to 
discuss and eventually to open prospects for cooperation with Russia. Dealing with these 
difficulties in a year when the parliamentary elections are scheduled seems too heavy a 
burden for the ruling political forces.259 Moreover, the solution of the Abrene problem 
denies the ultra-right political forces a substantial portion of their rhetoric. Continuing to 
seek a legal solution does not, in fact, change the existing situation where the policy of 
“negative stability” – i.e. stalemate or stability without positive development – has been 
pursued by the current Latvian government. 
Before the developing further policies, Latvia has to answer the question whether 
the Abrene district is essential to Latvian self-determination, and to solve two internal 
impediments, namely, constitutional constraints and the reaching of consensus among the 
political elite concerning the Abrene district.  
a. A Problem of Political Consensus 
In an interview to the Russian newspaper Izvestija President Vīķe-
Freiberga said that “Latvia does not have a territorial claim to the retrieval of the Abrene 
district. We really do not want it.”260 This opinion, however, has been almost the only one 
voiced for lifting the non-recognition policy. The opinion of the president has not been 
openly shared by the majority of Latvian politicians, including of those of the currently 
ruling coalition. The position of the government, as expressed in an adopted amendment, 
does not imply readiness of the ruling elite to lift demands for re-transfer of the Abrene 
district. On the other hand, the draft treaty, if signed, would confirm the status quo. More  
 
 
                                                 
259 The elections of the Parliament of Latvia (Saeima) take place every four years. The next elections 
are scheduled for October 7, 2006. 
260 See the reference on the interview of President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga to Izvestija, December 23, 
2005. Excerpts available online at news portal TVNET web page at 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/printArticle.php?id=117493  accessed on March 18, 2006.   
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conservative right wing organizations and the most visible leaders of this political 
spectrum have called the possible signing of current version of the border treaty 
unacceptable and even more, treason.261 
Latvian society is divided over the border problem. According to public 
polls, the Latvian population by and large supports the actual borders and only one fifth 
of the population considers the current situation inadequate for Latvian interests.262 From 
this perspective, even if the government feels internal pressure, it has majority support for 
an active, rather than passive policy to finally resolve the issue.  
The domestic debate, though, was not handled and managed well. When 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Artis Pabriks, claimed in public media that he was not free to 
reveal Latvian foreign policy plans towards the solution of the border treaty, he justified 
it by saying “that people in some embassies are listening right now to what we are 
saying.”263 The nature of diplomacy, indeed, does not always permit revealing a 
developing “statement of policy.” But in this case, when  a decision must be made about 
the future of national territorial claims, the exclusion of public groups, such as NGO’s or 
academics, from the decision making process leads to an impression of “diplomacy a la 
Kissinger,” in which the solution of the Abrene district, with hindsight would be found 
without the consent of society. The classified status of the draft treaty, which has been 
maintained for more than seven years, is additional evidence that the involvement of 
society in disputes about Abrene was considered unproductive and thus terminable.264 The 
assumption that the border problem can be solved without involving a broad spectrum of 
society is wrong. Political organizations and academics, left without a serious  
 
                                                 
261 Raivis Dzintars, Nacionālie Spēki Pret Jaunu Robežlīgumu (National Forces Against the New 
Border Treaty), Latvijas Avīze, April 17, 2005.  
262 Data from the weekly TV program Nedēļa (A Week) based on a survey of the company SKDS; in 
June 2005, 53. 9 per cent of Latvians considered signing the treaty necessary, even if it leaves the Abrene 
district in Russia. 22. 9 per cent were against it and 23. 2 percent did not have a definite opinion. 
263 Public debates Kas notiek Latvijā? (What is going on in Latvia?), Latvian Television, January 9, 
2005. 
264 Here I also argue that lifting the status of confidentiality of the draft Latvian-Russian border treaty 
on April 26, 2005 is not so much a sign of maturity of the political leaders of Latvia than the democratic 
achievement of the civil society in Latvia, which was able to create and maintain pressure on bureaucratic 
institutions in order to force the government to be more transparent and understandable. 
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explanations about the intentions and political gains of the Latvian government to have 
treaty signed, used a last resort and pointed to constraints imposed by the Constitution to 
impede the signing of the treaty. 
Internal disunity points to weakness in the Latvian political elite, which 
instead of being busy with policy formulation towards the Abrene problem, puts effort 
into constructing rationalizations that have them not politically responsible for leaving 
the Abrene district in the possession of Russia. The border problem itself does not worry 
the political elite. Domestic “realists” have a genuine fear that the political force, which 
would back the retreat from demands concerning the Abrene district, would be fiercely 
attacked by all political forces to the center and right of the political spectrum, and that 
the current leadership coalition would eventually lose political power. This is why no 
politician openly agreed with the president of Latvia when she claimed no interest in the 
Abrene district, because according to the Constitution the president does not maintain 
significant political responsibility and thus is free by the numerous traps of party politics.   
In the light of the argument above, the passivity of Latvian foreign policy 
in the Abrene direction is fully explained. If no political gain can be extracted for the 
political actors, their interests to pursue any policy will be open to change. It does, 
however, also point to the narrow interests of bureaucratic party politics. In this case they 
appear in direct opposition to state interests and thus, paradoxically, lead to the loss of 
initiative and consequent weakening of the Latvian position in this dispute. 
b. A Constitutional Constraint 
The difficulties in solving the problem of the Abrene district according to 
the Constitution of Latvia have been discussed widely enough by Latvian experts of 
jurisprudence; therefore the repetition of judicial arguments seems not necessary in this 
paper.265 It is important, though, is to mention political implications of the Constitution 
and more specifically, whether the requirements of the Constitution, indeed, prevented 
implementation of active policy and what actually was the Latvian choice in this case.  
                                                 
265 See Dietrich Loeber, Krievijas un Latvijas Teritoriālais Strīds Abrenes Jautājumā (Russian-
Latvian Territorial Dispute Over Abrene), Jurista Vārds, Nr.18(373), 24.05.2005, Ineta Ziemele, 
Robežlīgums ar Krieviju. Vai likums traucē politikai? (The Border Treaty with Russia. Is the law impeding 
politics), Diena, May 31, 2005 
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The essence of the Constitutional constraint is that Article Three of the 
Constitution, stipulating the borders of the Republic of Latvia (including the border 
between Latvia and Russia), cannot be changed without referendum, according to Article 
Seventy-Seven of the Constitution.266 From this perspective any political action leading to 
the signing of the border treaty in the current form, without the consent of the populace, 
could be considered unconstitutional. Or to put it bluntly: before signing the border treaty 
with Russians, the Latvian side should be sure that it would not create any legal problem 
in regard to the legal status of state continuity. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks explained that his request to 
experts to analyze the draft treaty from a legal point of view was already expressed in 
December 2004.267 While experts were reviewing the case, foreign policy makers were 
basically trying to persuade the international community that Latvia sincerely wants to 
sign the treaty.268 By the time it became evident that signing the treaty in its existing form 
did not seem possible, exactly because of the Constitutional constraint, “the time for a 
maneuver was very limited.”269 It is, however, not entirely clear why the minister had 
mentioned time limitations as justification for the actions which followed. Even if some 
preliminary arrangements determined the preferable timeframe for signing the treaty, 
they were not political but in the nature of protocol. If so, there was no need to move on 
with premature decisions, because neither could they ensure any domestic nor 
international gains for Latvia, nor entirely solve the dispute. To put it otherwise, the 
signing of the treaty in Moscow on May 10, 2005 would put Russia in the better position, 
because Constitutional constraints would later prevent the treaty from being ratified in the 
Latvian parliament. The outcome of such actions would be an unpleasant scenario for 
Latvia: signing a treaty later proved unconstitutional by one of the signatories would 
create enormous damage national prestige and, what is even more important, would later 
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deny Latvian policy makers the possibility to link the signing of the treaty with the 
recognition of occupation due to loss of initiative in negotiations.270 At the same time, 
the Latvian government was ready to sign the border treaty unconditionally even on May 
19, 2005 claiming the hope that “Russia will act constructively and will sign the treaty … 
with Latvia, in which we do not see any obstacles.”271 Therefore, it is obvious that if the 
treaty had not been signed for almost eight years, time would not make the situation 
better or worse.  
To balance the ambiguity of the situation, the Latvian government adopted 
an explanatory annex to the border treaty. The very intention to add the special opinion of 
Latvia emphasizing the particular issues in the treaty is positive. Russian reluctance to 
make reference to the founding document of interstate relations did leave only two 
options for Latvia: a) not to sign a treaty; b) sign it with special annex. Latvia chose the 
second. The declaration stipulates: 
By signing the Border Agreement with the Russian Federation, Latvia, 
confirms its good will to promote good neighbourly relations with the 
Russian Federation and simultaneously expresses its satisfaction of the 
willingness of the Russian Federation to develop good neighbourly 
relations with Latvia. Latvia declares that by Article 1 of this Agreement it 
understands the de facto functioning line of demarcation dating from year 
1990/1991, which is documented and technically described in the Annex 
of the Agreement. The only objective and subject of this Agreement is to 
document the abovementioned line of demarcation in order to ensure and 
to facilitate its practical functioning in the interests of both countries and 
their residents as well as in the mutual interests of the European Union and 
the Russian Federation. Latvia does not link this Agreement with the 
broader issue of the elimination of the consequences of the illegal 
occupation of Latvia. Latvia declares that this Agreement is not related 
and does not diminish, does not deprive the state of Latvia and its citizens 
of the rights and legal claims provided by international law, including the 
Peace Treaty between Latvia and Russia of August 11, 1920, and by state 
law of the Republic of Latvia pursuant to international law.  Latvia 
stresses the fact that this Agreement is a result of the good will of both 
parties to the Agreement, provides reasons for optimism, and therefore it 
wishes to undertake efforts in order to solve the abovementioned issue in a 
                                                 
270 It is important to mention that the internal logic of negotiations determines that the side which 
loses the initiative will later hardly be able to dictate the rules of the dispute. In this case, Latvia later would 
be forced to sign the treaty in the same condition – i.e., disadvantageous for Latvia.   
271 The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, available online at www.leta.lv  news 
report from May 19, 2005. 
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way acceptable to both parties of the Agreement, and on the basis of these 
principles and in the interests of both countries to continue developing 
good neighbourly relations directed towards future and based on mutual 
respect and non-interference in the internal matters of the other state. 272 
From the spirit of the document we see that the Latvian government still 
maintains the policy formulated in 1995 – i.e., to continue the non-recognition of the 
incorporation of Abrene. By the provision of this annex the Latvian government is only 
willing to ensure the physical functioning of the border and not the solution of the Abrene 
problem. Latvia, therefore, can be expected to return to the problem of the border treaty 
whenever it deems necessary, even with no clear nation goal. Thus, for example, the 
concept of “elimination of the consequences of illegal occupation” is left for loose 
interpretation of politicians.273 In the short term, adopting the annex gave some positive 
results. By the Russian refusal to sign a treaty, the Latvian government actually avoided 
the possibility of constitutional crisis. Moreover, domestically this outcome temporarily 
satisfied nationalistic politicians, too. 
In the long term, though, the annex creates rather negative conditions for 
Latvia. First, Russia found itself in a convenient position to block any further proposals 
for negotiations concerning the border treaty, justifying it as “silly territorial claims” of 
Latvia.274 It means that Russia has created its precondition for renewal of border 
normalization negotiations, and from the Russian perspective any improvements make 
sense only if Latvia lifts the annex to the treaty. Second, as Prime Minister Aigars 
Kalvītis pointed out, a retreat from the declaration is not possible.275 Rightly so, because 
once Latvia gives up the declaration, the concept of “demarcation line” becomes 
                                                 
272 The text of the annex to the treaty (declaration) adopted by the government of Latvia on April 26, 
2005, available online at the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia at 
http://www.am.gov.lv/en/policy/bilateral-relations/statement/Declaration/ accessed on March 6, 2006. 
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274 The statement of the President of Russian Federation, available at the web page of news agency 
RIA-NOVOSTI at www.rianovosti.ru accessed on April 4, 2006. 
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practically invalid and non-recognition policy actually collapses. Third, the refusal to link 
the signing of the treaty with the elimination of the consequences of Latvian occupation 
is built on expectations that Russia would be ready to re-evaluate its inherited past. It is, 
however, an idealistic delusion. This link is the only remaining policy option actually 
pushing Russians towards the re-interpretation of Soviet policies during the Stalinist 
period. After the unconditional signing of the treaty nothing would impede Russia from 
“open[ing a] new page in interstate relations”276 – in other words, there would be no 
more discussions about the bilateral past -   and would give Russia freedom from at least 
moral accountability for crimes committed by the Communist regime in Latvia.  Such a 
connection between the recognition of occupation and the new border treaty must be a 
centerpiece of the border dispute rather than given secondary importance. 
Thus, instead of broadening the issue, the government of Latvia pursued 
an intentional reduction of Latvian demands, and through the annex to the border treaty, 
in fact detached the border treaty from its historic roots. Kalvītis therefore is not entirely 
sincere when he claims that “the declaration approved by the Government… does not 
present territorial claims against Russia. This issue is not on the agenda of Latvian – 
Russian relations. Latvia will respect the borders defined by the prepared and initiated 
treaty.”277 It is unlikely to “respect the borders” and at the same time to understand the 
border only as a “de facto functioning line of demarcation.”  
Therefore, even if the position of the president of Latvia is that the signing 
of the border treaty aligns with Latvian national interests278 in a well balanced way, this 
governmental action resulted in Latvia emerging from this process without any foreign or 
domestic political gains. Hence, we may conclude that the idea to sign the treaty with 
Russia in this situation was a wrong policy option. Moreover, the undeniable awareness 
of the Latvian political elite concerning constitutional constraint as early as April 2005 
                                                 
276 The draft political declaration between Russia and Latvia, and the Russian proposal. Both states 
never agreed on a final version of the declaration and it has not been signed. Available online at 
www.leta.lv news report February 16, 2005 accessed on March 31, 2006. 
277 See the statement by Aigars Kalvītis from April 29, 2005, available online at the web page of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia at http://www.am.gov.lv/en/policy/bilateral-
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available at www.leta.lv  accessed on April 4, 2005. 
97
actually gave enough time for politicians to decide whether any move forward with the 
signing of the treaty would be appropriate both judicially and politically. The government 
continued to assure the domestic and international communities about the readiness of 
Latvia to sign the treaty, even though such a position was not solid, and disregarded the 
ultimate supremacy of the Constitution over desired political action. 
C.  THE RUSSIAN POSITION: DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL; LEAVE 
HISTORY BEHIND 
The Russian position in regard to the border problem should not be understood as 
totally opposite to that of Latvia. It would be wrong to assume that Russia does not want 
to sign a border treaty or that the Russians do not recognize the provisions of 
international law.279 Quite the contrary; from the position of Russian officials we can 
conclude that they understand that the Latvian position, based on principles of 
international law, is legitimate and creates serious political consequences for Russia. The 
Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee of Russian Duma, Konstatin Kosachev, 
expressed clearly that Latvian policy based on recognition of the Riga Peace Treaty of 
1920 “is not simply a tribute to the past. If this treaty would be recognized, it would have 
enormous consequences. Of course, Russia cannot agree to that.”280    
The problem with this position is that persistently refusing reference to the Riga 
Peace Treaty while building contemporary bilateral relations with Latvia, Russia claims 
that the forceful incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union is of no consequence, and 
is pressing forward to a new era of bilateral relations in which it refuses to admit 
wrongdoings of the Stalinist regime towards the Baltic States. With these actions Russia 
creates an image of undermining the sovereignty and state continuity of Latvia. If the 
Russian interpretation of history could be less ideologized, the dispute of the borders 
most likely would not last so long. Recognizing the illegitimacy of border changes 
between Latvia and Russia in 1946 would facilitate the political process in a much more 
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cooperative way. Therefore, within this dispute Russia is to large extent responsible for 
creating a moral climate which does not promote constructive approaches based on 
reconciliation and justice.    
Russia claimed its own rights to Pytalovo in 1992,281 at the same time labeling 
Latvian claims as trying to undermine the principle of inviolability of borders.282 Later 
that year Russia changed the former internal border between Latvia and Russia to an 
international border between two states. During bilateral talks Russia made it clear that 
there would be no talks about border changes and absolutely refused to discuss the issues 
of occupation of Latvia and the legal consequences of this issue. Moreover, deputies of 
the Russian Duma recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs study the possibility 
denouncing the peace treaty with Latvia.283 
In May 2005, Russia again refused to sign the border treaty. This time the refusal 
was justified by Latvian unilateral demands expressed in the declaration of the Latvian 
government.284 Russia interpreted the Latvian position as an openly expressed territorial 
claim. Russia referred to the inviolability of borders, one of the most important 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This position was officially confirmed in 
spring 2005, when Russia refused to recognize the occupation of the Baltic States and 
linked this issue with the necessity to comply with the principles adopted in 1975.285  
In a legal sense, Russia refers to the principle of uti possidetis that determines the 
legitimacy of borders as of 1991.286 The Russian position disregards the provisions of 
international justice demonstrating that uti possidetis cannot be applied to the situation of 
Abrene. Latvia was not able to defend its interests during the adoption of the Helsinki 
Final Act, because it was occupied and forcefully denied its sovereignty. The 
international practice in the rulings of the ICJ assumes the rights of legal claim over 
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territorial holdings, and it is explicitly emphasized by Loeber: “frontiers established in 
violation of international law are not protected by status of inviolability.” 287 According to 
Loeber, such changes according to practice in international law can be made only by 
mutual agreement. Such action therefore could not be considered legal, and constitutes 
“an assault on a frontier in the sense this term is used in the Helsinki Act.”288 
The current Russian position seems creating a new layer of problems in interstate 
relations. From the statements of Russian officials we can conclude that the statehood of 
Latvia of 1918 ceased to exist after its incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940. 
Although this assumption has never been expressed explicitly in regard to the 
continuation of the statehood of Latvia, the Russian position on two similar cases – 
Lithuania and Estonia - suggests that Russia does not recognize the Baltic States’ 
continuity in regard to their existence after World War II. In an interview in the Estonian 
Postimees, the Chairman of Foreign relations Committee of Russian State Duma 
Konstantin Kosachev maintains the position that “Estonia lost its independence in 1940, 
and in 1991 Estonia emerged on the world map as a new country.”289 Loeber also recalls a 
similar position of Russia towards Lithuania.290  
The position of Russia appears even more confusing when examining the Decree 
of Recognition of Latvia, signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on August 24, 
1991.291 Yeltsin, when signing this Decree, did not mention any reservation as to whether 
this recognition was viewed differently from the legal position of Latvia. If so, Russia is 
obliged to recognize the independence of Latvia as a continuation of statehood of the 
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republic of 1918. Changes in this position many years after such a Decree had been 
signed can be explained only by political motives. Thus, declaring de jure recognition 
and then gradually retreating towards a weaker interpretation of sovereignty, indeed, 
creates legitimate concerns about Russian interpretation of international norms; 
ambiguous intentions of Russians only facilitate a more rigorous entrenchment of the 
Latvian position in regard to the border treaty and wider prospects for cooperation. 
The changing Russian position towards Latvian state continuity reveals its belief 
that the independent Latvia of 1918 ceased in 1940; and that the re-established Republic 
of Latvia at the beginning of the 1990’s (as well as other Baltic states) does not require 
recognition of the  restitutio in integrum principle. By these assumptions Russia refuses 
to make references to the Riga Peace Treaty in the new border agreement. Moreover, 
Russian officials recently admitted that disregard or denial of legitimacy of national 
political structures in Latvia during the Soviet time makes decisions concerning regaining 
state independence rather questionable, if the assumptions of illegitimacy used by Latvia 
in regard to the decisions made by its local puppet Soviet government would be applied 
to the Latvian authorities of the “Period of Awakening.”292 
The reluctance of Russia to face this problem is nevertheless understandable. 
Recognition of the provisions of the historic peace treaty means acceptance of the fact of 
occupation, and creates important judicial consequences that link together the obligations 
to transfer a part of de facto Russian territory, possible resettlement of a significant 
amount of people living there, and accepting the status of migrants in Latvia as colonists. 
The recognition of occupation in a broader sense opens the way for demands for 
restitutions for damages caused to the Latvian people and state. Clearly, these outcomes 
do not satisfy Russia, and its leadership actively seeks opportunities to avoid discussion 
concerning this matter. At the same time the explanation of the Russian refusal to 
recognize the authority of the ICJ in this issue is revealed: it is more than likely that 
placing the border dispute in the ICJ jurisdiction would result in the transfer of the 
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Pytalovskii region into the possession of Latvia. Such a scenario is seen only as a breach 
of Foreign Policy Concepts of Russia and thus non disputable in interstate negotiations.      
By adopting the unilateral declaration, ironically, Latvia provided Russia with 
space to maneuver, justified by the argument that further negotiations on the issue were 
possible only after Latvian readiness to drop the territorial claims. This is convenient 
domestically for Russian hardliner audiences and also it does not require any further 
action from the Russian side. Russia also gains from the domestic development in Latvia. 
However, as long as Latvians maintain internal discussion concerning the best solution, 
formal Latvian policy will stagnate, while Russian foreign policy can remain passive. 
Moreover, Russia also does not have any significant incentive to sign the treaty, because 
it does not make significant improvements for economic or political cooperation in the 
Baltic region or with the EU. The only gain would be an insignificant decrease of the 
level of stress in bilateral relations, and in addition does not per se guarantee 
improvements in other areas of bilateral disagreements. Moreover, Latvian policies 
towards the solution of the Abrene problem have lately been passive; thus signaling 
reluctance of Latvians to tie this question with broader cooperation issues in the EU and 
NATO. From this perspective Russian officials are not required to make hard choices or 
experience significant internal dispute, because signed or unsigned the border treaty does 
not change much for Russia. Overall the Russian position has been maintained strongly 
and has an internal consensus. Consequently, the border issue with Latvia is indeed low 
on priority list of Russian policy makers. 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Vice Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and member of the Social Democratic Party from Estonia stated that 
“Russia's unwillingness to acknowledge the occupation of the Baltics is more of a 
psychological alarm than anything else.”293 For him, there is no possibility to expect 
apologies about occupation from Putin and his administration, and therefore the Baltic 
States should concentrate more towards the really important issues such as a practical 
solution to the new border treaties.294 
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To sum up, Russian policy towards the Pytalovskii region almost certainly 
excludes any possibility of signing the new border treaty based on demanding recognition 
of the Latvian-Russian border prior to World War II. Russia does not consider the border 
changes unlawful actions and claims the inviolability of the borders according to the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act. At the same time Russian policy towards the 
continuity of the Baltic States creates much concern in Latvia; therefore continuing 
demands for reassurance of its sovereignty are not unlikely, as well as an increase for 
recognition of occupation as the main precondition for signing the new border treaty 
between two states. 
D.  IS A SOLUTION POSSIBLE? 
The case of the Latvian-Russian border is the story of failure of norms of 
international justice, in which none of the involved parties should be proud about the 
result. According to British expert of international law Gary J. Bass, “international justice 
must not only be done, but also be made to look useful and appealing” or referring to the 
political theorist Judith Shklar, politicians should commonly decide to choose “justice as 
a policy.”295 The Latvian-Russian border treaty is not that case. Its political development 
points to the limits of institutionalism as well as realism. In the case of complex territorial 
issues, solutions to problems should not be linked with prospects for cooperation. The 
Latvian-Russian border dispute follows the assumption that a domestic political 
environment has enormous influence on foreign policy making and constrains practical 
political actions, as well. 
The future of the Latvian-Russian territorial dispute is unsolvable without strong 
political commitment from both sides and readiness to build a compromise, as was 
already expressed by Loeber in 1995.296 The principles of international law applicable to 
this dispute will play a lesser role than political negotiations. At the same time, the 
solution of the border dispute between Latvia and Russia is not an issue of immediate 
urgency. It cannot be left unsolved indefinitely either, because it can impede cooperation 
prospects not only between Latvia and Russia, but also between the EU and Russia. 
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As of spring 2006, the Latvian parliament has adopted a law that will send the 
draft border treaty to the Constitutional Court of Latvia. The decision of the Court is 
expected to shed the light on possible political options that would not contradict Latvian 
legislation or, as it was put by one of the Latvian parliamentarians “to find a legal way, 
how to give away, what has been illegally seized.”297 Other than that action, Latvia and 
Russia currently do not have any significant incentives to work on the solution of the 
problem. The de facto demarcation line functions as a state border that is also recognized 
by the EU. No immediate political agenda is linked in any way to the solution of the 
problem. Furthermore, even if there are no such research available, no substantial 
economic and political gains would be achieved by Latvia if the annexed territory would 
ever be transferred. This explains the observable pessimism of Latvian political elites 
towards the transfer of territory, and reluctance to pursue active policies for reclaiming 
the Abrene district or to internationalize the possible resolution of the dispute.
298
 
Therefore another internationalization of a problem does not seem successful and if 
achieved at all, the settlement should be achieved by mechanisms of bilateral relations. 
Russia, claiming that the current Baltic States are new countries that emerged on 
the world map only in 1991, is responsible to a large extent for bringing the course of the 
Latvian–Russian border dispute  to a dead end. The Russian position, based on political 
assumptions that recognition of occupation of Latvia is impossible due to a whole 
complex of political consequences it could create,299 in practice facilitates unfriendly 
perceptions about Russian intentions towards Latvia. The border problem is important for 
such concepts as Latvian sovereignty and continuity of the state. Russian step towards 
understanding of Latvian motivation in this dispute would gain both politically and in 
terms of its prestige in the Baltic States. Russian misinterpretation of the nature of 
decisions of the Soviet government in regard to annexation of the Abrene district, 
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therefore, should be explained by the psychological dimension of Russian domestic 
politics. The end of WWII was the most glorious time in the history of Russia. If the 
ultimate glory were suddenly to be labeled as brutal and unlawful aggression against 
peaceful neighbors, this could become a part of their “geopolitical tragedy.” 300 
Most recently, however, foreign ministers of Latvia and Russia have been trying 
to dissipate such concerns, saying that the current situation with the treaty “does not 
hinder the development of cooperation in other areas.”301 Such a statement, however, 
seems mere diplomatic rhetoric and an attempt to decrease the highly negative 
background of bilateral relations. In reality the rhetoric in regard to the border treaty, 
even though signaling “fatigue from antagonism,” does not change the nature of bilateral 
relations and at this moment cooperation seems not producing productive outcomes. 
The political process between Latvia and Russia leads to more specific scenarios 
which should be considered as potential perspectives. Four possible scenarios seem 
applicable for the solution of the conflict. First: Russia recognizes the occupation of 
Latvia and decides to return the Abrene district to Latvia. If this scenario were 
implemented, it would emphasize the ultimate triumph of international law and the 
fundamental changes within the Russian dimensions of geopolitical thinking. 
Expectations of the development of the situation, however, absolutely disregard the 
political context of international law. Even if Latvia appeared to be defending its rights to 
illegally seized territory, other issues of bilateral relations would not be solved. By 
expressing readiness to engage in such political actions, Russia would clearly retreat from 
its political positions, namely, inviolability of borders and justification of actions of the 
previous government of the Soviet Union. The events developing in this scenario would 
create a significant backlash among the Russian political elites and within a significant 
portion of the society, challenging long-held sentiments of Russians. Moreover, the 
changes of the borders would threaten a chain reaction in other places of Europe. Such 
events most definitely would not be in the interests of Latvia. Therefore, this scenario is a 
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utopian option that seems analyzable only for the purposes of a theoretical approach. The 
expectations that Russia would accept legal claims that are based on the Riga Peace 
Treaty are overvalued. The current ethnic composition of the Abrene district makes 
transfer of territory as well as resettlement of people in contemporary Europe impossible. 
Second: Latvia waives its territorial claim and signs the new border treaty without 
reference to the Riga Peace Treaty and forceful subjugation to the Soviet Union in 1940. 
Basically, the border dispute could be solved by a Latvian retreat from its position in 
regard to the necessity of solving the Abrene problem according to international law. 
Such action by Latvia, though, appears politically dangerous and unacceptable 
domestically, and therefore seems inapplicable as a scenario for the solution of the 
dispute. The government of Russia would be satisfied by a Latvian waiver to claim rights 
to Abrene, but it would not necessarily mean the preconditions for a thaw in Latvian-
Russian relations, because other bilateral problems would not be solved. Therefore this 
scenario would also not promote cooperation between the two neighbors, and seems 
highly unlikely.      
Third is the principle of a political and legal package. Russia recognizes the fact 
of occupation of Latvia; in return Latvia drops the territorial claim to the Abrene district 
and claims for compensations for the occupation.302 This scenario seems the most 
realistic. It has, nevertheless, certain preconditions as well; it needs a consistent policy of 
government in Latvia and more cooperative policies in regard to the Baltic States in 
Russia. The problem also is that one side must take the initiative in re-energizing 
negotiations, when bilateral relations between both sides are still somewhat unfriendly 
and highly sensitive about issues of historical interpretations, like consequences of the 
occupation. If neither party is willing to take the first step, there is a possibility that the 
problem will be moot, similar to that between Russia and Japan. 
One more option always exists, and that is maintaining the current status quo for 
an uncertain period of time. Stability achieved by this stalemate will be of a negative, “no 
peace, no war” type, and will not facilitate any cooperation between Latvia and Russia. In 
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this case both states will limit their cooperation to the minimum possible, but the 
prospects of bilateral relations and mutual gains from it will remain unfulfilled. 
As to tactical considerations, the possibilities for solutions to the problem could 
be expected not in 2006, but rather in 2007 or early 2008. One reason for that is a new 
parliament and new president in Latvia. New parliamentary elections in 2007 will also be 
held in Russia, and President Putin’s term expires in 2008, as well.  Each of these factors 
can influence the process of bilateral relations. The new status of the interstate border 
must not, however, be achieved by any means possible. If this agreement cannot be 
achieved by natural consensus and in favor of both states, improvement of bilateral 
relations between Latvia and Russia will not happen in any case. And concerning this 
issue, purely political factors should not be sought. Symbolism and controversy of 
perceptions still makes up a significant part of these relations and overcoming these 
objectives will be much harder than simply putting two signatures on paper.  
The current region of Pytalovo does not hold much interest for Latvia; this 
opinion is shared among political leaders and the majority of Latvian people. It is the 
issue of the recognition of occupation that is important, not only on moral grounds, but 
because of the concept of state continuity, which is the basic principle Latvia used to 
regain its independence in 1991. The piece of land alone, even with its evidentiary 
symbolism, neither facilitates solution of the border problem, nor impedes the 




VI.  CONCLUSION: LATVIA AND RUSSIA: IS THERE A WAY 
OUT OF THE MAZE OF THE PAST AND MISPERCEPTION? 
This study has offered a skeptical view of the asymmetric relations between two 
neighboring countries which are bound by the burden of distrust and misperceptions. 
Very little would lead to optimistic conclusions about the nature and future of their 
bilateral relations between Latvia and Russia. The mutual political agenda has been heavily 
constrained by interpretations of events before and after World War II as well as results of the 
Soviet occupation, in general: the question of citizenship for migrants from the Soviet Union 
and compensation for damages caused by the Soviet occupation. These interpretations have 
been transformed into state policies which have denied bilateral relations unproductive 
outcomes. As President of Latvia pointed out, Latvia and Russia have “dialog of deaf.”303 
Russia clearly has to take chief responsibility for this outcome because, as we have 
seen, not only is Russian leadership flirting with its communist past, but, to some extent, 
justifying such crimes as aggression and unlawful annexation of other states’ territories. A 
view of these actions can be easily perceived by others that Russia does not differ much from 
the Soviet Union in terms of values and boundaries of “acceptable” and “unacceptable” 
behaviors in international affairs. Moreover, Latvia has indeed changed a lot from its initial 
vigorous positions on citizenship and status of minorities. These positive initiatives have been 
left without any answer from Russia. 
Latvia, on the other hand, constantly misses windows of opportunities to end the 
emotional race with Russia for the status of one of “the greatest victim of World War II.” Its 
domestic political agenda keeps producing discussions about the past that shift valuable focus 
from the achievements of societal and institutional transformation caused by Latvian 
integration into NATO and the EU. Even though the Communist and the Nazi regimes 
committed crimes in Latvian territory, leaving behind incomprehensible suffering; even if 
Latvians have experienced both refugee camps in the West and the GULAG prisons in 
Siberia; even though there are fewer Latvians in the world now than before the war; and even 
if fifty years of Soviet occupation made the prosperous country of Latvia a backward 
periphery of Europe, it is now time to close the “book of pain” and look into the future. At                                                  
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the end of the day, there are new generations of Latvians in this world who must know the 
painful history of the Latvian nation and the state, but do not have to be either hostages or 
bearers of past victims’ complexes or historic guilt” in general that has strong roots in some 
part of Latvia’s society and political elite. The new Latvians should focus instead on 
increasing their wealth and promoting stability and peace in Latvia, in the Baltic region, in 
Europe and also in the world. Without a more pragmatic view of historic events, there will be 
a substantial problem for forming a modern political Latvian nation. It is, however, important 
to understand that Russia also can facilitate Latvian reconciliation with its past by admitting 
the wrongdoings of the Soviet regime. This link between the Latvian domestic political 
agenda as a response to Russian “historical fundamentalism” should be studied more from 
the perspective of both societal behavior and the so-called “second image reversed” of 
international relations. From this research it is possible to conclude that a more 
comprehensive Russian approach to the 20th century history could evolve into a less hostile 
perception towards Latvia, and thus reassure Latvians about non-violent Russian intentions 
and set the stage for improvement of Latvian-Russian relations. 
Six main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of available data presented 
in this paper. First, the changes to international systems left little influence on Latvian-
Russian bilateral relations. The animosity between Latvia and Russia still persists 
between these states after the enlargement of NATO and the EU. The assumption that 
relations could be improved after the enlargement of NATO and the EU has proven 
wrong. Even if Latvia’s relative position in international affairs has been significantly 
improved by participation in the strong political, economic and military alliances, this 
improvement appears to be insufficient to solve practical problems of bilateral 
cooperation. 
Currently, Russia is much too busy with its plans for revival as an “energetic 
superpower,” and it assumes that serious efforts should be put only into the development 
of relations with other great powers and particularly with those in Europe, namely, 
Germany and France. The expectation that the latter two and Russia again will be able to 
comprise a new European regional powerhouse is one of the main driving forces of 
Russian foreign policy towards Europe, albeit not directly deriving from official security 
policy. Thus, in the Russian mind, the smaller states “in between” European great powers 
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will unavoidably experience an increase of economic and political influence over what 
the smaller states consider their internal affairs. Furthermore, problems with the 
formulation of coherent Latvian policy towards Russia at the EU level open more options 
for Russia in bilateral relations, which is exactly the desired Russian stand in European 
politics. 
None of the most important bilateral disputes between Latvia and Russia have 
been created or solved by changes in the international system. For example, the dispute 
over the border treaty has not been influenced by some specific situation in the 
international system, even though the piece of land both states disagree upon is part of the 
EU-Russia border. Neither power relations between states nor international institutions 
significantly influence on the current state of Latvian-Russian affairs. 
At the same time the future of Latvian-Russian relations can be more influenced 
by the situation in the international system and particularly by the ability of the EU create 
more coherent policy for cooperation with Russia. Especially concerning seems the 
development of the EU energy policy and position towards deteriorating democratic 
standards within Russia.   
Second, the overall evaluation of Latvian-Russian relations at the domestic level 
reveals that neither Latvia nor Russia has a feasible policy in regard to relations towards each 
other. No foreign or security policy document in Latvia or Russia sheds light on the vision of 
how mutual relations should look from the perspective of the next decade. Meetings of 
diplomats and politicians of both states currently consist of declarative phrases that when 
announced in public neither create any positive development nor are intended to do so. In this 
regard both states do not have practical incentives to find a solution of their discrepancies. 
Only at the end of May 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia published another 
draft of Foreign Policy guidelines. Even though this document presents more detailed Latvian 
view on the security processes in the world, in regard to Russia policymakers essentially have 
not expressed significant changes from the previous versions; the process still prevails over 
the commitment for result and desirable end state remains blurred.  
It seems impossible to separate the difficulties of economic cooperation and 
political issues. The Latvian attempt to separate the problem of the border treaty from 
economic cooperation should be considered a pragmatic and overall positive policy that 
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does not seem fully supported by the Russians, however. Their concern for the situation 
of Latvia’s Slavic population and “neomercantilism” in economics are linked, and as 
such will be maintained by the Russian leadership. If there is no common or close 
position of both states concerning the interpretation of historic Soviet aggression in the 
Baltic States, the issue of Slavic minorities cannot be solved, because the perception of 
“wrong” and “right” is viewed as the same in both cases. Furthermore, if economic 
cooperation is directly linked to the treatment of Slavic minorities in Latvia, no economic 
agreement will ever be implemented in a constructive and mutually beneficial way. In 
this light we can assume that the latest development of Russian energy policy as an 
instrument of coercion is aimed at changing Latvian policies in areas where it is most 
challenging to Russian foreign policy goals. Hence, the maintenance of Slavic minorities 
as victims of “Baltic apartheid”304 is an important weapon the in the Russian foreign 
policy arsenal. This attitude, however, has hardly anything to do with the real situation of 
the non-Latvian population in Latvia and, thus, there is only one explanation for such 
actions, namely, that Russian policies towards Latvia are oriented towards the 
preservation and increase of Russian influence in the Baltics. The reason for that, 
however, is not a realist vision of self-interest, but the Russian “traditionalist” value 
driven perception that Russia still owns the sphere of influence around its borders. The 
existence of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States offer a wonderful  opportunity to use 
them in creating political soap bubbles, even though the Russian compatriots in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus live in truly extreme and worrisome conditions and Russia does 
very little to help them. 
Third, paradoxically, even if there is no immediate necessity for solving the 
border problem from a national security perspective, the dispute over the Abrene district 
remains the centerpiece discrepancy of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations. By leaving the 
issue untouched for a long period of time, Latvia will inevitably lose the possibility to 
address it, as well as the issue of occupation, in general. In order to maintain the illegality 
of the Soviet actions in the 1940s, Latvia has to achieve a solution with Russia on the 
border treaty as part of a package including recognition of occupation and/or recognition 
of state continuity of the Republic of Latvia. Other solutions to the border treaty separate                                                  
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the issue of occupation from real policy tools; that would be a costly mistake and doom 
any Latvian demands in this regard and make the issue incomprehensible to 
contemporary European politics. Moreover, Latvia’s inability to use the authority and 
influence of EU leadership to favorably influence this historical debate has not left any 
feasible policy options other than linking occupation and the Abrene district. The solution 
of the constitutional constraint eventually will be part of the domestic political process in 
Latvia and should not be considered too important for the signing of the new border 
treaty. It will provide the Latvian political elite with another policy option, not 
necessarily with a clear action plan. 
It is also important that the Latvian-Russian dispute about the border treaty is by 
no means unique in the regional context. The Estonian-Russian border treaty has not been 
signed largely due to the same reasons. From this perspective, the development in one 
dispute will influence the development of another and vice versa. The Estonian political 
consensus among the political elite, however, differs from the situation in Latvia. The 
psychological advantage that this situation gives to Estonians is not significant, but still, 
in this case, the Russians are the ones who lost the initiative when president Putin 
withdrew from the treaty. In the Latvian case, the Russian position is conveniently based 
on the refusal of demand of the Latvian government’s for recognition of occupation. Such 
action, however, does not seem possible in Latvia, because it would jeopardize the whole 
policy on the border problem, and in 2006 would be domestically impossible.   
Fourth, the Russian commitment to great power politics makes Latvian reliance 
on alliance politics even more important. NATO and the EU are institutions which not 
only integrate Latvia in the European security system institutionally and psychologically, 
they guarantee a say in the European politics. At the same, the opportunity to express an 
opinion on the European political stage should not, however, be taken for granted. There 
is no guarantee that other Europeans will listen, and even if they do, there is no guarantee 
that they will act supportively. Therefore, even if it requires additional resources, Latvia 
should not only rely on the generally expressed support from its allies in transatlantic 
security structures, but seek supporters and regional cooperation mechanisms for 
persuading the partners about the importance of current issues on the Latvian political 
agenda with Russia. For example, the decision to seek European support for signing the 
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border treaty with Russia, recently expressed again by the government of Latvia,305 is 
right, but has been tactically dilatory and untimely. Yet the ambiguity of such a policy 
does not explain why this process again needs to be renewed before the domestic 
constitutional constraint has been removed and policy options are transparent. In another 
case, the highly volatile process (in terms of policy) of building the Nord-European gas 
pipeline requires active and common political positions of more than one EU state. Hence 
regional pressure on EU institutions and Germany seems the only way to make this 
project less concerning to the Baltic States and Poland.   
To sum up, Latvian political goals in the Eastern sector are highly ambiguous. 
Policy wise it is not clear, for example, on what terms Latvia will be ready to drop the 
non-recognition policy of the annexation of the Abrene district and what the real purpose 
of the demands for compensation for occupation is. Therefore, a more detailed Latvian 
position towards Russia and on the solution of mutual problems is important not only as 
guidelines for Latvian policy makers, but for Latvian allies in the EU and NATO, whose 
agenda and perceptions about Russia do not correspond to that of Latvia.     
Russian foreign policy performance does not deserve a positive assessment; the 
knowledge and understanding of Latvian motivation and preferences is flat and continues 
to produce a distorted image of Latvia. Russians should re-evaluate the inconsistency of 
their political messages in areas such as linking political and economic processes and 
tolerance of communist crimes. Some Russian scholars point out that “it is not clear, 
however, how long it will take the country to throw off the last waverings and suspicions 
concerning the West and what price it will have to pay for its final break with the 
past.”306 This undeniably requires courage from the Russian politicians to take a 
principally new stand on their past and admit that greatness of military victory is only one 
side of the story. The other side is naturally linked to the communist system, namely, that 
the backwardness, corruption, and overall poverty is nothing to be proud about, even if it  
was marketed as a time of unity between a regime leadership and the people. Unless this 
“fundamentalism” ceases to dominate Russian domestic policies, Russian foreign policy 
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will continue to project an aggressive image. Hence, the aspirations to great power 
leadership will remain aspirations, and cooperation in the international system will move 
towards a zero sum game – eventually, to instability and conflict. When Russian 
Ambassador to Latvia Kalyuzhni claims that an “infamous curse of evil has been lifted 
from Russia by the international society”307 Latvia must recognize that Russia does not 
look friendly either and therefore the key variables for the future of Latvian-Russian 
relations should be sought in Moscow, rather than in Riga. As one French foreign policy 
expert mentions, “Russia, with current repressions against civil society, the re-
nationalization of main economic sectors, inability to create any political approach to the 
resolution of conflict in Chechnya and with the cultivation of nostalgia for the Empire 
kills its only chance to take a significant position in the future.”308 
Fifth, contemporary Latvian-Russian relations are heavily constrained by mutual 
historical experience, which is an undeniably important variable that shapes values and 
interests in both states. It is, however, not the only factor in foreign policy formulation in 
Latvia and Russia. The traditions and practices of the political elite and personalities of 
political leaders by no means matter less. Both states are currently led by strong leaders 
with high authority within their respective societies. 
Even though Latvian-Russian relations are not good, they are not deadlocked, and 
both states still have opportunity to normalize relations by changing perceptions in order 
to create social and political demand for cooperation between them. However, until the 
Latvian and Russian societies relinquish traditional prejudices about the past, it will 
create “biases” among the elites. As mentioned in scholarly works, from the perspective 
of communication, “bias” is “an error in judgment that is consistent and predictable.”309  
From this perspective Latvian-Russian relations do not evidence any positive 
“surprises” produced in the near future. To put it another way, any positive change should 
be considered a welcome but unexpected development. Both states are merely trying to 
maneuver, using means of power at their disposal and persuasion to achieve their 
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respective goals. In bilateral relations of neighboring countries such a situation is a 
persistent source of friction and conflict. Whatever the political rhetoric would claim 
about the prospects of improvement of bilateral relations, by this point it remains only 
rhetoric, and prospects do not transform into policies. The optimistic view that Latvian 
and Russian bilateral relations have developed a positive tendency is not supported by the 
evidence. Such statements appear as desperate attempts of political leadership in both 
states to find at least some positive message suitable for domestic and international 
public. Neither the spring 2006 official visit of the Prime Minister of Latvia to Moscow, 
nor a single agreement on economic cooperation has been signed as of early June 2006, 
even though such expectations were cultivated extensively. For example, the argument 
that an inter-governmental commission has been established in 2005 as such does not 
point to any positive changes in relations between the two states.310 Similar commissions 
had been established a few times in post-Soviet history, their “shelf-life” depending on 
political developments in Russia. The most recent example of the Russian attitude 
towards inter-government commissions “in action” could be observed in bilateral 
relations with Latvian neighbor Lithuania. After the crash of a Russian Air force fighter 
in the Lithuania,  supposedly dissatisfied with the Lithuanian reaction to this event, the 
Russian delegation refused to participate in bilateral talks on cooperation in trade, 
economics, and scientific and culture matters.311 These issues by nature could not be 
linked, but the action of the Russian government revealed a broader path of policy against 
the Baltic States. In this context Latvians should not expect that the Russian leadership 
will formulate and implement their foreign policy out of barely explainable norms of 
morality. In situations where Russia really owns the potential for global coercion in the 
form of energy resources, such expectations would be, to speak the words of Charles 
Krauthammer, “to confuse foreign policy with philanthropy.”312 Meanwhile, the 
Russians should not expect that their “energy stick” gives them carte blanche over the 
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seemingly fragmented Latvian political environment. In the most important issues of 
domestic and foreign policy – the orientation towards transatlantic relations and alliance 
policies, strong support for the state continuity and interpretation of the past; and finally, 
suspicions against the majority of Russian diplomacy maneuvers – the Latvian political 
elite is almost unanimously united. 
Sixth, this study has revealed that there is not enough research on the process and 
roots of national security formulation in Latvia, the other Baltic States, and to a lesser 
extent in Russia. Particularly interesting and promising fields of research are opening in 
the areas of strategic culture that this research paper has attempted to sketch, and the link 
between values and national interests in post-NATO and post-EU enlargement societies 
in Central and Northern Europe.    
In reality, Latvia and Russia are and will be neighbors, with multiple links and 
dependencies, even though one is large and the other small. There is currently not much 
positive movement in mutual relations. Nevertheless, both states face the same global 
challenges that will welcome cooperation, and eventually the integration of Russia into 
European markets and security mechanisms will create windows of opportunity for 
making step(s) closer to each other. It is probably the only optimistic conclusion about 
the state of affairs of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations that we can make in the middle 
of the first decade of the 21st century. Tina Rosenberg is right when she says that “nations 
like individuals need to face up to and understand traumatic past events before they can 
put them aside and move on to normal life.”313 It is, however, not easy for individuals, 
and much harder for ethnic groups or nations and states. Hence, there is a long road that 
still lies ahead for Latvians and Russians to reach consensus about “rights” and “wrongs” 
in their history. Currently the impediment of history is a barrier against building new 
relations, and both states must learn to live with what they have and coexist peacefully. 
William Faulkner characterized these situations with amazing precision when he said, 
“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”314 
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